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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is inspired by the newly emergent phenomenon of participatory 
environmental management that has mushroomed in the post-authoritarian political 
climate in Taiwan. The phenomenon challenges the existing literature on the systems of 
government in East Asia, in which the state largely monopolises the policy process, even 
suggesting that the western experience of a shift from government to governance can be 
seen to be occurring, at least in the environmental sphere. To examine these issues, the 
thesis reviews three case studies of collaborative environmental governance in the 
Kaoping River basin seeking to assess whether they have resulted in a meaningful and 
sustained move towards local environmental democratisation. 
 
Both intensive and extensive methods have been used to collect empirical evidence. The 
former employed in-depth interviews with fifty-three key actors and the latter an 
extensive examination of reports in local newspapers. More than 2000 news-cuttings, 
dating from the 1960s to 2010, were examined. The three selected case studies were 
differentiated according to whom initiated a collaborative approach to environmental 
governance. Two were endogenous programmes (initiated by citizens) and one an 
exogenous project (initiated by government officials). The three studies reveal quite 
different political and managerial processes, levels and kinds of available resources, and 
sustainability over the long term. The key element in successful collaborative governance 
is provided by the spontaneous and continuous commitment of local citizens. But whilst 
the most disadvantaged groups of citizens are able to play active roles in preventing 
environmental degradation, the state-society partnership is rarely one of equal and mutual 
benefit, not least because of the reliance of environmental groups on government 
resources for the expansion and maintenance of their governance activities. More 
specifically, local political competition between factions can be fatal to collaborative 
activities, revealing the crucial importance of community consensus before launching 
such initiatives. 
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 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis assesses the effectiveness of collaborative governance in resolving 
environmental issues and improving stakeholders’ participation in contemporary 
Taiwan. It examines how disadvantaged groups and civil society more generally can 
initiate successfully (or otherwise) collaborative governance within an historic 
context of state hegemony and how this may influence the quality of governance in 
the interests of the environment. It is an attempt to assess the relevance of ideas 
developed in western democracies regarding collaborative governance in the quite 
different political economy and culture of Taiwan, a country that is often seen as 
‘typical’ of the East Asian ‘tiger’ economies. The thesis concludes that 
environmental collaborative governance is growing rapidly in Taiwan, initiated from 
both an endogenous and exogenous approach. It has rapidly changed the political 
landscape and the outcomes of environmental governance. However, without the 
spontaneity of civil actors, its continued success will be problematic. Also its 
capacity to transform state-society relations is constrained due to its reliance on 
government support, which makes it prone to be manipulated and disabled when it 
chooses to confront the state regarding controversial issues.  
 
This introduction is organised into six sections. The first introduces the context that 
frames the research, whilst the second builds on this description to offer a research 
rationale. The third part of the chapter sets out the research questions, and the fourth 
explicates the research arguments. The fifth introduces the research methods and 
finally the chapter concludes with a description of the thesis structure. 
 
1.1 Research context 
 
During the last three decades, various forms of collaborative governance have 
emerged as a means of reforming governmental processes in western democracies. 
This new form of governance brings multiple stakeholders together to find the 
resolution for public issues, in which social participants regain the ownership and 
greater acceptance of public policies. The key purpose has been to search for forms 
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of governance that are more reflexive, deliberative, participatory, hetero-archic and 
consensus-based. They are designed to facilitate the steering and enabling capacity 
of the state. It is widely recognised that the state in western democracies no longer 
‘controls’ but ‘steers’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Peters, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 
2000). The new forms of governance being proposed are not seen so much as a 
substitute for the state and market, but as complementary to them (Gray, 1989; 
Ansell and Gash, 2006). 
 
Collaborative governance has been applied to policy decision-making studies, 
governance theory, urban planning, the study of development, network theory and 
environmental management. It has been of particular interest in the environmental 
and developmental domains in the last two decades (Wondolleck et al., 1996; 
Coenen et al., 1998b; Bloomfield et al., 2001; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; 
Berkhout et al., 2003; Munton, 2003; Holden, 2011). Collaborative governance 
presumes an active and mutually beneficial engagement between the state and civil 
society. However, it should not simply be viewed in instrumental terms as providing, 
for example, environmental infrastructure and services, but also as a method to fulfil 
environmental values and political accountability. By allowing a greater level of 
public participation in environmental issues, collaboration becomes an important 
new form of local environmental governance and makes partnerships more relevant 
by leading to a better satisfaction regarding local environmental needs (Edge and 
McAllister, 2009).  
Whatever their success in the West, the transfer of these ideas and practices to 
societies and states where the historical political culture is less deliberative and 
inclusive, cannot simply be assumed to be beneficial. This is especially the case as 
much research in the West has tended to assume, rather than to demonstrate, that 
collaborative governance will lead to an improvement in the quality of 
policy-making (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Rauschmayer et al., 2009; Murray et al., 
2010; Holden, 2011). The better the co-ordination of the interests of civil society 
and government does not guarantee a more effective policy. Moreover, civil 
societies in countries with long democratic traditions, as in Western Europe and in 
the United States, where most empirical work on collaborative governance has been 
conducted, are comparatively well-developed economically and socially quite 
homogeneous in global terms. Outside the West, the implications of collaboration 
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are frequently different in the absence of processes of deliberative democracy. 
Given its authoritarian history, the search for a sincere process of collaborative 
governance in the East Asian context, in which state and society stand on an equal 
footing, may seem to be an unrealistic goal. In post WWII East Asia, authoritarian 
states have frequently ignored civil society and dominated the development of both 
economy and society, leading to a state-centred initiation of hierarchical governance. 
The non-state sector became largely absorbed into a corporatist order, in which 
social associations had to be legitimised and arranged by the ruling power, operating 
in coordination with the objectives of the state (Cumings, 1984; Evans, 1989; Wade, 
1990; Unger and Chan, 1995; Evans, 1997; Brødsgaard and Young, 2000). However, 
some of those East Asian countries that were authoritarian in nature are now 
experiencing a transition in governance because of moves towards various forms of 
democratisation. More specifically, democratisation liberates social pressures that 
seek a positive state response to bottom-up demands, including public participation 
in governance (Yamamoto, 1999; Yamamoto and Ashizawa, 2001; Warren and 
McCarthy, 2009; Kim, 2010), and these are especially evident in the 
‘environmental’ arena (Hsiao, 1995, 1999; Lee and So, 1999). The central question 
here is how genuine collaborative governance can emerge in particular localities 
where corporatist politics and an overwhelmingly dominant state remain influential 
legacies. 
This broad process of change in patterns of governance has some immediate 
resonance with my research into the activities of environmental groups in the 
Kaoping River basin, Taiwan, over the last 20 years. In particular, I have observed a 
process in which many environmental groups and grassroots organisations, which 
originally were involved in direct protest politics against the state, have moved 
towards launching collaborative actions with local governments. This shift in 
approach has not only led to some changes in environmental policies and practices 
but has, to some extent, led to a revitalisation of the environmental movement, a 
movement that was otherwise declining in its impact on local politics and local 
environmental protection. As this thesis will show, calls for state-society 
cooperation that look similar on the surface prove to be different in character and in 
their effects across geographical space. 
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1.2 Potential contribution  
 
The value of this research is three-fold. One is that by examining the effect of a 
series of endogenous initiatives in innovative environmental management in Taiwan, 
taken from the Kaoping River basin, this thesis enriches the literature on 
collaborative governance. This is done by investigating the application of 
collaborative governance theory and practice in a social, political and environmental 
domain (southern Taiwan) that has been previously unexamined. Existing literature 
on collaborative environmental governance largely draws upon experience in 
advanced western democratic societies. It mainly focuses on the factors that affect 
collaboration, the risks and opportunities of collaborative governance in enhancing 
outcomes and the various institutional designs of such governance forms. This 
thesis by contrast, contributes to this field by examining how a different mode of 
public participation has emerged in an ‘Eastern’ context and provides a comparative 
perspective on the ‘hidden’ contextual conditions of collaborative governance in the 
West. This research thus seeks to develop an analytical framework to explain the 
dynamics of collaborative environmental governance in new political contexts, 
whilst providing a wider understanding of the formulation, opportunity and risks of 
practising collaborative governance in diverse political and cultural backgrounds.  
 
The second reason the study is valuable is that it contributes to the literature on East 
Asian governance set in a political context of an authoritarian state apparatus that 
created the condition for the East Asian economic miracle. This literature (see, for 
example, Cumings, 1984; Skocpol, 1985; Evans, 1989; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995; 
Unger and Chan, 1995; Unger, 1996; Evans, 1997) assumes that a robust and 
dominant bureaucracy was of strategic importance to post-war economic growth 
that led to rapid national prosperity. Even with the emergence of democratisation, a 
‘soft’ authoritarian regime in Taiwan retained a corporatist order and repressed those 
social forces opposed to the external costs of industrialisation, including 
environmental degradation. This thesis also questions the traditional view of state 
dominance in the initiation of collaborative governance practices in contemporary 
East Asia (Cumings, 1984; Skocpol, 1985; Wade, 1990; Unger and Chan, 1995; 
Brødsgaard and Young, 2000). It argues that the dialectical relation of state-society 
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collaboration over the last two decades has, to a certain extent, altered the 
long-lasting antithetical relationship between state and society, at least in the 
environmental domain (see also Marsh, 2006). This is due to the fact that 
environmental issues have released considerable social energy in favour of pursuing 
endogenous governance innovation. The vitality and diversity of bottom-up 
demands for participation have revealed a more equal and closer state-society 
synergy than is evident elsewhere in East Asia (see, for example, Evans, 1997), a 
synergy that requires both a strong state and a strong society to cooperate in an 
equal and productive manner (Yamamoto and Ashizawa, 2001).  
 
Thirdly, in addition to contributing to the academic literature, this research also 
endeavours to contribute to our understanding of the development of environmental 
policy in Taiwan. The research results have some value for both policy makers and 
practitioners who have been attempting to break the gridlock between state and 
society, yet who remain sceptical of the possibility of genuine and effective 
collaboration over the longer term. 
 
1.3 Research aims 
 
The phenomenon of collaboration is central to the evolution of the state-society 
relationship in Taiwan in the post-war period corporatist order led by a strong state 
apparatus. This leads to a series of questions. It is crucial to address how 
collaborative governance can emerge from this particular power relationship and 
become institutionalised as part of environmental policy; and whether the adoption 
of collaborative governance as a political and management strategy can possibly 
transform this unequal state-society relationship, or does it just represent the 
existing power structure in another way? This is of interest to both academics and 
practitioners. 
 
It is within the environmental domain that ideas of collaborative governance are of 
special interest, not least because environmental issues are highly uncertain 
temporally and locality-based. The key concern is whether these circumstances can 
bring forward new opportunities for environmental activism, and whether these 
 14
opportunities can lead to more effective environmental management. Thus, I set up 
five major research questions within the context of Taiwan. First, what have been 
the reasons that have motivated the emergence of environmental collaborative 
governance? Second, have different approaches to initiating environmental 
collaborative governance led to different processes and results? Third, does the 
emergence of environmental collaborative governance promise a new pattern for its 
long-term development through its institutionalisation within the policy structure 
generally? Fourth, what are the levels of transformability and constraints of 
collaborative governance in the context of Taiwan? Fifth, does the current practice 
of collaborative governance in Taiwan result in a true transition of the state-society 
relationship or just a disguised form of corporatist strategy? 
 
More specifically, by examining state-society collaboration in the environmental 
restoration of the Kaoping River, the thesis explores how various forms of civic 
participation increase the effectiveness of river governance. It seeks to identify how 
socially and economically disadvantaged people mobilise to acquire the 
opportunities to participate in the policy process, the role the local state plays, and 
what principles should be incorporated into collaborative policy design in order to 
enhance the sustainability of public–private partnerships.   
 
 
1.4 Research arguments 
 
I would argue that there are three major weaknesses in the existing literature. First, 
most authors adopt a normative stance rather than an analytical approach. The 
former focusses on providing a set of static principles of collaborative governance 
to encourage governmental agencies to initiate actions with non-state actors. The 
latter explores how collaborative governance emerges, develops, diverges and 
reinforces itself. Second, the western literature tends to focus on a bureaucracy-led 
approach to collaborative governance and at the same time values it as a policy tool 
for government officials. Seemingly, that literature pays less attention to the 
potentiality of initiating collaborative governance from the bottom up. Third, the 
literature has neglected more recent East Asian patterns of governance and the need 
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for a different analytical framework to reflect their different underlying political 
mechanisms, economic circumstance and social structures. 
 
The thesis argues that democratisation in the 1990s in East Asia released the social 
energy to pursue ownership of, and participation in, the policy process (Yamamoto 
and Ashizawa, 2001; Marsh, 2006; Adams, 2010). Even where the state apparatus 
traditionally owned a monopoly over the policy process, it gradually faced 
bottom-up challenges based upon requests for public participation. However, while 
the rise of collaborative governance may be said to change the state-society 
relationship from one of authoritarian rule to one of corporatism and then possibly 
to a more equal partnership, the means and forms of collaborative governance to 
emerge remain embedded in their context and shaped by it. 
 
In addition to examining normative principles of collaborative governance, the 
research concerns the reasons for, and timing of, its emergence and the factors 
affecting its long-term development as a way of governing. This places particular 
emphasis on its transformability and embeddedness in the political arena. The 
research argues that there are four factors that shape the emergence of collaborative 
governance, namely motivation to collaborate, the nature of the specific 
environmental issue, geographical specificity, and ‘attention-focussing’ events (see 
Figures 5.2, 6.2, 7.2). In addition it is argued that leadership is integral to 
meaningful collaborative governance. The leadership may come from government 
officials or from civil society. It plays a role in interpreting environmental problems 
and conditions, making initiatives and mobilising available resources. 
 
In the Taiwanese context, collaborative governance may be initiated endogenously 
by members of local civil society or exogenously by government officials. It is 
argued that the process differs considerably depending on who initiates the process. 
Each approach faces different barriers with no guarantee of success. An endogenous 
approach is built on social consensus, available resources and spatial heterogeneity 
leading to place-based solutions, able to tackle the environmental problems the 
community faces more effectively than the government alone. An exogenous 
approach builds upon existing administrative arrangements and routines that lack 
the social spontaneity and flexibility to tackle troublesome environmental issues. 
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These two approaches, to some extent, determine both the processes and results. 
However, in the end, successful collaboration relies on the capabilities and 
resources of the civil organisations involved, what they can input into the process of 
collaboration, and the sincerity and flexibility of government agencies in adapting to 
a particular collaborative process. 
 
For collaborative governance to succeed, both parties have to treat the experiment as 
a learning process. The development of collaborative governance is non-linear. Both 
the mechanisms of institutionalising collaboration and a successful outcome 
produce a feedback function to reinforce the participants’ commitment to 
collaborative governance. Equally, the processes of institutionalisation can also limit 
the innovative aspects of participation, especially when the state fails to continue to 
respect demands from local civil society.  
 
1.5 Research methods 
 
I develop these arguments through three case studies. They consist of three recent 
environmental movements and civil actions situated in a river catchment in southern 
Taiwan. In order to understand the emergence of various forms of collaborative 
governance in the environmental arena over the last 15 years, this thesis adopts a 
multi-method approach of qualitative research, utilising both intensive and 
extensive materials, along with a multi-site approach to the case studies. This choice 
of research methods is underpinned by a critical realist perspective that seeks to 
explore the underlying mechanisms, causality and basic conditions of a social 
phenomenon. Three major methods were used to collect data. First, 53 in-depth 
interviews were conducted with key governmental officials, core members in 
relevant communities, environmental organisations and stakeholders. This was so as 
to explore the respondents’ perceptions of the emergence and development of 
collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin. Secondly, data was also 
gathered from observations in 33 relevant activities to clarify some contradictions 
between the perceptions of the interviewees and the researcher. This observational 
method also helped the researcher to identify key actors in the new forms of river 
governance within the basin. Finally, one secondary source of data was employed, 
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derived from an analysis of related press-cuttings (6080 pieces) in one major 
national news-archive in Taiwan, to acquire an overall picture of the evolution of the 
river governance.  
 
1.6 Brief thesis outline 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The first part of Chapter Two situates the 
research in the theoretical context of collaborative governance. In the second part, it 
examines the literature of East Asian governance. In the third part, it develops a 
potential model for analysing collaborative governance in Taiwan. Chapter Three 
discusses the epistemology of the research, its methodological implications and 
introduces the case studies, the data collection process and analytical methods. In 
this chapter, I also discuss my positionality in this research: as an academic, as a 
local and as an activist. Chapter Four explains the general background to the case 
studies, which is Taiwan’s political and economic context since the 1960s. Chapters 
Five to Seven are devoted to the empirical analysis of the three case studies. Chapter 
Eight explores the results of the empirical analysis, relates them to the theoretical 
the argument and the model in Chapter Two, and discusses the contribution of the 
research findings to the previous literature on collaborative governance. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
In order to situate this review within a wider conceptual context, and establish the 
limits of existing knowledge about collaborative governance outside western 
contexts, this chapter reviews three strands of literature. The first examines current 
western notions of collaborative governance and the circumstances that have 
encouraged their emergence. The second part enquires into why collaborative 
governance is particularly relevant to environmental issues, and the third the current 
discourse of collaboration in an East Asian context. Finally, based on this review, 
this research develops an analytical framework relevant to Taiwan in order to apply 
it to the conduct of empirical studies in Taiwan.  
 
2.2  Western Notions of Collaborative Governance 
 
2.2.1 The Emergence of Collaborative Governance 
 
Collaborative governance, a political strategy 1  often interchangeable with 
participatory governance, has aroused academia’s and politicians’ interest across 
many disciplines and countries over the last two decades (see Gray, 1989). Interest 
is to be found in the planning literature (Gray, 1989; Tewdwr-Jones and 
Allmendinger, 1998; Hibbard and Lurie, 2000; Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 
2002), the development literature (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Hickey and Mohan, 
2004), research into natural resource management (Goodwin, 1998a, b; Goodwin, 
1999; Wondolleck and Ryan, 1999), and political science and political philosophy 
literature (Dryzek, 1997; Sanderson, 1999; O'Neill, 2000). The current literature is 
mainly preoccupied with the initiatives in collaborative governance led by public 
agencies (Ansell, 2003; Ansell and Gash, 2006), which are designed to increase the 
                                                 
1 Strategy refers to, usually, temporary methods for mobilising resources and networks to achieve 
specific goals, Sometimes it is characterised as those methods that cannot be legislated or 
institutionalised, but can be part of policies written or unwritten. 
 19
legitimacy of policy-making and enhance state capacity (Jessop, 2002). In general 
terms, they aim to bring multiple stakeholders together, into the process of policy 
decision-making and implementation, to reach a greater degree of consensus and to 
improve the quality of the policy outcomes over established policy-making 
practices. 
The prevalence of such a novel approach to governance is a response to both market 
and government failure (Rucht, 2005) or, more specifically, to the accountability 
failure of the so-called ‘Public Management’, which focused heavily on the actions 
of the state (Ansell and Gash, 2006). Governance, as opposed to government, 
usually refers to processes that engage multiple institutions that include, but are not 
exclusive to, both parts of government and civil society to describe a wide range of 
organisations that act in partnership in order to develop and deliver public policies 
and services, thereby enlarging (and changing) the domain of government. 
Governance suggests that more than just public agencies are involved in the 
formulation and implementation of policy. It is indicative of a ‘declining 
relationship between jurisdiction and public management’. This means that 
governance is no longer about who takes the office and whose jurisdiction it belongs 
to, but who is included in the policy negotiation and implementation (Frederickson 
and Johnston, 1999: 702). Indeed, in western countries today, it is quite difficult to 
find situations where environmental decision-making, for example, occurs without 
public consultation or some other form of public involvement in the process (Rucht, 
2005; Haveri et al., 2009). However, whether the nature of that involvement is 
‘satisfactory’ is another matter altogether (Munton, 2003). In addition, this emergent 
managerial phenomenon leads to an increasing number of relationships between 
public and non-public organisations - an increasingly complex mix of public and 
private activities (Campbell and Peters, 1988; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). 
 
Although not without criticism (McCloskey, 1996a, b) 2 , such transition from 
government to governance has prevailed in much of Western Europe and the U.S. 
over the last two decades. But what is governance and how is it different from 
‘government’? For early researchers, the terms are sometimes used interchangeably 
                                                 
2 McCloskey, a former chairman of Sierra Club, expressed his doubts that Clinton Administration’s 
policy of forest management, which intended to integrate local communities and stakeholders, might 
exclude environmentalists’ chances to voice. 
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(for example Wilson, 1976), but more recently ‘governance’ has been used quite 
deliberately to distinguish it from government. Although governance is generally 
taken to include the institutions of government and civil organisations, it is 
essentially about processes rather than institutional structures (Leach and 
Percy-Smith, 2001). In Table 2.1 below, Leach and Percy-Smith identify the basic 
differences between old government and new governance.  
 
Table 2.1: From Government to Governance: The Shifting Focus 
Old government New governance 
The state The state and civil society 
The public sector Public, private and voluntary (or ‘third’) sectors  
Institutions  Processes  
Organisational structures Policies, outputs, outcomes 
‘Rowing’, providing  ‘Steering’, enabling 
Commanding, controlling, directing  Leading, facilitating, collaborating, bargaining 
Hierarchy and authority Networks and partnerships 
Source: Leach and Percy-Smith (2001:5) 
 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 24) proclaim that ‘Governance is the process by which 
we collectively solve our problems and meet our society’s needs. Government is the 
instrument we use.’ The decision making process is perceived as inclusive rather 
than confined to office holders. Whilst government is widely seen as ‘them’, 
governance includes ‘us’. Government implies politicians and public officials 
governing, doing things, delivering services, with the rest of ‘us’ as passive 
recipients. Governance blurs the distinction between those governing and those 
governed and the divide between the public and the private (Tendler, 1995; Rhodes, 
1999; Kooiman, 2003). We are all part of the process of governance.  
 
In addition, the term ‘collaborative’ has now frequently been used in association 
with governance. The notion of ‘collaborative’ was derived from Gray (1989), 
Freeman (1997), Agranoff and McGuire (2003), Ansell and Gash (2008), Kallis et 
al., (2009) and Kim (2010). Freeman stressed its meaning of co-labour to achieve a 
common goal, often working across boundaries and in multisector and multiactor 
relationships. Collaboration is based on the value of reciprocity. Gray (1989) 
referred to this notion as a process of joint decision-making among key stakeholders 
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of a problem domain as regards the future of that domain. Innes and Booher (2010) 
emphasised the notion of ‘collaborative rationality’, an idea developed from 
Habermas’s (1981) communicative theory, in which all the affected interests jointly 
engage in face-to-face dialogue to deliberate on the problems they face together. In 
the process, participants must be well-informed and are mutually respectful to each 
others’ perspective whether they are powerful or not. The legitimacy, 
comprehensibility, sincerity, and accuracy of what is said by participants must be 
ensured. Seeking consensus is core to the process. This requires a transition in 
governing methods from a narrow technical and procedural focus towards a 
communicative and collaborative model for achieving common purposes in the 
shared spaces of our fragmented societies (Healey, 1997). 
 
In many ways, the role of government is socially constructed. Politicians, 
government agents and citizens cast government in particular and differing ways to 
communities. Within this broad process, the role of government itself is changing. 
Modern government increasingly involves ‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’, to adopt 
the terminology of Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 25-48). Or, to use a concept which 
has become familiar in the British context, it is about ‘enabling’ rather than 
‘providing’ (Clarke and Stewart, 1988; Brooke, 1989). Government should not 
attempt to do everything itself, to meet every need through direct government 
provision. It should facilitate and co-ordinate rather than direct and control (Leach 
and Percy-Smith, 2001). Today, the central perception is one of government not as a 
‘provider’ but as an ‘enabler’ of a vibrant society. In that regard, collaborative 
governance may well enhance the role and authority of government rather than 
challenge it (Cavaye, 2004).  
Rather than adopting Rhodes’ (1999) assumption of a ‘hollowing out’ of the state, 
implying the dominance of the market3 and civil society, Kooiman (2002) retains 
                                                 
3 The market has been considered a strong force driving the rise of democratisation and new forms 
of governance in parallel with civil society (Kooiman, 2003). It is especially true when market 
activities catalyse the emergence of the middle class (Hsiao, 1999), which was seen as the major 
population class behind many political reforms. But the political influence of the market mostly 
focusses on the liberation of economic activities and deregulation rather than directly striving for 
political freedom and social equity. In addition, the state often promotes economic benefits, 
especially in developing countries, in pursuing both national wealth and proliferation of political 
power. In the case of East Asia, the market activities have accompanied a rapid growth in industry 
and have been seen as being managed or governed by a developmental state (Wade, 1990). This 
relationship of state and market has reflected many aspects of the allocation of natural resources, as 
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the importance of the state. He suggests that the essence of governance lies in the 
interactive arrangements in which public and private actors participate, often at the 
initiation of the state. In doing so, actors attend to the institutions within which these 
governing activities take place. More practically, Schmitter (2002) suggests that 
governance is a method or mechanism for dealing with a broad range of problems 
and conflicts. In governance, actors regularly arrive at a set of mutually satisfactory 
and binding decisions by negotiating with each other and then cooperating in the 
implementation of the decisions. His definition treats governance as a fact, rather 
than a normative principle (Smismans, 2008; Klinke, 2009). Decision-making takes 
place both because of societal interaction as well as debate within governmental 
institutions. In short, governance refers neither to a specific mix of institutions, nor 
to a positive or negative judgement of political arrangements, in ethical terms. 
Neither is it to be seen as a better or worse mechanism than traditional hierarchy to 
achieve specific societal targets (Gbikpi and Grote, 2002). 
 
The participation of civil society is directed to the core activities of governing, 
rather than acting passively and indirectly through the electoral process, as in 
traditional conceptions of liberal democracy. Ackerman (2004), for example, uses 
the term ‘co-governance’ to describe such cooperation between state and society, 
aiming to tap into the energy of society and improve the accountability of the state. 
This leads Jessop (2002) to suggest that the growing importance of governance 
should be seen as part of an on-going social transformation. Governance is to be 
viewed as a third type of societal coordination, beside the anarchy of the market and 
the hierarchy of the state, characterised by reflexive self-organisation of negotiated 
consent to resolve complex problems. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
well as of river governance in Taiwan. In discussion, new forms of governance, market, state and 
civil society are given equal attention. However, in this thesis, market is less of a focus as it aims 
principally to explore how the role of civil society and the state deal with dilemmas that emerge in 
collaborative governance. 
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2.2.1.1  Basic Approaches to Collaborative Governance: Exogenous and 
Endogenous 
 
There are two contrasting, but not mutually exclusive, views on how to involve 
non-state actors in the public realm: top-down and bottom-up. The former can also 
be seen as part of a state-centred tradition (Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Pierre and 
Peters, 2000; Akkerman et al., 2004; Adger and Jordan, 2009) in which the state 
plays a leading role, making priorities and defining objectives (Pierre and Peters, 
2000: 12). It conceives of non-state actors as objects of state attention to be 
consulted or manipulated by state agencies. This approach leads to modest 
adjustments of institutional arrangements, in order to tolerate the voices of non-state 
actors, and through this means to legitimise state dominance and remedy its 
democratic deficit (Piewitt, 2010). Public agencies and officials openly and 
inclusively engage with various stakeholders in a process of dialogue and mutual 
adjustment regarding problems of common concern. But stakeholders are generally 
seen as having different, even antithetical, interests. However, the idea remains that 
through dialogue, stakeholders may identify unanticipated opportunities for positive 
cooperation, or at least ways to mitigate the costs of adversarial relations (Ansell, 
2003). The focus on encouraging the relevant actors to articulate their interests and 
to deliberate about their common purpose is seen as ‘part of the solution’, not ‘part 
of the problem’, for achieving sustainable public policies (Gbikpi and Grote, 2002). 
 
The latter, bottom-up, approach can be called a society-centred approach (Mohan 
and Stokke, 2000; Dobson and Bell, 2006; Adger and Jordan, 2009; Dobson, 2009). 
It sees non-state actors as purposive agents involved in governance in their own 
right. It emphasises bottom-up and spontaneous challenges to current orthodoxy and 
allows a local initiation of developmental programmes. These challenges can then 
be assessed in terms of their strength, consensus, preferences within society and the 
specific geographic features of the locality.  
 
However, in order to avoid ambiguity in the definitions of the approaches to 
collaborative governance, this research decided to use the terms ‘endogenous’ and 
‘exogenous’ to replace the usage of bottom-up and top-down. An endogenous 
approach of collaborative governance means it is initiated and developed within a 
 24
local civil society. In contrast, exogenous is derived externally to it. The advantage 
of adjusting the terminology is its wider implication to more than the initiation of 
collaborative governance, but also to its institutional design and informal rules as 
well. 
 
Table 2.2 below recognises that there is a wide a spectrum of public participation. 
The first five methods from the base upwards, namely casting a vote, passive 
participation, participation by consultation, functional participation and interactive 
participation, are top-down forms of engagement designed, if not manipulated, by 
the state apparatus. The public is seen as a passive, invited participant. Only the last 
method, self-mobilisation, represents genuine community spontaneity in which the 
‘public’, or ‘part of the public’, owns the initiative.  
 
Table 2.2: Spectrum of government interaction with communities and forms of 
participation 
Behaviour of governance Type of 
participation 
Agency Democracy 
pattern 
Facilitation of 
community-led 
development 
Self-mobilisation  Community 
action 
Participative 
democracy 
Community partnership Interactive 
participation 
  
Structured community 
involvement 
Functional 
participation 
  
Consultation Participation by 
consultation 
  
Informing of decisions Passive 
participation 
  
Intuitive representation Casting a vote Government 
action 
Representative 
democracy 
Source: Cavaye (2004: 87), adapted from Cavaye (1999), Pretty (1995), Arnstein (1969) 
 
 
Also in Table 2.2 above, we see that Cavaye has integrated typologies developed 
elsewhere, including those of Cavaye (1999), Pretty (1995) and Arnstein (1969), to 
indicate a range of relations between the state and elements of civil society. From 
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this spectrum, it is suggested that spontaneous grassroots activity will possess more 
autonomy than where the state takes the lead, though whether activity initiated by 
civil society is more likely to succeed remains a question to be researched. ‘Casting 
a vote’ forms the most basic form of citizen participation and in some countries is 
treated as a compulsory obligation. Voting is regarded as representing individual 
interest rather than a collective interest or community consensus, if there is any. 
Citizens participate passively in a one-way relationship with government that 
informs citizens of decisions and disseminates information. Citizens have little 
chance of expressing their opinions, or even rejecting a policy that has been made.  
 
Consultation involves a two-way communication between government and citizens. 
However, the consulted often possess no veto and only act so as to provide 
information to help decision-making. This type of participation is often linked to a 
specific issue or proposal, the outcome of which has been pre-determined by a 
government agency. Better than being a passive voter, ‘structured’ community 
involvement entails advisory committees or representative panels that mediate 
citizens’ input. People may join with government on specific projects, or in other 
types of formal involvement, and sometimes may be motivated to do so by personal 
material gain or even incentives funded by the government. Participation, up to this 
level, is still viewed as a tokenistic strategy (Arnstein, 1969; MacLeavy, 2009) of 
the government to ease public dissatisfaction to policies. 
 
Interactive participation shares both leadership and common goals. People 
participate equally and fully in a joint learning process, but often on a 
pre-determined state terrain. Finally, self-mobilisation and citizen initiation manifest 
the most spontaneous type of participation. Citizens can suggest orientation and 
control outcomes, resources and actions. In this case, even if a government takes the 
necessary actions, those actions have been initiated by the organised citizens and not 
selected by that government agency. 
 
Collaboration clearly has the potential, under the right circumstances, to bring 
citizens and their interests to the attention of government (Wondolleck et al., 1996). 
However, civil participants must make a strategic decision on whether to participate, 
how to participate, how to remain in effective communication with their constituents 
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and whether or not to be involved in ensuring that any agreement is implemented 
(Pearce, 1997a). Thus while full participation brings the community into the inner 
workings of government, the benefits cannot be blindly received - the difficulties 
must also be confronted. It is a challenge that then begets new challenges. 
According to Table 2.2, authentic collaborative governance should reach the level of 
self-mobilisation or, at least, interactive participation. However, the position of civil 
actors in the process of participation is often teetering according to political 
circumstances that are in constant change. In order to stay on the top of the 
participation ladder (Arnstein, 1969), Wondolleck and his colleagues (1996) 
emphasise that it is crucial that citizens have some of the requisite skills, such as 
political savvy, negotiation and communication skills, and the energy and resources 
to devote to the process of successful participation.  
 
2.2.1.2  Civil Actors in Collaborative Governance  
 
Civil society has emerged as a critical arena for contemporary social change and 
social theory. The nature and extent of public involvement in the public realm is an 
important indicator of the condition of late modernity (McIlwaine, 1998). More 
generally, the concept of civil society seeks to give space to social elements that lie 
beyond the scope and control of the state on the one hand, and the market on the 
other. There are civic social organisations that operate at national and international 
scales (such as major charities), but civil society is usually associated with local, 
grassroots organisations (Chin, 2009). These spring up either to improve the local 
well-being of citizens or to represent them against the unwelcome consequences of 
state or market actions. In this sense, a spatial scale difference is often constructed 
between civil society and the state (Marston, 1995; Kelly, 1997), but it is equally 
possible to find situations where civil society and the state both operate at the local 
scale (Adams, 2010). 
 
In modern western societies, the state intrudes across numerous areas of welfare in a 
broad programme of decision-making that is not always effectively integrated. Civil 
society actions are often also specific to particular policy concerns, for example 
environmental pollution, reflecting differences in their social and spatial concerns. 
This leads some authors to view civil society as ‘a space which reflects the social 
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divisions of society as a whole’ (Pearce, 1997a: 72), a ‘space for multiple groups to 
compete for access to decision-makers’ (Brinkerhoff and Kulibaba, 1996: 13), or ‘a 
potential location of power outside the state’ (Von Doepp, 1996: 27). Civil society is 
thus a form of self-organisation (Hall, 1998) among members of a society. The 
levels of self-organisation can vary significantly from informal collective actions, 
voluntarily entered into by small groups of individuals with potential interests in 
common, to formal organisations with large numbers of members and requiring 
sophisticated management, as is the case with major environmental NGOs. This 
spirit of civil society derives from notions of trust, cooperation and individualism, 
which form the basis of a ‘negative resisting power’ and finally lead to a spirit of 
tolerance of difference and diversity. In a democratic political context, Hall (1998) 
sees these organisations as providing the basis for negotiation and cooperation with 
the state whilst still enabling individualism, i.e. individuals who are free to belong 
(or not) to such organisations. Thus it is that some writers define civil society as 
comprising of various types of organised groups (Blair, 1997; Pearce, 1997b), with a 
tendency to view NGOs as the primary ‘vehicles’ or ‘agents’ of civil society (Clark, 
1997: 44-45). Especially in developing countries, civil society is treated as ‘an agent 
of change to cure a range of social and economic ills left by failure in government 
or the market place, i.e. it often acts as an institution for development (Escobar, 
1994; Ndegwa, 1996; Van Rooy, 2002: 489; Potter et al., 2008). Citizenship, as the 
major component of civil society, is seen as a tool for changing societal attitudes 
and behaviours (Dobson, 2009).  
 
However, others give greater recognition to individualism and informal activity as 
constitutive parts of civil society, making the concept of civil society difficult to 
define. They accept the heterogeneity of groups and the individuals that constitute 
them and the fact that many groups in civil society are often in conflict or in 
competition with each other (Bryant and Wilson, 1998); and this in turn contributes 
to two contrasting approaches to our understanding of the concept of civil society. 
 
Two contrasting views operate in parallel with each other in the discourse of civil 
society. In very broad terms, neo-liberal conceptions of civil society, deriving from 
the writings of de Tocqueville, consider civil society an autonomous sphere of 
freedom and liberty (see also Putnam et al., 1993). Strengthening vibrant civic 
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associations can therefore consolidate democratisation, and civil institutions can be 
vehicles for participation that empowers4 target groups in development programmes 
(Mohan and Stokke, 2000). But this liberal approach, which tends to separate state 
from society, has aroused criticism from Marxists who emphasise the intricate 
relationship between state and society, not least because it is often highly 
context-determined (McIlwaine, 1998). Drawing on the works of Marx, Hegel and 
Gramsci, Marxists see civil society sometimes to be a site of oppression and power 
inequalities, penetrated by a state determined to reinforce class conflict (Nzimande 
and Sikhosana, 1995; Foley, 1996; MacDonald, 1997: 19-21; McIlwaine, 1998; 
Edwards and Gaventa, 2001:1; Potter et al., 2008). Marx ists focus upon the 
potential conflicts between the institutions of civil society, seeing the state as 
deliberatively fostering these to maintain the status quo. To them, empowerment is a 
matter of the collective mobilisation of marginalised groups against the 
disempowering activities both of the state and the market, as well as powerful, 
established elites within civil society (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). The cleavages 
surrounding the politics internal to civil society are, they suggest, understated in 
much of the literature. 
 
To lessen the danger of imposing a western notion of civil society on the South, 
where the search for consensus through democratic processes has a much shorter 
history, McIlwaine (1998) urges a re-conceptualisation of the concept of civil 
society. This argument emphasises that civil society must emerge from below, and 
not from a civil elite. But how will this occur? Some argue that civil society can be 
encouraged by the efforts of outside support and internally by the promotion of 
social capital (Abers, 1998; Leach, 2006). Social capital is a concept closely linked 
to civil society because of its implication in voluntary association and civic 
organisation outside the market and state (Putnam, 1995; Alessandrini, 2002). 
Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1995) and others discuss social capital in terms of 
participation in networks, reciprocity, trust, social norms, the commons and 
spontaneous social organisations. According to Putnam’s notion of social capital, 
                                                 
4 By the term empower, I mean to enable or facilitate disadvantaged people to voice and take actions 
to pursue their own benefits, which coincide with public goods, especially in those situations where 
dominant power-holders have repressed the weak for centuries. This can be achieved both by 
legal/formal and informal/unconventional means. The discussion of empowerment has always 
accompanied the discussion of collaborative governance (Gray, 1989).  
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social capital generates robust trust and network relations, which facilitate 
cooperation and mutual support in collaborative governance. Researchers constantly 
ask ‘how important is social capital to the production of civil society?’ (Onyx and 
Bullen, 2000; Lyons, 2001) and while both may reinforce each other, their 
contribution to democratic involvement should not be treated as a panacea (Fine, 
2001; Harriss, 2001). This is because of its potentially negative consequences in 
enhancing the exclusion of outsiders and restrictions on individual freedoms (Portes, 
1998). 
 
2.2.1.3  The State Actor in Collaborative Governance 
 
The rhetoric and experiment of participatory governance represent part of an 
ongoing evolution in the role of the state. Kenny (1994), for example, has 
conceptualised several evolving models of government. An integrated model of the 
evolving role of the state, based on the conceptualisation framework of Kenny 
(1994), Botsman and Latham (2001) and Cavaye (2004), is as follows (see Figure 
2.1 below).  
 
Figure 2.1: A General progression in government forms 
Age Model of the state Central concern 
Independent state Representativeness 
Instrumental state Policy production 
1960s -70s
Interlocking state Policy integration 
1980s Contractual state Economic rationale
2000s~ Enabling state Public participation 
Source: Adapted from Kenny (1994), Botsman and Latham (2001), Cavaye (2004).  
 
The current focus on participation is contributing to the notion of an ‘enabling state’ 
(Botsman and Latham, 2001). Government is attempting to build a facilitation and 
partnership role with communities that better ‘enables’ social capacity (Sirianni, 
2009), adding value to community outcomes. This view of the state emphasises the 
participation of civil society, but does not suggest discarding the state. The state 
retains a central role in producing a framework within which non-state actors can 
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engage in governance (Bryant and Wilson, 1998; Akkerman et al., 2004). More 
specifically, participatory governance enriches a hierarchical form of governance, 
rather than replaces it. However, the state remains critical, especially in terms of its 
regulatory capacity (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002). 
 
In contrast to the argument of a ‘hollowing out of the state’, in the Third World even 
the state is often criticised for delivering little of value and conducting ‘business as 
usual’ in its relations with ordinary citizens, and it is impractical and unrealistic to 
dismantle the functions of the state (Evans, 1995). The state lies at the heart of 
solutions to the problem of social and economic order. The appropriate question is 
not ‘how much’ state involvement but ‘what kind’, and more particularly what role 
the state plays in the process of collaboration between itself, the market and civil 
society (Koontz, 2004). The most successful collaborative governance requires 
agency officials to blend three roles- leader, partner and stakeholder, rather than act 
as an impartial facilitator (Wondolleck and Ryan, 1999). 
 
2.2.2  Conducting Collaborative Governance 
 
The opportunities and risks of collaborative governance are directly related to the 
prospects of success and failure of the new forms of governance. Although Getimis 
and Kafkalas (2002) remain concerned about the improbability of success, we 
should think of the possible benefits that stem from the better mobilisation of 
underused or isolated individuals and institutional resources (Ansell and Gash, 
2006).  
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Table 2.3: The Risks and Opportunities of Collaborative Governance 
Risks Opportunities 
Non-transparency Legitimacy 
Compartmentalisation Effectiveness 
Instrumentalisation Knowledge 
Loss of direction Consensus 
Power imbalance enhancement Innovation 
Non-authentic forum  Accountability 
Rent seeking  Flexibility 
Apathy  Participation  
Exhaustion and disillusion  Equity  
Source: based upon Getimis and Kafkalas (2002), Cavaye (2004), Freeman (1997), 
Gray (1989), Adgar et al., (2003), Fung and Wright (2001), Adgar et al., (2003), 
Innes and Booher (2010), Irvin and Stansbury (2004) 
 
 
2.2.2.1  Benefits and Opportunities of Collaborative Governance 
 
Given the growing crisis of a democratic deficit at all levels of political 
representation, it is crucial to widen the forms of representation (Paddison et al., 
2008; Klinke, 2009). New forms of governance have been proposed, based on 
dialogue and bargaining, with a broader legitimacy and involvement of new types of 
actors through new forms of interest intermediation (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002). 
Instead of authorising outsiders to make the decision, local stakeholders and 
relevant parties can retain ownership of the solution (Bryan, 2004). Thus parties 
most familiar with the problem, and not their agents, can create the solutions (Gray, 
1989).  
 
Broadening participation can add an independent democratic value (Freeman, 1997; 
Fung and Wright, 2001; Adams, 2010), and therefore enhance the acceptance of 
solutions and a willingness to implement them (Gray, 1989; Fung and Wright, 2001). 
These conditions will facilitate effective problem-solving, especially on regulation 
issues (Nie, 2008), which require information sharing and deliberation among 
parties (Freeman, 1997; Fung and Wright, 2001). In addition, such governance 
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arrangements provide for empowerment and access to stakeholders, and hence may 
lead to effective policy outcomes. The new cooperative partnerships may go beyond 
legal rights, supporting cooperation and widening forms of participation (Fung and 
Wright, 2001; Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002). 
 
Collaboration emphasises continuous learning (Muro and Jeffrey, 2008; Painter and 
Memon, 2008) and improvement as well as an on-going engagement (Freeman, 
1997). Different actors test their knowledge, arguments and power and learn from 
each other (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002). Broad, comprehensive and reflexive 
analyses of the problem domain improve the quality of solutions, not least because 
responsive capability is more diversified (Gray, 1989; Fung and Wright, 2001). As 
the process proceeds participants build a capacity for self-management within 
communities, improve policy knowledge and create innovative strategies tailor-made 
to the unique conditions of each particular situation (Innes and Booher, 2010).   
 
Collaborative governance emerges as a means of early conflict resolution to avoid a 
later conflict resolution by the courts (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002; Baccaro and 
Papadakis, 2009). Moreover, under some circumstances, collaboration is also useful 
for re-opening deadlocked negotiations, so reducing the risk of an impasse and 
improving the relations between stakeholders. The process ensures that each 
stakeholder’s interests are considered in reaching any agreement (Gray, 1989; 
Bloomfield et al., 2001). Thus it may provide a means for parties to reach a 
provisional solution (Freeman, 1997) which all agree could be subject to revision. 
 
Collaborative governance can trigger organisational restructuring and enhance the 
potential for innovative solutions. This role becomes even more important whenever 
it is coupled with broader societal objectives, such as the pursuit of sustainability 
(Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002). During the process of reconstructing public 
institutions for collaboration, the mechanisms for coordinating future actions and 
arbitrating disputes among the stakeholders could be established as well (Gray, 
1989). Parties are mutually dependent but accountable to each other. New 
arrangements may replace or supplement traditional oversight mechanisms, 
including self-monitoring and disclosure, community oversight, and third party 
certification (Freeman, 1997). Participation is both a-means-to-an-end and 
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an-end-in-itself. This implies that participation has both instrumental and 
transformative values (Munton, 2003; Gardner, 2005). Collaboration usually serves 
to deliver effective outcomes for a disadvantaged population who cannot voice its 
position in traditional hierarchical governments.  
 
2.2.2.2  Risks of Collaborative Governance 
 
Given the multiple benefits of collaborative governance, it is not without complexity, 
contradiction, limitation or dark sides (Haveri et al., 2009; Huitema et al., 2009; 
Kallis et al., 2009; Mwangi, 2009). In some cases, collaborative governance can 
cause diffusion, and probably a dilution, of responsibilities. This dilution of 
responsibility makes the partnerships increasingly non-accountable to participating 
parties (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002; Acar et al., 2008; Paddison et al., 2008). In 
addition, policy partnerships with unequal power relations can lead to the uneven 
distribution of costs and benefits of a given policy. The new collaborative 
governance arrangements are sometimes developed without a set of understood and 
agreed rules as to how they are to work, but then implemented in different sectors 
and at different territorial scales, where they maybe interpreted selectively by 
dominant players (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002; Antunes et al., 2009; Kroon et al., 
2009). 
 
Collaborative governance can be seen as a means to solve a policy crisis. As a result, 
it can lead to an over-emphasis on problem solving and policy outcomes, 
encouraging a technocratic, rationalistic perspective with reduced participation 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004) while at the same 
time undermining political legitimacy and social justice (Getimis and Kafkalas, 
2002; Cavaye, 2004). Increasing participation does not always fulfil its expected 
goals due to a lack of intention or commitment by the agency who initiated it 
(Gardner, 2005; Kim, 2010). This effect allows the new governance structure to 
become an instrument of shifting responsibilities at best, and a loss of orientation at 
worst (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002). The efforts that state actors put into providing 
infrastructure and services should be equivalent to the investments in relationships 
and leadership (Cavaye, 2004). 
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Empowering civil groups or building community capacity often undervalues the 
existing informal capacity of societies to interact and can politically reinforce 
paternalistic approaches to societies. Capacity building of civil organisations needs 
to be reframed into capacity appreciation or extension, or to helping citizens build 
their organisational capacity (Cavaye, 2004). This can possibly avoid a facade of 
‘trust’ and a rhetoric of ‘collaboration’ being employed to promote vested interests 
or reproduce existing power structure (Clegg and Hardy, 1996: 679; Aguera-Cabo, 
2006; Baiocchi et al., 2008; Agger and Larsen, 2009; Baccaro and Papadakis, 2009; 
MacLeavy, 2009; Larson and Lach, 2010). In the participatory process, those 
situated outside the collaborative bodies may not recognise the authority of insiders 
and resist their decisions (Fung and Wright, 2001). In addition, the forum of 
collaborative governance needs to retain its recognition as an exclusive place for 
policy making, otherwise it might lead to a reluctance to accept the collaborative 
outcomes (Ansell and Gash, 2006). 
 
Though most collaborative processes aim to enhance the public good, it is also 
possible that the processes may be manipulated to advance private or factional 
interests (Nikolic and Koontz, 2008). Some institutions deliberatively incorporate 
check mechanisms to prevent the new form of governance being absorbed into the 
old clientelist system. However, the extent to which the mechanism can effectively 
check this tendency is usually problematic (Fung and Wright, 2001; Irvin and 
Stansbury, 2004; Ansell and Gash, 2006; Agger and Larsen, 2009). Most citizens are 
overwhelmingly consumed by daily life and are too busy to give the time, energy, 
and commitment that collaborative efforts require and this can also lead to the 
temptation for some to free ride on the efforts of others (Fung and Wright, 2001). 
Usually collaborative action begins with mass enthusiasm and good will. However, 
over time those feelings may reduce because participants find the process to be 
increasingly time-consuming, or the results not sufficiently rewarding (Fung and 
Wright, 2001; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004; Holman, 2008). It is a fact that 
unmitigated success remains rare and the search for a definite, best practice of 
collaborative governance may end in disappointment (Rauschmayer et al., 2009; 
Murray et al., 2010; Holden, 2011). 
 
To conclude, collaborative governance, as a general concept, has no agreed form 
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and is highly context-determined. Having gone through market failure and state 
failure in the history of modern states, there is the potential for governance failure 
(Jessop, 1998). This is because it is possible that governance fails to respond to the 
diversity and complexity of contemporary societies (Jessop, 1998; Bovens et al., 
2001). Similarly, initiating collaborative governance under disadvantageous 
circumstances might lead to increased governance impotence as Ansell and Gash 
(2008) have suggested. This leads us to discuss some of the major factors that lie 
behind successful collaborative governance in the next section. 
 
2.2.2.3 Ansell and Gash’s Model of Collaborative Governance 
 
Ansell and Gash (2008) conduct a meta-analytical study of the existing literature on 
collaborative governance and aim to establish a new model of collaborative 
governance (see Figure 2.2). Based on a review of 137 empirical cases 5  of 
collaborative governance across a range of policy domains, they identify a set of 
critical factors in the model, which will influence/produce successful collaboration. 
The critical factors that could possibly influence successful collaboration include (1) 
prior history of conflict or cooperation, (2) power and resource imbalance, (3) 
collaborative process, (4) leadership, and (5) institutional design. Crucial elements 
in the process of collaboration are also emphasised, which include face-to-face 
dialogue, trust building, and the development of commitment and shared 
understanding. They suggest that practitioners focus on producing ‘small wins’ that 
can create a virtuous cycle of collaboration which deepens trust, commitment, and 
shared understanding. A more surprising finding in their research is that, even under 
conditions of bitter social conflict, collaborative governance can still lead 
stakeholders to identify mutual gains 6 . Face-to-face dialogue is especially 
emphasised as being at the core of breaking down stereotypes and other barriers to 
communication. 
 
                                                 
5 Ansell and Gash focussed on cases largely taken from the U.S. Later in Ansell’s book, published in 
2011, he defined collaborative governance as a pragmatist approach for achieving problem-solving 
democracy. Collaborative governance is thus regarded as a concrete strategy for fostering 
deliberation and learning about our mutual interdependency.  
6 For example, here he uses the case of Desert Tortoise protection in Las Vegas in 1989 (Ansell, 
2011). 
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I have taken Ansell and Gash’s model as a departure point developing its heuristic 
purpose as a conceptual framework in order to help in the analysis of Taiwan’s 
attempts at environmental collaborative governance. Collaborative governance is a 
dynamic and complicated process and, as a result, is presented in various forms in 
different parts of the world. Nonetheless, their process-oriented model provides a 
clear conceptual framework and has helped me to distinguish relevant factors and 
elements in the empirical chapters. 
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Figure 2.2: Ansell and Gash’s model of collaborative governance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Ansell and Gash, 2008:8) 
 
At the outset of their model, Ansell and Gash argue that significant power/resource 
imbalances between stakeholders reduce the incentives of stakeholders to join 
collaborative actions. Powerful stakeholders often try to manipulate collaborative 
forums and reduce the possibility of meaningful participation for disadvantaged 
stakeholders. Similarly, unproductive and unpleasant previous experiences of 
interaction between the parties often has the same result. Both conditions can be 
responsible for reducing the incentives for stakeholders to participate.  
 
In addition, they argue that any collaborative forum should be designed as a formal 
institution which is entitled to act as an exclusive venue for authoritative 
decision-making. It should aim to produce ‘authentic dialogue’ as Lovan, Murray 
and Shaffer (2004) put it, which gains legitimacy and political authorisation and 
produces sincere communication and constructive conclusions that take into account 
the perspectives of both sides. Otherwise, it will have little chance of attracting 
stakeholders to participate or to achieve consent with its outcomes. To create a 
forum, with the agreement of all parties to participate in it, the initiator must, in 
advance, acquire the respect of alternative forums (courts, legislators, executives) 
for the process.  
 
However, Ansell and Gash emphasise that the above mentioned obstacles can be 
overcome if there is proper leadership (also see Hou and Chen, 2009), whom they 
refer to as commonly accepted outside mediators. Where conflict is high and trust is 
low, but the power distribution is relatively equal, stakeholders have an incentive to 
participate and can successfully proceed by relying on the services of an honest 
broker that they trust. In adverse circumstances, like those of an asymmetric power 
distribution or weak incentives to participate, there is still the possibility for 
successful collaborative governance if there is a strong ‘organic’ leader who 
commands the respect and trust of the various stakeholders at the outset of the 
process. 
 
The model shows that a series of elements are identified as influential during the 
process of collaboration, including face-to-face dialogues, trust-building, and the 
development of commitment and shared understanding. Moreover, whether the 
process can produce ‘small wins’, as an intermediate reciprocal outcome, is crucial 
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because they deepen trust, commitment and shared understanding. They also bring 
about positive incremental changes, which can, in time, overcome many limitations 
(Abers and Keck, 2006). If these cannot be anticipated then stakeholders probably 
should not embark on a collaborative path (Ansell and Gash, 2006; Holman, 2008). 
Ansell and Gash also argue that even if the prior history is highly antagonistic, it is 
sometimes feasible to embark upon collaboration if the policymakers or 
stakeholders budget sufficient time for effective engagement and are fully devoted 
to trust-building and a strong commitment to cooperate. In addition, a strategy, that 
provides ‘small wins’ for each participant, is crucial to maintain the process of 
collaboration.  
 
To conclude, even under circumstances of low trust and limited mutual dependence 
between participants, they remain optimistic that collaboration is possible under 
three conditions. These are (a) the forum is an exclusive place for consensus 
building, (b) an experienced and accepted facilitator is provided and (c) the process 
continues to provide ‘small wins’. 
 
Although Ansell and Gash’s meta-analysis and model contribute significantly to 
governance study, there remain a number of problems regarding its adoption as the 
basis for analysis of environmental cases in Taiwan. First of all, they stress that they 
define collaborative governance as operating in formal forums, which are usually 
initiated by public government agencies and pursue institutionalised settings. This 
definition distinguishes itself from the traditional focus on the more informal 
interaction between government agencies and interest groups. It also clarifies its 
differences from ideas relating to corporatism, policy networks and public-private 
partnerships7. Hence, the process of institutionalising collaborative governance 
becomes a crucial element in the model and it neglects the possibility of endogenous 
initiatives from civil groups (Singh, 2008), which I am more interested in examining 
in the context of an East Asian model of collaborative governance. 
 
Secondly, the emphasis on the institutionalisation of collaborative governance is 
                                                 
7 Ansell and Gash include these three types of collaboration as some of the methods of conducting 
collaborative governance, but doubts as to their relevance remain in this thesis as they often imply 
different kinds of state-society relations in policy domains.  
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problematic as it downplays the possibility of innovation in governance and the role 
of civil partners. Since this research aims to explore how civil actors can practise 
real and effective participation beyond tokenism, it demands a definition 
governance in a broader social sense while examining the process and results of 
institutionalisation. Thirdly, while Ansell and Gash mention that their model is 
largely based on environmental experience, they fail to discuss how environmental 
collaborative governance is different from other domains. Fourthly, the model is 
primarily developed on experience described in the English literature, which is 
mostly produced in the U.S., and lacks empirical support from experience recorded 
in other languages.                      
                                                    
Finally, in Ansell and Gash’s model, an imbalance in power is an obstacle to 
collaborative governance, but in Asia such an imbalance of power between the state 
and social actors is common. How empowerment, as Ansell and Gash suggested, 
solves some of the dilemmas for implementing collaborative governance should be 
carefully examined within an East Asian context. Similar attention is emphasized in 
Roberts and Jones’s research (2009), which enquires whether it is possible to use 
partnership to empower local communities while the state remains in overall 
control. 
 
Despite these weaknesses, my adoption of Ansell and Gash’s model serves as a 
departure point for the purpose of establishing an original model for analysing 
Taiwan’s experience of collaborative governance. I constantly adjust the model in 
the following sections as the literature review proceeds. Throughout the rest of this 
chapter, the model is adjusted at the end of each review section according to the 
conclusion of the section, until it becomes a more appropriate model for analysing 
collaborative environmental governance in Taiwan (as shown in Figure 2.3).  
 41
 2.2.3  Practising Collaborative Governance over Environmental Issues 
 
Although collaborative processes have been adopted across many policy sectors and 
disciplines, they are found most frequently related to problems in the environmental 
domain because of two of its key features (Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 1996; 
Wondolleck and Ryan, 1999; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; van den Hove, 2000; 
Berkhout et al., 2003; Munton, 2003; Gardner, 2005; Holden, 2011). First, 
environmental issues are characterised as ‘ill-defined, tightly coupled with other 
sectors and questions, and reliant upon elusive and transitory political agreement for 
their resolution’ (Coenen et al., 1998a: 2), and thus are often termed ‘wicked’ (Rittel 
and Webber, 1973; Carley, 1990; Clarke and Stewart, 1997; Darbas, 2008) or 
‘multifaceted’. They usually affect society as a whole and have no absolute solution. 
Hierarchical governments often fail to respond effectively to these sorts of issue due 
to their inflexibility and ineffectiveness. This is because environmental problems do 
not normally lead to simple solutions and do not fit easily into traditional 
governmental structures (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Environmental issues thus 
require a high level of consensus, engagement and commitment from interested 
social actors. More inclusive deliberation and collaborative action allows different 
sources of knowledge to be integrated. 
 
The second feature of environmental issues is their geographic-specificity. 
Geographic-specificity means that an environmental issue appears differently in 
different localities and requires responsive actions that recognise spatial 
heterogeneity. Broader relations between localities, local politics, social relations 
and the physical environment need to be taken into account. Local social actors are 
seen as more capable in their response to geographic-specificity. 
 
Reviews of environmental management policy contain abundant criticism of the 
state’s capacity to reconcile environmental exploitation and conservation (Sachs, 
1993; Redclift, 1994; Johnston, 1996; Bryant and Wilson, 1998). Environmental 
governance implies governing spaces that comprise different power relations and 
interests, and therefore needs to recognise an inherent spatial heterogeneity. A 
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bureaucratic style of policy process is often found to be unsympathetic to the 
heterogeneous needs and interests of ‘grassroots’ actors (Bryant and Wilson, 1998). 
Most officials are physically distant from the localities in which environmental 
policies are implemented. Their understanding of the results of their policy-making 
often lacks local knowledge and may cohere with the notion of ‘remoteness’, as 
Plumwood (1998) put it, with decisions being made by distant political elites. Such 
elites often create governing systems which reinforce their ‘remote’ preferences 
(Hurrell, 1994). This is especially true in environmental issues because their 
geographic specificity is often related to more local stakeholders and plural interests 
than other policy domains. 
Comprehension of the environment by state and non-state actors potentially 
diverges. The former often adhere to techno-centric attitudes deriving from western 
positivist science, which results in a problem-solving approach that tends to separate 
the social and economic context from human-environmental relations (Redclift, 
1994; Burgess, 2000). The understanding of non-state actors may possess 
‘non-scientific’ attributes, and therefore be under-valued despite the fact that they 
have a detailed knowledge of local ecological conditions. There is often a perceived 
gap between established scientific and local knowledge (Burgess, 2000; Painter and 
Memon, 2008; Kroon et al., 2009). Although such a disjuncture between the 
attitudes of state and non-state actors may be too simplistic, it is clear that state 
officials may approach environmental problems differently from local non-state 
actors, a picture complicated by the heterogeneity of local actors and their interests 
(Bryant and Wilson, 1998).  
 
Researchers and practitioners have searched for inclusive, deliberative and 
integrative forms of environmental governance in order to combat these differences 
in outlook, and the emergence of sustainable development as the dominant narrative 
of environmental policy also helps to account for the increasingly frequent use of 
participatory processes. Its requirement that environmental concerns are integrated 
with economic and social issues emphasises the value of an inclusive participatory 
process, while at the same time the contested nature of sustainability demands a 
deliberative process (Owen and Cowell, 2002). Similarly, the Agenda 21 
programme has encouraged many countries to attempt integrative solutions, which 
require both community participation in policy-making and implementation while 
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solving social, economic and environmental issues at the same time (Macnaghten 
and Jacobs, 1997; Burgess et al., 1998; Coenen et al., 1998a).  
 
The participation of non-state actors is central to environmental governance because 
it helps to achieve sustainability and innovative policies on several grounds (Heinelt, 
2002). Environmental issues being geographically specific, complex and uncertain 
suggest that they need to include a wide range of heterogeneous stakeholders 
distributed in various locations without the likelihood of absolute solutions. Thus it 
is highly desirable that those affected by environmental policy participate in the 
process of policy-making, not only because traditional democratic theory refers to it 
as a natural right, but also to provide a chance for mutual persuasion for the 
common good. In addition, the participation of a wider range of stakeholders 
extends the scope of relevant knowledge (Lindblom, 1959), improves the social 
acceptability and legitimacy of innovative environmental policies, and in general 
increases support for the implementation of policy decisions. In short, sustainable 
policies are based on the core values of dialogue, negotiation, active citizenship, 
partnership and subsidiarity (Heinelt, 2002).  
 
Empirically, however, this relation between collaboration and environmental 
management leads to contrasting positions among researchers. Some praise the 
efforts of collaborative governance as providing a pragmatic and efficient vehicle 
for resource managers and stakeholders to address common concerns and promote 
environment, economy and community all at the same time (Kenney, 1999; Weber, 
1999; Leach, 2006) 8 . Others argue that civil participation can be costly and 
ineffective. For example, where there is public reluctance to participate, geographic 
difficulties in organising face-to-face meetings, and competing factions among 
stakeholders (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004), the effective application of collaboration 
can prove difficult (Margerum and Whitall, 2004). Indeed, it would be inadvisable 
to assess the value of participation whilst neglecting the underlying power structure 
(Adger and Jordan, 2009). Moreover, governance structures for sustainable 
development must enable individual and social learning processes (Petschow et al., 
2005). 
                                                 
8 Kenney and Leach’s works both based on 1990s watershed management reform and Weber based 
on grassroots ecosystem management in the U.S.  
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 While the theory of collaborative governance was developed from a series of 
problem-solving measures based on deliberative and cooperative actions, Elinor 
Ostrom has established a strand of literature on environmental governance, 
responding to Hardin's argument of 'the tragedy of commons', which seemed to 
describe irrational collective behaviours that exhausted natural resources. Focussing 
on governing 'common-pool resources' (CPR), Ostrom and her colleagues have 
demonstrated that social capital and informal institutions, for example norms, trust, 
network and reciprocity, can lead to sustainable environmental management. Her 
theory was developed from investigations of traditional agricultural and fishing 
societies, which have practised for centuries as self-organised governance systems. 
These societies have developed a variety of institutional arrangements for managing 
CRP which have avoided ecosystem collapse even when they are under pressure. 
She concludes that human use of cosystems does not necessarily lead to 'the tragedy 
of the common', but, with certain commonly accepted rules and norms, it is possible 
to maintain long-term sustainable resource yields (Basurto and Ostrom, 2009). 
However, due to the multifaceted nature of human - ecosystem interaction today, no 
singular institutional form can be treated as a panacea (Ostrom, 2007)9.  
 
Ostrom’s theory of co-management employing robust conditions of social capital 
and a dense network of links between actors is one important form of collaborative 
governance and explains why many collaborative actions, as recorded, in the 
empirical cases in this study, can be possible. It is very important to emphasise the 
significance of the broad political context within which detailed local studies are 
based. This is especially so in Taiwan where major national transitions in the nature 
                                                 
9 Thus, a combination of conditions for institutional design should be paid attention to. Ostrom 
identifies eight ‘design principles’ for stable local common-pool resource management systems 
(Ostrom, 1990, see also Poteete et al., 2010 for additional variables): 
1) Clearly defined boundaries (effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties); 
2) Rules regarding the appropriation and provision of common resources that are adapted to local 
conditions; 
3) Collective-choice arrangements that allow most resource appropriators to participate in the 
decision-making process; 
4) Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the appropriators; 
5) A scale of graduated sanctions for resource appropriators who violate community rules; 
6) Mechanisms of conflict resolution that are cheap and of easy access; 
7) Self-determination of the community recognised by higher-level authorities; 
8) In the case of larger common-pool resources, organisation in the form of multiple layers of nested 
enterprises, with small local CPRs at the base level. 
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of government have taken place in recent decades. Thus a major concern for this 
study is to explore the social implications of national power transitions which lie 
behind the development of collaborative governance in Taiwan. These demand 
further understanding of the particular context of Taiwan’s environmental politics in 
order to understand the evolution of collaborative governance, and these larger 
political forces are, it is suggested, not gain sufficient weight in the collaborative 
governance literature. The Taiwanese context is one of considerable change and 
adjustment, quite separate from the detailed self-management of local ecosystems.  
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 2.3  Collaborative Governance in East Asia 
 
In the West, the notion of collaborative governance was developed from several 
western political phenomena, including the ‘hollowing-out’ of the nation state, the 
emergence of multi-level governance (Rhodes, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 2000), and 
the need to renew democracy and trust between those governing and those governed 
(Rackham and Mitchell, 2000). In the East, the meaning of collaborative 
governance is ambiguous and lacks careful examination, but it normally implies that 
the state retains a key role (Yamamoto, 1999).  
This part of the review will combine three strands of literature. The first strand 
draws on cases of environmental collaboration beyond the West, in order to discuss 
its nature, institution and method. The second strand examines various discourses of 
the state-society relationship in East Asian countries in recent decades in relation to 
corporatism, paternalism and the combined effort between the state and society on 
economic development projects. On one level corporatism seems similar to 
collaborative governance in terms of its stress on stakeholders’ participation. But in 
fact, they are widely divergent. The third strand explores how the newly emerging 
civil society in East Asia relates to collaborative governance, especially the legacy 
of corporatist politics within East Asia. 
 
2.3.1  Examples of Environmental Collaboration in Developing 
Countries 
 
Outside the West, the rubric of collaborative governance is rare, even if discussions 
about participation are common and detailed in Africa, South America and South 
Asia (for example Evans, 1997; Hickey and Mohan, 2004; Mahanty et al., 2009; 
Gaynor, 2010; Peris et al., 2011). Researchers argue that the distribution of 
economic benefits for policy decisions is often found to be very unequal and the 
potential to improve the governance deficit arising from these outcomes is 
considerable (Mahanty et al., 2009; Maharjan et al., 2009). Some examples of how 
matters can be improved can be seen from the research of Ostrom (1997) who 
demonstrated how the involvement of citizens in the planning and implementation 
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of water and sanitation projects in urban Brazil has greatly improved their 
effectiveness and reduced corruption; from Lam (1997) who showed how 
community participation in irrigation programmes in Taiwan made water service 
delivery much more efficient and effective; from Tendler (1995) who demonstrated 
the salutary effects of the co-production of healthcare service delivery by 
street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1969) and a range of societal actors in Brazil. She 
emphasises the potential benefits of networks that span the divide between the state 
and civil society, while Ostrom (1997) and Lam (1997) argue that synergistic 
conditions can become truly enduring, as well as easily reproduced, when they are 
given strong institutional foundations.  
 
Elsewhere, Pretty (1998) has demonstrated the importance of adapting policies to 
meet local circumstances by integrating local knowledge. He focused on agriculture 
in Africa where a top-down approach to introducing new methods to increase crop 
yields has often turned out to be a disaster, not least in environmental terms, when 
introduced without due regard to local circumstances and local knowledge through 
the participation of the local population. He found that evidence of success of 
participation occurred mostly at the most local of levels. It was in local 
environmental politics where significant transformations occurred, gradually 
affecting the higher levels of bureaucracies. It remains to be seen whether 
governments see this as an opportunity or threat to their power and authority. 
 
Collaboration creates multiple benefits, including consolidating community support, 
creating robust social capital and facilitating mutual learning. According to Lemos 
(1998), who examined a pollution control project implemented by Cetesb (a state 
environmental protection agency) that controls air, water and soil industrial 
pollution in the city of Cubatão, Sao Paulo, one of the most polluted regions in the 
world, that by responding to community demands and seeking to encourage public 
participation, policy makers favoured a style of policy design and implementation 
fundamentally different from ‘business as usual’ in Brazil. Through community 
support, Cetesb was able not only to increase its leverage vis-à-vis the polluting 
industries, but the ability of popular movements to forge collective identities and 
frame pollution as a social issue expanded their basis of support and promoted the 
creation of social capital. Finally, during the implementation of the pollution control 
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project, the interaction between technical personnel and social scientists provided 
both groups with a new understanding and appreciation of each other’s expertise, 
creating an opportunity to re-evaluate their professional roles in policy-making. 
 
Participation can improve the performance of environmental policies better than 
traditional policy strategies, but has not always been found to be effective when 
environmental issues become particularly complex and controversial. Collaboration 
alone produces limited effects, although Hofman (1998) has shown, in Southeast 
Asia, that citizen confrontation can play an important role in the enforcement 
process. Public participation often takes place at the end of a decision-making 
process when citizens can only accept a decision imposed upon them or protest 
against it as outsiders (Rodan, 1996). In addition to the limited democratic traditions 
and the presence of authoritarian regimes, Hofman assumes that this kind of 
situation might also result from the overall social background, like a low level of 
industrialisation, poor citizen education and low per capita income, all of which 
constrain the public from taking action for the common good. Similarly, in 
post-apartheid South Africa, environmental activists have been confronted by the 
limitations of inclusion in a deliberative forum and have, therefore, strategically 
adopted a more adversarial position (Barnett and Scott, 2007). 
 
2.3.2  State-Society Relationships in East Asia 
 
The purpose of discussing existing political arrangements and culture in East Asia is 
to examine how they may respond to the demands of civil society for participation, 
as this challenges traditional state-society relationships that are based upon 
paternalism and various forms of corporatism. In the literature, there are four types 
of discourse over the state-society relationship. These are: bureaucratic oriented 
politics, state-society synergy, soft authoritarianism and East Asian corporatism. 
 
Many East Asian studies treat the state as an essential player, rather than one to be 
manipulated and fragmented by political elites and plural social interests (Skocpol, 
1985). In Chalmers Johnson’s research on Japan, one typical example is the 
experience known as ‘Japan, Inc.’, in which major industrial conglomerates and 
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their dependent workforces were consciously manipulated by Japan’s Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), so as to make the most of post-war 
economic growth (Johnson, 1982, 1995). This particular bureaucratic-orientation 
had an overwhelming influence over private industries. Elsewhere, Amsden (1985) 
has emphasised the ability of the state apparatus to transfer the general target of the 
authoritarian state from regaining control of Mainland China to developing Taiwan’s 
economy. He claims that Taiwan’s ‘economic miracle’ was largely led by the state 
via a wide range of reforms. But within this process of re-orientation it was the 
bureaucracy rather than the political elites who led the shift in goal from 
‘Re-conquer the Mainland’ to investing in the economic boom. Elsewhere, Evans 
(1995) has used the notion of ‘embedded autonomy’ to describe how the state 
presides over economic development by enhancing its collaboration and networking 
with private economic sectors, while at the same time retaining its partial autonomy. 
 
In their challenge to the notions of the ‘withering away’ and ‘hollowing out’ of the 
state, some researchers have shown that networking between the state and society 
can reinforce the role and interests of each. Evans (1995), for example, drew upon a 
series of empirical observations of the industrial transformation in the hi-tech sector 
in Korea, Brazil and India. Korea is particularly successful as a developmental state. 
It has a highly selective meritocratic recruitment history leading to long-term career 
rewards, which have in turn created commitment and a sense of corporate cohesion 
within the state bureaucracy. ‘Corporate cohesion’ in the state apparatus of the 
Korean government created a robust internal structure driven by the state which the 
other two counterparts, Brazil and India, did not have. In other words, the strong 
state apparatus, in combination with embeddedness into a dense social network, 
allows the state to perform the leading role in development. It is the contradictory 
combination of ‘corporate cohesion’ and connectedness to the social network, which 
Evans called ‘embedded autonomy’, that gives power to the state to solve problems 
of ‘collective action’. In this light, state and society are more than just linked 
together, each helping to constitute the other and reinforce each other’s role. Evans 
(1997) later proposed a notion of ‘state-society synergy’, based on an interweaving 
relationship between state and society in the East. This synergy can be viewed as a 
development strategy, combining the function of the state apparatus and organised 
community actions to provide economic productivity and efficient service delivery 
 50
via robust networks in society (Ostrom, 1996). It usually consists of a combination 
of complementarity and embeddedness through incorporating the trust and informal 
networks inherent in civil society into the economic development programme. 
Instead of relying on state- or society-centred explanations, Evans (1997) persuades 
us to look for an alternative that puts the collaborative relationship between the two 
at the heart of our thinking. 
 
Although some scholars emphasise that social order has its own value, its purpose in 
consolidating an existing political regime is much larger than just doing public good. 
Etzioni (2004) analysed how East Asian countries under ‘soft’ authoritarianism and 
traditional Confucianism legacies have, over the last decades, formulated a 
communitarianism, a view that prioritises community need over individuals and 
sometimes implies individuals should sacrifice their own advantages for collective 
benefits. That depicts a different picture of the state-society relation. This prioritises 
social order and trust over individualism and freedom, and therefore promotes a 
different imagery of community. It also allows for the possibility of ‘governance 
without government’, resting on the social base of communal solidarity. 
 
Fukuyama (1992) examined a number of East Asian nations. While they may on the 
surface appear to share the West’s system of constitutional democracy, their 
societies are, it is argued, ordered according to unequal group hierarchies that 
emphasise conformity to group interests over individual rights. In Asia, it is argued, 
capitalism has become far more universal than democracy, and countries there have 
found a way to reconcile the market economy with a kind of paternalistic 
authoritarianism which persuades rather than coerces. This alternative, in the view 
of proponents such as Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (1992), 
comes more naturally to Asian societies than western liberal democracy since it 
builds on Asia’s shared Confucian traditions. Although it is a tremendous 
oversimplification to speak of a single ‘Asian alternative’ or a uniform Confucian 
legacy affecting all states in the region, both Etzioni and Fukuyama mention the 
relation between soft authoritarianism and the Confucian legacy. This legacy also 
contributed to the birth of East Asian corporatism10.  
                                                 
10 Similar to the paternalistic view of the state-society relationship in East Asia, a significant amount 
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 The so-called East Asian Miracle (the post-war economic success of East Asian 
New Industrialised Countries, NICs) in post-war Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, in 
particular, has been seen as managed or governed by the corporatist strategy of the 
developmental state (Wade, 1990), which relied upon the vertical cohesion of 
authority, both inside the bureaucracy and among state and society actors. As a 
result, the cohesion provided the state with the leverage to direct the allocation of 
industrial resources. Policy authority resided in a powerful modern state apparatus, 
staffed by economic technocrats loyal to the ruling regime. Horizontal cooperation 
between the line ministries was essentially directed from the top down (Wade, 1990; 
Evans, 1995; Noble, 1998). However, whilst these regimes provided strong 
leadership in economic growth they performed poorly in responding to social 
demands such as the social demand for housing, environmental degradation, land 
speculation and rising house prices (Chen, 2005b). The introduction of democracy 
in Asia has further removed many of the authoritarian mechanisms that had earlier 
contributed to the capacity of a state to ‘govern the market’ for rapid economic 
growth (Wade, 1990). Democratisation has challenged the developmental state by 
undermining the political foundations of past practices in economic policy-making 
and public administration (Chen, 2005a; Wong, 2005).  
 
At one level, corporatism has aspects similar to collaborative governance in terms of 
its emphasis on stakeholder participation (Ansell and Gash, 2006), and, at another, 
where environmental activists are often manipulated by the state (see McEachern, 
1993: 180-1; adopted in Doyle and McEachern, 1998)11 or agents pursuing their 
own benefits under the cover of public interests (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). 
                                                                                                                                         
of literature emphasises a so-called ‘East Asian model’ of corporatism. Unger and Chan (1995) 
argued that it prevailed in the capitalist states of East Asia. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea erected 
strongly authoritarian corporatist structures during periods of intensive development and amidst 
perceived threats from abroad. It seems quite plausible to assume there is a correlation between 
Confucianism and East Asian corporatism, however whether Confucianism’s emphasis on social 
compliance fosters future social order remains to be seen. In the West, corporatism has been 
theoretically applied to a wide range of polities which are organised around a mechanism mediating 
different interests. Corporatism has been referred to as a ‘balance between labour and capital’ or as a 
‘mode of policy formation and implementation that entails regular negotiations…between state 
agencies and interest groups’ (Wallerstein, 1989). In contrast, corporatism in the East Asian context 
usually refers to processes primarily working in the opposite direction, or ways by which the state 
uses such relations to achieve social control and economic development. 
11 McEachern’s argument was developed based of a study on environmental policy in Australia 
1981-91. 
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McEachern identifies three different ingredients that make up this corporatist 
process: incorporation, assimilation and adaptation. In his analysis, environmental 
activists and the business community are brought together inside a process of 
political negotiation defined by the state. While the arena creates a sense of 
consensus around environmental concerns, participants are not allowed to raise a 
dissident view as that would be seen as against an emerging, shared and politically 
acceptable position (incorporation). In addition, environmental discourses are 
turned into legitimate, acceptable, non-threatening practices and discussions, for 
example, around the idea of ‘sustainable development’ within an economic frame of 
analysis and evaluation (assimilation). As a result, although environmental concern 
is incorporated into policy considerations, the ‘solution’ reached in corporatist 
policy-making employs policies that would allow maximum economic growth 
whilst minimising environmental damage (adaptation). This argument clarifies how 
corporatist policy can be differentiated from a collaborative one. While the former 
focusses on the interests of a consolidated ruling power, the latter focusses on those 
of the public. 
 
To help achieve its ends, the state, in this East Asian model, uses 
officially-recognised civil organisations (not only industrial enterprises) as a means 
of restricting and controlling public participation in the political process and 
limiting the power of civil society. It is a so-called “pre-emptive” strategy to 
exclude spontaneous associations becoming active and legitimised. Those officially 
recognised organisations even get channelled into the policy-making processes in 
order to assist the state in implementing policy on the government's behalf. By 
establishing itself as the arbitrator of legitimacy, and often assigning responsibility 
for a particular constituency to one organisation, the state limits the number of 
players with whom it must negotiate and co-opts their leaders into policing their 
own members (Unger and Chan, 1995). 
 
East Asian governments have a common advantage in adopting state-corporatist 
solutions: each of them already possess well-organised bureaucracies with 
established traditions. Moreover, traditionally they were authoritarian states largely 
autonomous from interest-group pressures, acting through patron-client social and 
political systems. Although most of these countries now enjoy greater freedom of 
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association and speech, with freer and fairer elections than in the immediate 
post-war era, the model of corporatism still has a long-lasting influence in the social 
and political sphere. 
 
To conclude, these four discourses over the post-war East Asian states-society 
relationship point to a common phenomenon, that of raising their prosperity. 
Although it focused mainly on an economic perspective, it was intensively 
intertwined with corporatist rule and a robust bureaucratic system where traditional 
Confucian culture provided the breeding ground. Under the states’ corporatist 
strategies, traditional social active actors and organisations were primarily state 
authorised and had a highly praised social harmony, instead of being absolutely 
spontaneous. Whilst, nowadays, East Asian states are in rapid political and social 
change toward democracy and minimisation of social control, they are still in the 
shadow of the past, with its overwhelming corporatist order and policy system that 
was strongly bureaucratically-oriented. 
 
2.3.3  The Emergence of Social Mobilisation and Civil Society 
 
Despite the legacy of authoritarianism and corporatism, a series of research projects 
have shown that civil society in East Asia, as a new social force, can today influence 
the provision and allocation of public goods (Hiroka, 1999; Yamamoto, 1999; 
Yamamoto and Ashizawa, 2001; Adams, 2010; Kim, 2010). Numerous studies 
emphasise how Eastern civil societies differ from their western counterparts 
(Cumings, 2002), especially in terms of their emergence, which lacked a context of 
democratisation (Downie and Kingsbury, 2001; Verma, 2002). Instead, it is often 
argued that their origins are closely related to traditional Confucian values (Rodan, 
1997; Armstrong, 2002). Their influence is three-fold. First of all, Confucian 
education encourages intellectuals to pursue the promotion of common benefits of 
communities and societies as a whole, and this is one source of Asian citizenship 
and activism. Second, public servants enjoy high prestige in Confucian society, and 
this phenomenon resulted in the inclination of intellectuals to cooperate with, rather 
than confront, the state in terms of seeking greater public welfare. Third, the 
Confucian ethical order, which honours heaven, earth, rulers, parents and teachers 
encourages civil actors to lobby and cooperate with the state (Chiu, 2005). 
 54
According to Confucian philosophy, intellectuals should speak for the public 
interest but in a way that respects existing governance ethics, which implies at least 
a partial submission to the regime.  
 
There are numerous reasons why civil society has become the new key player in 
East Asian governance. One major reason is the appearance of a ‘crisis of 
effectiveness’ in traditional government. Yamamoto (1999b) argues that during the 
period of post-war economic growth, East Asian countries relied on an authoritarian 
and interventionist state, which led in turn to the passivity of their citizens in both 
the social and political arenas. As these developmental states transformed 
themselves into industrial states, this growth model based on ‘Asian values’ has 
been called into question, particularly in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis 
that struck in 1997, when these countries’ governance systems appeared ineffectual 
at best and even culpable of tolerating nepotism, corruption, and the income 
inequalities that these systems fostered. In a search for more effective and just 
systems of governance, civil society stepped in to fill the vacuum, including 
demands for democratic systems of government. 
 
On the one hand, democratisation itself resulted in a multiplication of demands on 
the state for scarce resources, whilst releasing the social energy that gave social 
actors the enthusiasm to engage in public affairs (Yamamoto and Ashizawa, 2001; 
Marsh, 2006). Democratisation often followed the emergence of social movements, 
most notably environmental movements, in the 1990s, with environmental 
movements often being used as a cover by activists more concerned with promoting 
democracy and encouraging the general emergence of civil society (Lee and So, 
1999). In South Korea and Taiwan, environmentalists’ protests against pollution 
were among the few forms of popular mobilisation tolerated by their military 
regimes. Environmental campaigns also enjoyed widespread popular support and so 
have been less easily suppressed than those calling for democratic and social reform. 
Repertoires of legitimate collective action created a public sphere within which 
political dissidents could act, and within which environmental and democratic 
movements were often partners (Hsiao, 1996; Yamamoto, 1996; Lee and So, 1999; 
Armstrong, 2002; Schak and Hudson, 2003). On the other hand, along with 
dramatic reforms and power shifts in the Asian state, the political spaces opened up 
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to local actors and NGOs have expanded significantly in the last decade. New 
political configurations and alliances have emerged and alternative conceptions of 
common interest and identity have been articulated (Warren and McCarthy, 2009; 
Kim, 2010). 
 
The contribution of the voluntary sector is often treated as a substitute for a public 
welfare service that the governments of developing countries often lack the capacity 
to provide. This condition has also occurred in Asia. For example, the successful 
management of specific environmental projects can be attributed to joint 
participation of both the government and NGOs (Gupta and Asher, 1998). 
Alternatively, in certain instances, NGOs are firmly entrenched in opposition to 
governmental development projects and little dialogue takes place, but overall 
NGOs have become important actors on the environmental scene (Gupta and Asher, 
1998) with the effect of making the state provide environmental goods. This trend 
has become common in Asian society, with different civil society groups responding 
positively to the greater freedoms afforded by new regimes (Warren and McCarthy, 
2009). 
 
These developments have led several scholars to re-examine the theoretical claims 
and empirical foundation of the Asian developmental state (Boyd and Ngo, 2005; 
Underhill and Zhang, 2005). For example, Ngo (2005) has re-examined the role of 
the state in Taiwan. Taiwan has been the privileged site of a whole series of 
well-known stylised facts about the state’s exercise of 'governing the market'. Ngo 
has revisited these on the basis of recently declassified materials. His findings are 
dramatic and challenging. The stereotypical account of the Taiwanese case speaks of 
a state that possesses a high degree of unity that can focus the actions of numerous 
agencies. Ngo paints a very different picture, one of institutional fragmentation, 
imperfection, and even unstructured hierarchy. Contrary to what is described in the 
‘governing the market’ literature, the state is in fact kidnapped by the struggle 
between ambiguous authorities, factional competition and different government 
departments. Even within the state, there are constant conflicts and incompatibilities 
between the unwitting practices of individual officials and their organisations. The 
Taiwanese state, in his view, is better described as an ensemble of ephemeral 
institutions whose jurisdictions and functions are extremely mutable. He argues that 
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the state departments, in pursuing developmental projects, were episodic rather than 
constant. State departments are often dependent upon particular combinations of 
circumstances. This phenomenon enables specific power-holders to disguise their 
own parochial agendas in national state projects. Hence, the state is thus personal 
and episodic. It relies on the congruence of developmental projects to maintain its 
regime. 
 
Similar situations have been described in South Korea. For example, Koo (2005) 
concludes that the state's role in its labour relations was marked by contradiction, 
inconsistency, and myopia and was driven by political considerations rather than 
economic logic. Moon and Prasad (1994) conclude that the statist perspective 
neglects, or understates, the importance of intra-state dynamics. For example, the 
government apparatus in different departments formulates various types of network 
with outside actors, who are often competing on the basis of their own interests and 
agendas. This perspective suggests that concepts from policy network theory reveal 
a richer description of state-society interaction (Ferreyra et al., 2008). Concepts of 
political interactions, institutions and leadership choice, which are mutually 
influential, are more persuasive in analysing Asian states than the traditional statist 
view (see also Haggard, 2005). 
 
It is inappropriate to view East Asian society as a homogeneous entity and by now 
tension between civil society and the state has arisen in most national contexts. 
Previously, there has not been a great deal of room for civil society to play a 
significant role in governance because of the state’s vast resources and the clear 
consensus on national goals. Hence the bureaucracy has been seen as the exclusive 
arbiter of public interest. Because of such an historical background, the relationship 
between the newly emerging civil society and the government in these countries can 
be characterised as volatile and constantly shifting between cooperation and conflict. 
Under these circumstances, civil societies have struggled between being co-opted by 
the state and becoming irrelevant if they remained outside of the policy process 
(Yamamoto, 1996; Mouer and Sugimoto, 2003; Schak and Hudson, 2003). 
 
The three strands of existing literature on East Asia’s governance all point to one 
thing- the role of a bureaucratic system in deciding policy orientation with or 
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without a collaborative effort from their civic counterparts. This means that 
collaborative governance becomes complex when it is intertwined with established 
corporatist political arrangements and a bureaucracy that supports these. Even so, it 
would be inappropriate to neglect the potential of endogenous approaches in 
initiating collaborative governance in an East Asian context. This context of a 
Confucian culture, corporatist politics and rapid democratisation might both 
facilitate and constrain the emergence and development of collaborative governance 
at the same time. The rise of civil society in Asia is deeply rooted in Confucianism, 
the same culture which bred the soft-authoritarian regimes. Eastern intellectuals 
have been encouraged to engage in activism since Asian societies began a process of 
democratisation in the 1980s and 1990s. This exposes the contradictory relationship 
between social citizenship and the state in Asian countries. At the same time, this 
contradictory relationship also led to democratisation in the 1990s, opening up 
political opportunities for the emergence of collaborative governance. But given that 
economic prosperity is major source of legitimisation for Asian authorities and 
social development, this implies that economic pressures of differing kinds will also 
continue to play an important role in either hindering or helping the extent of 
democratic reforms that collaborative governance can bring forward. 
 
2.4  Conclusion: An Analytical Framework of Environmental 
Collaborative Governance in Taiwan  
 
While this study is situated within the broad framework of collaborative governance, 
its context in Taiwan inevitably invites some amendments to the scope of research 
examples quoted by Ansell and Gash and, to some extent, the approach to 
collaborative governance arising from studying what has happened on the ground. 
The following section thus reflect anew on Ansell and Gash’s model in terms of its 
value as a heuristic framework for organising the empirical material that follows in 
Chapters Five to Seven. 
 
Ansell and Gash (2008) established a process-oriented model of collaborative 
governance emphasising the major factors that affect the process and outcome. 
Their model did not attempt to examine the political structure by which 
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collaboration is effected or where it is situated. To apply this framework to an East 
Asian context demands more attention be paid to broader social-politics. In East 
Asia, the definition of collaborative governance can easily be confused with existing 
corporatism, traditional Confucian political culture and soft authoritarianism, all of 
which prioritise collective interests above personal ones. Therefore a new analytical 
model to examine collaborative governance in East Asia should add these contextual 
factors which may affect its practice. Also, a more dynamic perspective must be 
employed to examine how the emergence of environmental collaborative 
governance subsequently facilitates the evolution of new power relations and shapes 
the effectiveness of governing. 
 
In the following section, this thesis tries to generate a conceptual framework which 
can more appropriately reflect an East Asian pattern of environmental collaborative 
governance, as shown in Figure 2.3, which is itself an adaptation of Ansell and 
Gash’s model that pays additional attention to the features of environmental 
management and the political establishment in East Asia. This provisional 
framework serves as a conceptual device to help organise the later empirical 
material in Chapters Five to Seven and also provides the foundation for establishing 
a coding system for analysing press-clippings (see Chapter Three). Ten adjustments 
are made to Ansell and Gash’s original model and are numbered following Figure 
2.3.. 
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Figure 2.3: An analytical framework of environmental collaborative governance in Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most important viewpoint in the new framework is its emphasis on the need to 
treat collaborative processes as dynamic, context-based and recursive. On the very 
left side of Figure 2.3, I assume, based on the literature, that the emergence of 
collaborative governance begins with a series of motivators and enablers (Marschke 
and Sinclair, 2009) and specific geographical circumstances. These are comprised of 
(1) motivation to collaborate, (2) the particular nature of environmental issues, and 
(3) geographic specificity. Based on the review in Section 2.2.3., environmental 
issues are identified as scientifically uncertain and locality-based (Edge and 
McAllister, 2009), and these features influence the formulation of environmental 
governance from the very beginning. Very often (4) a civil mobilisation (Patsias and 
Patsias, 2009) arises to express the social resentment to existing environmental 
problems. Various kinds of emotion and dissatisfaction with the existing condition 
of the environment demand political responses and relevant policy actions. Most 
contemporary environmental collaborative governance starts with issues which 
cannot be solved by the traditional form of governing, are the issues are shaped by 
their relation to geographical specificity.  
 
This mobilisation is then channelled by (5) the strategy-making process of a 
transformative government apparatus or facilitative leaders of communities (see also 
Freeman, 1997; Wondolleck and Ryan, 1999) to solve a common environmental 
issue. (6) The initiator of collaborative governance can be the state apparatus, 
elected officials, economic associations, or members of civil society or community 
groups. (7) Their choice of approach to collaboration is based on their interpretation 
of how these contextual factors will influence their specific engagement with the 
state, and will naturally produce contrasting processes and results. 
 
In the process of initiating collaborative governance, transformative leadership is a 
crucial factor (Shaw, 2008; Hou and Chen, 2009). As Wondolleck and his colleagues 
(1996) argue, whether the leaders of participating groups possess the requisite 
capacity- such as political savvy, negotiation, and communication skills- will shape 
the process of collaboration. They interpret the starting conditions, determine 
whether to take collaborative action, and create innovate solutions based on 
available resources. Indeed, without transformative officials or civilian leadership 
(Abers, 2007) to mobilise and sustain local resources, failure is a real possibility. By 
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leadership, I signify a different interpretation from Ansell and Gash’s model. They 
emphasise the role of a neutral third party, which is an interchangeable term with 
honest broker, outside mediator and facilitative leadership. My adoption of 
leadership means leaders in either the state apparatus or within communities, who 
can break through institutional constraints, re-orient public attention and mobilise 
resources for pursuing the common good. 
 
The decision to undertake collaborative governance is embedded in, and shaped by, 
broader contexts of societal-politics and economic concerns. These contextual 
factors are often neglected in the western literature. Similarly, (8) resource 
availability and especially its mobilisation (including human, financial and material) 
is decisive for embarking on collaborative governance (Newman et al., 2004). It is 
suggested that the greater the mutual resource dependency between the state and 
society, the more likely it is that they will be able to establish collaborative action 
(Abers and Keck, 2009). Mutual dependence is key to bringing related actors 
together for configuring potential solutions for common problems they face.  It 
covers a wide range of possible dependent relations. For example, the social actors 
might need administrative support and political recognition from the state, while the 
state might need social attention to create public pressure and mobilise the political 
will of the state to engage in collaborative governance. 
 
On the right side of Figure 2.3, it is indicated that the development of collaborative 
governance can be divided into three parts: initiation approach, process and 
outcome. As previously explained, there are two types of approach- (9) endogenous 
and exogenous- where the development of collaborative governance diverges. An 
endogenous approach, initiated by local groups based on their capabilities, 
preferences and local circumstances, will produce a set of locally-agreed rules and 
methods to tackle local environmental issues. It will try to ensure a governance 
process in-line with local concerns and needs. In contrast, an exogenous counterpart 
initiated by outside experts or bureaucrats is often based upon generalised 
collaboration principles and actions with less consideration given to local 
circumstances. It often orients the process to fit in with the operations and purposes 
of bureaucratic routines, rather than the implications for those affected by the policy 
in local communities. Although the latter approach often possesses more suitable 
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financial resources to ensure the continuity of policy, it can fail to mobilise local 
resources and commitment. In examples of both of endogenous and exogenous 
approaches, it is crucial to clarify the contextual power relationship (between the 
state and society as well as within society) and the influence of the underlying 
corporatist arrangements. 
 
The process of collaborative governance, as Ansell and Gash describe, should 
include the following: genuine deliberation, mutual learning, production of new 
public goods, an increase in the participants’ sense of ownership of the process, and 
the creation of trust and commitment. However, I deliberately keep these boxes of 
process blank at this stage due to a lack of clear evidence from literature on what the 
process is like in East Asia and I expect to fill in more conceptual content based on 
empirical information from the case studies. 
 
Regarding the outcome of collaborative governance, Ansell and Gash mention that 
most research does not answer the basic question of how effective collaborative 
governance is in comparison to traditional hierarchical methods and regulations. 
Researchers tend to focus more on the circumstances under which stakeholders will 
resort to collaborative governance. In addition, most literature is devoted to process 
outcome, rather than policy or management outcome, and most cases commenced 
when traditional methods or market-based ones failed to respond to a governance 
deficit. The last, but not the least, of the major differences between this model and 
that of Ansell and Gash concerns the role of (10) feedback. The bottom right hand 
side of Figure 2.3, which leads back to the actors involved, indicates the importance 
of effective feed-back if collaborative governance is to be sustained in the long term. 
Each process of collaborative governance might reinforce or undermine the other. It 
might also lead to an institutionalisation of the collaborative strategy. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
3.1. Methodological challenge: Exploring the underlying 
mechanism of the emergence of environmental collaborative 
governance in Taiwan 
 
Chapter Three introduces the methodology this research adopted to respond to the 
research questions and assumption developed in Chapters One and Two. In Chapter 
Two, an analytical framework to explore the emergence of environmental 
collaborative governance in Taiwan was developed. The model assumes that the 
strategic thinking of human actors and social structures, which form the wider 
context of governance, and the geographic specificities which constrains the key 
actors’ motivation and the form of governance, have contributed to the rise of 
collaborative governance.  
 
The framework takes into account both micro and macro conditions. On the one 
hand, the framework draws attention to the decisions of civil organisations, 
communities and tribal groups to engage in a collaborative relationship with the 
state. While, on the other hand, it pays attention to how broader contexts shape their 
process of developing collaboration. The human actors’ decisions influence the 
social world, but they are also constrained by social structure. This recursive 
structure-agent relationship is central to the complex ontology and epistemology of 
critical realism. This perspective underpins this research and reflects what this 
research aims to untangle. Critical realism argues that the value of scientific 
research lies in the exploration of underlying mechanisms which make social 
change possible (Sayer, 2000: 15). It suggests a methodology that provides insights 
into the motives and thinking of key actors in the decision making process, without 
losing the consideration of a broader context which constrains the actors’ perception 
and behaviour.  
 
Chapter Three explains the underlying philosophy of this research, critical realism, 
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in terms of its ontology and epistemology, and the suggestion of research methods. 
In Section 3.1, the design of the research and why it uses a critical realist approach 
is introduced. In Section 3.2, the ontology, epistemology and methodological 
implications of critical realism are laid out. Critical realism argues that social 
research should investigate the generative mechanisms of social phenomena that 
exist in an observable domain of the world by conducting a ‘retroduction’ approach 
and by combining both extensive and intensive research methods. Critical realism 
justifies the decision to adopt a multi-method and multi-site case study approach. 
Section 3.3 provides a justification of the selection of field sites. Following this is a 
brief introduction to the research site, the Kaoping River basin, introduced in 
Section 3.4. An acknowledgement of my positionality is in Section 3.5, and Section 
3.6 gives details of the research process, including the strategies and decisions of 
data collection, processing and analysis, and the format of data reporting.  
 
3.2. Critical realism: The philosophy underpinning this research  
 
From the early 1980s, critical realism gained increasing attention in the 
geographical literature, in particular its methodological application to geographic 
research (Lawson and Staeheli, 1990; Chappell, 1991; Lawson and Staeheli, 1991). 
It has been widely applied in social studies which include economic geography 
(Sayer and Morgan, 1985), economics (Lawson, 1997; Fleetwood, 1999), 
entrepreneurship (Blundel, 2007), and organisational studies (Fleetwood and 
Ackroyd, 2004). Critical realism is a potential vehicle for conducting human 
geographic research. It is particularly effective for exploring generative mechanisms 
and contextual contingency in examining governance issues (Sarre, 1987; Morgan 
and Sayer, 1988; Allen and McDowell, 1989; Henderson, 1989; Massey et al., 1992; 
Sayer and Walker, 1992; Watts and Bohle, 1993; Pratt, 1995; Yeung, 1997). 
 
Critical realism, founded by the work of two philosophers, Harré (1972) and 
Bhaskar (1975), has gained prominence over the last three decades. It provides a 
‘middle way’ for social science research which needs to avoid both reductionism 
and relativism. The former took little consideration of interpretive understandings, 
whilst the latter was criticised as having an issue of incommensurability (Sayer, 
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2000: 67-80). The origin of critical realism related to direct experience in the field. 
For example, Sayer (2000: 5) found it impossible to reconcile the richness and 
complexity of the social world with law-like abstraction which aimed to be 
‘all-embracing, all explaining’ as reductionism suggested. However, he also 
reminded social researchers that the crucial task of social research is to investigate 
underlying mechanisms which drive real social change rather than just to describe 
the surface expressions of social phenomena which, in turn, leads to a limited ability 
to explain social changes.  
 
3.2.1. The ontology of critical realism: structure, mechanism and 
causal power 
 
Bhaskar stratified the social world into three domains: actual, empirical and real. 
The actual domain means concrete social events which occur irrespective of human 
observation, while the empirical domain is the world of human experience and 
knowledge12. The real domain comprises underlying structures, tendencies and 
associated mechanisms beneath observable events. The first two domains, the actual 
and empirical, are transitive and temporal. The last, the real domain, is intransitive 
and permanent. It is transcendental but makes social events possible. In other words, 
it comprises the underlying mechanisms which drive the changes in the social world. 
The real domain is the key domain upon which scientific research should focus 
(Bhaskar, 1975). The level of critical realism’s ontology is summarised in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: The ontology of critical realism 
 Real domain Actual domain Empirical domain 
Mechanism v   
Event  v v  
Experience  v v v 
Source: Bhaskar (ibid:13) 
 
Furthermore, the real domain contains ‘social structure’, ‘causal power’ and 
‘mechanism’, which are core areas of social scientific research (Sayer, 2000). 
                                                 
12 ‘Experience’, meaning human conception of social events, is usually subjective and seldom equal 
to reality. 
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‘Social structure’ refers to how social objects in a society are constituted and relate 
to each other. A social object has certain ‘causal powers’, which are the things that 
potentially enable it to act or to facilitate various activities and developments 
(Lawson, 1997: 21). ‘Mechanisms’ refer to the way causal power of an object is 
exercised and give rise to concrete social phenomena. They therefore appear to be a 
‘generative mechanism’ (Blundel, 2007). While a particular mechanism can produce 
entirely different social events in different settings, inversely, the same event can 
result from entirely different causes (Sayer, 2000). Critical realism aims to explain 
the relationship between mechanisms in causality (see Figure 3.1 below). For 
example the poverty of mountain indigenous people (event) is often caused by the 
exclusion of their ownership of, and free access to, natural resources (mechanism). 
However, what makes the exclusion possible is the imbalanced distribution of 
political power and overwhelming economic benefits (underlying structure and 
other mechanisms). See Figure 3.1 for an illustration of the relationship between 
events, mechanisms and structures. 
 
Figure 3.1: A critical realist view of causation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Sayer, 2000:15) 
 
 
 
In addition, realist ontology indicates a unique structure-agent relationship. Realism 
sees the world as comprising concrete events, mechanisms and structures in an open 
system where there are complex interactions between the structure and agency 
(Cloke et al., 1991: 146). Realism does not deny agency, although it does emphasise 
that behaviour is constrained by structure and processes (Johnston, 1991). 
Individuals make decisions within an infrastructure that they are not aware of. The 
infrastructure is both constraining and enabling to human thoughts and behaviours 
(Johnston, 1991; Lawson, 1997).  
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 3.2.2. The epistemology of critical realism 
 
The distinct ontology of critical realism has several implications for epistemology. 
First, as Unwin (1992) noted, the aim of critical realism includes both the need to 
identify how a phenomenon happens (causal mechanism) and how extensive it is 
(empirical regularity). But the central interest of critical realism focuses on 
explaining causality: what produces change, what makes things happen, and what 
allows or forces change (Sayer, 1985: 163). Second, critical realism concerns the 
underlying mechanism as well as the structure of social relations (Kitchin and Tate, 
1999), without rejecting subjective experience (Layder, 1994). Third, though realists 
conduct their research at the level of subjective experience, they prefer to see the 
interpretation of actors as merely the starting-point to pursue a deeper causal 
explanation. Therefore an actor’s account of experience only provides a provisional 
starting point for an explanation (Bhaskar, 1979; Whittington, 1989; Blundel, 2007). 
This suggests that realist enquiry in a single level of the social world (for example, 
the empirical domain) is presumed to be unsatisfactory (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; 
Low and MacMillan, 1988). To conclude, its epistemology suggests a 
methodological ‘triangulation’ designed to produce knowledge based on multiple 
methods, and is likely to include both extensive and intensive (see Section 3.2.3 for 
more explanation) ones (Sayer, 1985; Yeung, 1997).  
 
This philosophy responds to the purpose and challenge of this research. The 
analytical model established in Chapter Two takes into account different social 
structures. This includes actors’ decision making, geographic specificity and the 
influence of wider social factors in searching for the fundamental mechanisms and 
contextual conditions of the emergence of collaborative governance. 
 
3.2.3. Retroduction and its methodological implications 
 
‘Retroduction’, a unique form of scientific inference that critical realism adopts, 
involves explaining social events by seeking to discern the structures and 
mechanisms that are potentially able to produce them (Sayer, 1992: 107). It operates 
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quite differently from inductive and deductive approaches. The inductive approach 
might move from a series of observations to an empirical generalisation. Deductive 
ones form a set of premises, such as the existence of certain variables, to reach a 
conclusion about their implications for a social phenomenon. But, retroductive 
inference moves from the description and abstract analysis of particular social 
phenomena to a reconstruction of the basic conditions, i.e. the structure, causal 
powers and mechanism that make it possible (Bhaskar, 1986; Blundel, 2007). This 
approach argues that social research should move from pure description of social 
phenomena to abstract possible causes (Yeung, 1997). Following the example of the 
poverty of mountain indigenous people (social phenomenon) in Section 3.2.1, we 
can trace that the origin of their poverty issue is deeply rooted in the history of 
colonisation (retroduction). The population was forced to change their traditional 
hunting and agriculture activities and provide labour for logging precious wood for 
export and their territory was transformed into timber farms (description and 
analysis). Their economy was, therefore, marginalised in the world system due to 
the operation of capitalism (abstract causes). 
 
Retroduction seems to lack of the preciseness of its methodological counterparts, 
but it requires a creative insight into the nature of social events (Lawson, 1997) in 
order to probe directly into the core generative mechanisms. This position also leads 
to its view on the generalisability of knowledge. Critical realism does not agree that 
knowledge can be absolutely generalisable, but is imperfect (ibid). Although 
retroduction searches for the basic conditions which cause social events to occur, it 
also involves a type of generalisation about fundamental mechanisms and structure 
whose causal powers act across different social events. These results of 
generalisation are not law-like principles as empiricists or positivists would argue, 
which are only possible in a closed system, but rather, they tend, prima facie, to be 
demi-regularities (or partial regularities) that arise in a society which is usually an 
open system rather than a conditional controlled environment. To Lawson (ibid: 
204-7), the purpose of scientific research is to differentiate social demi-regularities 
from one another generated by different social structures. 
 
To summarise, there are three implications of the retroductive approach for the 
working practices of social research (Blundel, 2007), and they correspond with the 
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needs of the model produced in Chapter Two. The implications for research methods 
are: 
- multi-method data collection; 
- a case study approach to explore the underlying mechanisms and context 
contingency; 
- actors’ accounts as a starting point for investigations. 
 
Firstly, in order to reflect the complexity of concrete social phenomena, realist 
research prefers to draw on multiple sources of data which contain various types of 
intensive (usually qualitative) evidence as well as extensive (quantitative) evidence 
(Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Brannen, 1992; Easton, 2001: 241). The combination of 
extensive and intensive research methods serves the purpose of the research to 
investigate different strata of a social phenomenon, explaining both the causations 
without neglecting its regularities and generalisations. Sayer (1985) has suggested 
that realist research can be undertaken at the local scale by using intensive research, 
which aims at producing a causal explanation, while on a regional scale extensive 
research is aimed at examining descriptive generalisation. Intensive research 
focuses on determining the processes and conditions both necessary and 
contingent13, while extensive research focuses on determining the regularities and 
generality of particular characteristics and processes in relation to a wider 
population by using quantitative methodologies. In spite of their differences in 
methodologies and the types of questions they ask, they share the same purpose of 
explaining phenomena in terms of their underlying mechanisms and structures 
which reveal their patterns and forms (Kitchin and Tate, 1999). This approach to 
data collection, sometimes described as ‘triangulation’, is a kind of call for a 
multi-method in social scientific research (Webb et al., 1966; Denzin, 1970). 
Triangulation improves the validity and reliability of research findings.  
 
Secondly, in order to explore and clarify the necessary and contingent relationship 
between structures, realist researchers have often adopted a case-based research 
approach (Danermark et al., 2002). In this approach, extreme and ‘pathological’ 
cases are selected to highlight the structure and mechanism that give rise to certain 
                                                 
13 By contingent I mean uncertain and possible, in contrast to necessary, which means essential.  
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social phenomena (Bhaskar, 1979: 48; Collier, 1994: 165). Moreover, the spatial and 
temporal boundaries of the cases are taken into account in the study in order to 
ensure that wider structural conditions are addressed (Whittington, 1989: 85). 
Thirdly, realist researchers pay particular attention to the accounts of human actors, 
not just ‘in their own terms’, but also in seeking the ‘rules’ that constitute these 
accounts (Tsoukas, 1989: 555). Thus the actors’ accounts can be seen as starting 
points for a retroductive investigation of the structural constraints of these 
perceptions.   
 
3.2.4. Case study approach: multi-method and multi-site 
 
As critical realism suggests, a multi-method case study can explore both the causal 
relationships and the regularities of a social phenomenon. Moreover, a multi-site 
case study increases the transferability of the causal relations found in a case study. 
Rather than using samples, and following a rigid protocol to examine a limited 
number of variables, the case study method examines a phenomenon within its 
natural setting in depth, rather than breadth, to provide a ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 
1973), which aims to produce a holistic and exhaustive examination of the context 
and situation of a social event. However, the case study approach is often criticised 
for its lack of generalisability (Bolgar, 1965; Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1985; 
Ball, 1996) because of its traditional focus on single unit analysis, and leads to 
variations in the case study approach to avoid ‘radical particularism’ (Ball, 1996). 
For example, one of the variations, the multi-method case study, combines 
qualitative and quantitative methods to determine both regularity and causality of a 
social phenomenon, while the other type of variation, the multi-site case study 
research, aims to analyse certain issues across a number of settings. The former tries 
to reinforce the validity of research and the latter to increase its transferability. Both 
of the variations proposed are designed to reassure oneself that the events and 
processes in the case study approach are not unique (Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
This implies that generalisability of a social phenomenon in a case study approach is 
established on the number and heterogeneity of research sites (Firestone and Herriot, 
1984). 
A multi-site case study approach also provides the possibility of multi-site 
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comparative analysis. This helps to unveil the social structure and processes that 
occur across many cases or sites and to understand how such processes are bent by 
specific local contextual variations (Miles and Huberman, 1984). A multi-site 
approach thus produces a result that can achieve a greater possibility of 
generalisation. 
 
3.3. Justifying the selection of field site  
 
This thesis chooses three examples of local collaborative governance in the Kaoping 
River basin as cases for study in order to examine the validity of the model 
established in Chapter Two for the Taiwanese context. These examples are (1) Water 
Defence, initiated by local environmental coalitions, (2) Riverfront Adoption 
promoted by local officials, and (3) River Enclosure initiated by Taiwanese 
indigenes.  
 
The case studies in this study were chosen based on several principles. Firstly they 
were, to some extent, representative of the current trend of environmental 
collaborative governance in Taiwan. They cover a spectrum of collaborative 
management from spontaneous social-centred initiation to genuine citizens’ 
responses to government actions that have arisen in the last decade (more clearly, 
from the consolidation of democracy since the late 1990s). The participants in these 
cases aimed to get involved and get their hands dirty, rather than stay in the role of 
whistle-blower or stay at the phrase of deliberative communication. Secondly, these 
cases were situated in the theoretical framework of collaborative governance, but 
with a slightly different outlook from their Western counterparts due to their 
background of rapid growth in numbers after the loosening-up of corporatist control 
in the late-1980s, which had repressed civil society for half a century. This 
background had limited the variety of types of collaborative governance in Taiwan. 
These cases focussed on compensating the democratic deficits in environmental 
governance and fulfilling the enthusiasm of the public to engage management 
reforms. Thirdly, in order to investigate the particular process of transition ‘from 
corporatist to collaboration’, the examples here focussed on illustrating a variety of 
participatory forms of civil society, some of them developed from earlier conflicts, 
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and the different processes of political change behind the notion of ‘from 
government to governance’. 
 
There were five major reasons for selecting the Kaoping River region as the field 
site. The first reason is that the Kaoping River basin is, physically, a typical river 
basin in Taiwan. Environmental actions in the basin emerged from the same regional 
background of rapid industrialisation that has caused enormous environmental 
externalities and which gave birth to East Asian corporatism. However, they present 
a variety of environmental concerns, composition of membership and geographic 
features, thus leading to different courses of action that have provided an 
opportunity to make a comparison between them (for further details see Chapter 
Four).  
 
The second reason is that because of the fast-changing social-political development 
evident in Taiwan during the last two decades, the cases of collaborative governance 
in this study have emerged within the last ten years and have grown quickly. This 
has provided the researcher with an opportunity to examine the major factors that 
have affected their approach to and development of environmental collaborative 
governance more closely and holistically. The third reason was based on the 
argument that collaborative governance in localities is more visible and suited to 
examining the structure and underlying mechanisms (Marston, 1995; Kelly, 1997; 
Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002; Munton, 2003). Also, in governance theory, local 
governance has been considered the best level to demonstrate collaboration as 
discussed in 2.2.1 and the best location to realise the ‘communicative rationality’14 
that Habermas has suggested (Marston, 1995; Kelly, 1997; Leach and Percy-Smith, 
2001). The necessity of including the stakeholders most directly affected by public 
actions, and the requirement of face-to-face deliberation entailed by the notion of 
'communicative rationality', are seen as best promoted through decentralized 
planning and policy decisions (Barber, 1984; Williams and Matheny, 1995). This led 
to my decision to conduct empirical research at a local level. 
                                                 
14 The theory of communicative rationality is core to the practice of deliberative democracy. It 
suggests that human rationality and reason can develop from successful communication. With a 
clarification of the necessary norms and procedures, non-coerced mutual understandings and 
agreements can be reached and is therefore a view of reason. In other words, the potential for reasons 
is inherent in communication itself (Habermas, 1992; Chilvers, 2009). 
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The fourth was a pragmatic decision in terms of the budget and time constraints of 
this research. The Kaoping River region is the author’s home region, but in order to 
increase the heterogeneity of cases in this study, I chose three different types of 
collaborative governance (a total of 14 examples in three categories) which have 
taken place in the river basin in recent years. This was in order to highlight the 
inside changes of political relationships in governance reform and the mechanisms 
that gave rise to these changes. The final reason is that the variety and spectrum of 
environmental collaborative governance in this basin satisfy the demand for 
stratification in each category of cases. By this method, the research increases the 
generalisability of the mechanism which gives birth to social events in different 
contextual conditions.  
 
3.4. The Kaoping River case  
 
Taiwan has supported rapid economic growth since the 1960s during which time 
state policy has strongly supported industrialisation in a repressive manner often at 
the expense of social freedom and environmental quality. This pattern of 
development and the tensions it created are well demonstrated in the study area 
selected. This consists of the river basin of the Kaoping River. The Kaoping River is 
the longest river in southern Taiwan with a length of 171 km (see also Chapter 4.3). 
Its basin covers a total area of 3,257 km2 which occupies 9% of the total area of the 
island. It is a typical Taiwanese river, short with a fast flow and polluted due to 
insufficient investment in a domestic sewage system. Domestic and industrial waste 
water have been discharged into the river without cleansing, which has resulted in 
high levels of contamination. In addition, the river basin was degraded when it was 
treated as a landfill site. 
 
The basin has a rapidly growing population of 1.5 million, based around the city of 
Kaohsiung. It has achieved high rates of economic growth (GDP Growth Rates of 
7.9% in the 1980s and 6.3% in the 1990s) 15 , focusing on heavy industries, 
particularly in the fields of petrochemicals and steel production. These 
                                                 
15 Department of Investment Service, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
http://investintaiwan.nat.gov.tw/zh-tw/env/stats/gdp_growth.html, 30 April 2008 
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developments led to a rapid increase in demand for resources, as well as conflicts 
between conservation and industrial needs, especially regarding water resources for 
both domestic and industrial uses. Assuming there are no new water development 
projects, there will be a daily shortage of 0.6 million m3 of water by 2021 in the 
metropolitan Kaohsiung area. This potential shortage has led to a series of 
environmental conflicts between industrial development and river conservation 
since the 1980’s. 
 
Due to the history of authoritarian rule, river governance has been dominated by the 
state. Traditional jurisdiction of the river is divided into three departments: (1) The 
River Bureau (mainly in charge of the midstream and downstream area), (2) The 
Water and Soil Conservation Bureau (upstream area) and (3) The Water Resource 
Bureau (water resource management). As a response to environmental activism in 
the river basin, the bureaus have slowly incorporated civil actors into river 
governance. There were six examples of collaborative action found in the Kaoping 
River basin during a preliminary study of relevant news-clippings in 2006. This 
research has selected three of the more recent and contrasting cases to study. This is 
because critical realism suggests that extreme cases may best illustrate generative 
mechanisms and causal relationships. The three chosen examples of collaborative 
governance are (i) River Enclosure by indigenous tribes, (ii) Riverfront Adoption by 
rural communities, and (iii) Water Defence by environmental organisations. 
 
River Enclosure is an environmental movement which started from spontaneous 
action among the indigenous communities to protect their rivers from overfishing. 
These actions were initially illegal because they prevented people from fishing in 
the river, but they were later legalised and spread island-wide. Seven examples have 
been selected to illustrate how this movement has emerged and ultimately 
developed cooperation between the state and the most disadvantaged population in 
Taiwan. 
 
Water Defence is a two-wave environmental movement aiming to protect the water 
resources of the Kaoping River from industrial exploitation. It has become a process 
for state actors and environmentalists to negotiate a means of water and wetland 
preservation. It represents a dynamic process between conflict and reconciliation 
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and, in this case, four environmental organisations were selected as study objects. 
Riverfront Adoption is a collaborative action initiated by local governmental 
officials who wanted to clean up the banks of the river, which were once treated as a 
dumping site, and encouraged local communities to adopt their nearby riverfront 
green space. This action has become popular in the whole river basin. In this case, 
three examples of collaborative governance have been selected as study objects. 
 
Each of the three areas of collaborative governance contains three to seven 
examples, drawn from a news-archive review (see Section 3.6.1) which recognised 
the significant exposure and coverage these examples had received. The selection of 
examples is also stratified based on their environmental and social characteristics as 
summarised in Table 3.2. Geographic features include their location in different 
administration areas and take the case studies across different local politics and 
contexts, and their relative openness or closeness to the outside world. Close access 
to natural resources is argued to be one of the key elements of common management 
(Ostrom, 1990) and collaborative governance, where clear boundaries of the 
environment increase the local population’s sense of ownership, as in the cases of 
River Enclosure and Riverfront Adoption. 
 
Differing levels of social capital are also thought to be crucial to effective 
collaborative governance. Social capital refers to those characteristics of social 
relations, such as existing ‘norm, trust and network’, that facilitate collaborative 
action (Coleman, 1990; Putnam et al., 1993). Social capital is central to governing 
the ‘Commons’ in terms of supplying institutions, making credible commitments 
and mutual monitoring (Ostrom, 1990; Kooiman, 2003), and some scholars argue 
that social capital can be promoted by governmental action leading to the design of 
new institutions (Abers, 1998; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Adger, 2003). In the case 
examples studied here, most mountain villages in the River Enclosure initiative and 
rural communities in the Riverfront Adoption scheme have strong bonds and social 
norms inside their communities16. Therefore these communities are thought to 
possess higher social capital than urban environmental organisations in Water 
Defence.   
                                                 
16 This judgement was made according to interviews and observations. 
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The notion of group competence is derived from the resource mobilisation theory. It 
is argued that the capacity of an organisation to mobilise resources, materials or 
symbolic meanings, will determine the success or failure of their civil action (Olson, 
1965; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly et al., 1975). Similarly, the capacity of an organisation 
will be one of the key factors affecting the effort of civil actors in participating in 
new governance arrangements. The resources needed to manage the environment 
will vary according to their local contexts. For example, while urban environmental 
organisations in Water Defence exhibit higher skills in adaptability in administration 
work and in mobilising professional aid and financial support from both the state 
and civil sectors, their rural counterparts, the communities in River Enclosure and 
Riverfront Adoption, show a lack of professional skills and resources but strong 
villager solidarity. It also matters whether a collaboration is launched endogenously 
or exogenously (Sabatier, 1986; Johnson, 1992) because this may influence whether 
it is compatible with local conditions and relevant to local organisations.
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Table 3. 2: Three categories of local collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin 
Collaborative 
Actions  
Central notion Social composition Social capital Group 
competence 
Pattern of 
initiative  
Spatiality  Location  
Water Defence 
(WD) 
Protecting water 
resource and 
environment from 
industrial 
exploitation 
Urban 
environmental 
organisations 
Low High  Endogenous Open place  Downstream 
area (urban) 
Riverfront 
Adoption 
(RA) 
Taking charge of 
communal 
riverfront green 
space creation and 
maintenance 
Rural communities High  Low  Exogenous  Open place Midstream area 
(rural) 
River Enclosure 
(RE) 
Blockading river 
access from fish 
pirates and 
developing 
eco-tourism 
Tribal villages High  Low  From endogenous 
to exogenous  
Closed place Upstream area 
(remote 
mountain 
region) 
Figure 3.2: Research field 
 
  
Research field 
 
Source: http://www.theinterpretersfriend.com/indj/dcoew/taiwan.html 
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3.5. Acknowledging my positionality: as a local and an activist  
 
The purpose of this section is to state my relation to the examples in this study. 
Having emphasised that researchers’ insights of particular social phenomena are of 
particular importance in a retroductive approach, each researcher’s subjectivity and 
reflexivity should be taken into account because potential bias is plausible under 
these circumstances. Moreover, there is increasing attention in the literature to the 
issue of a researcher’s positionality and biography in doing geographic research 
(McDowell, 1992). This is because ‘where we are located in the social structure as a 
whole and which institutions we are in … have effects on how we understand the 
world’ (Hartsock, 1987: 188). Every researcher’s positionality influences his or her 
point of view on the research question and the nature of the investigation, it shapes 
fieldwork relations, and eventually the information produced (Hastrup, 1992; 
McDowell, 1992; England, 1994; Katz, 1994; Kobayashi, 1994; Cloke et al., 2000). 
Thus higher reflexivity is demanded over the issue of the ‘researcher’s effect’ 
(Malterud, 2001). The perspective of the observer is always limited and determines 
what can be seen. Knowledge is partial and situated according to the producer’s 
positionality (Haraway, 1991). Examination of one’s positionality is of particular 
importance during the fieldwork process when there is an unequal power 
relationship involved between the investigator and those being investigated (Gilbert, 
1994). Attention should be paid to the structures of power that privilege certain 
(typically white, male, middle class) voices, sanctioning some points of view, whilst 
silencing others (typically people of colour, female, working-class) (Jackson, 
2000c).  
Clarifying one’s positionality is of particular importance when examining how 
disadvantaged groups obtain positions in collaborative governance. This has led to 
two issues in this research: one is about the selection of interviewees, and the other 
is the reflexivity of myself as researcher. Firstly, it is crucial for the marginalised to 
speak for themselves, without distortion by researchers or being represented by the 
so-called ‘key informants’ (Hartsock, 1987: 189; Spivak, 1988). Secondly, the 
positionality of myself as the researcher and my subjects, and the power relations 
between us, need to be recognised (McDowell, 1992). In addition, the fieldwork 
process should also be seen as a dialogical process between the researcher and the 
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researched (ibid) rather than a clear dichotomy between an ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ 
(Herod, 1999). My positionality in the chosen fieldwork site is threefold: first as an 
academic, second as a local and lastly as an environmental activist. My association 
with some of the research sites helped me to perceive local politics and social 
changes more concisely. I had insight into local knowledge and a personal network 
related to the research sites. The following section is an effort to position myself in 
relation to the case studies.  
 
3.5.1. As a local  
 
Positionality refers to a person’s physical and social characteristics in relation to the 
research. In this regard, I am a mature female, middle class, native of southern 
Taiwan. I have spent half of my life in Kaohsiung city, the biggest city in southern 
Taiwan, located in the Kaoping River area. Being a local definitely influenced my 
exploration of environmental collaboration between the state and society in the 
Kaoping River basin. Both advantages and disadvantages coexist in the case of 
conducting research in a home environment. One of the benefits of ‘home 
advantage’ (Crow and Allan, 1994; Herod, 1999) is that it allows greater access to 
information and enables the researcher to more easily develop trust and 
understanding with his or her subjects. This mirrors my relationship with 
interviewees and both the type and depth of communication between us. My 
sensitivity and distinct insight, derived from me being a local, as Lawson (1997) 
suggested, is an important element in conducting realist research. It helps me to 
appreciate my respondents’ narratives and to be aware of their position over local 
governance issues and their transition. Such insight is more difficult for a non-local 
to obtain, but it risks the research being designed in ways that reinforce the views 
that were held of the situation before the research commenced. 
 
There are also drawbacks to being a local insider. Sometimes, research participants 
may omit information due to a presumption that I could already be familiar with it. 
In some circumstances, they may presume that I will take a position about certain 
local controversial issues and avoid revealing their true thoughts. These two issues 
rely on my sensitivity to judge the depth of dialogue, and also my confidence to 
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encourage them to deliver more intimate details. Aware of these potential issues, I 
undertook a strategy called ‘the participating observer’s sidetrack’ to create an 
appropriate distance from a study setting that I was personally involved in. This was 
to avoid direct intervention with the social events I was studying. Instead of making 
myself part of the research object, i.e. being a research instrument in the study 
setting, as some cultural scholars might suggest (Kitchin and Tate, 1999), I reserved 
a position as an observer and avoided directly engaging with the research events and 
the leading participants’ thoughts and behaviour. 
 
3.5.2. As an activist 
 
Since 1995 I have been a local environmentalist in Kaohsiung City alongside 
developing my career as a journalist. Being a journalist provided me with the 
privilege of engaging and intervening in public policy. This further aroused my 
interest in influencing the policy process for the public good, which was rooted in 
my involvement in student movements in the early 1990s. I was employed by two 
news publications during my nine-year journalism career. I spent the first half of the 
nine years in the capital, Taipei, working for the a magazine called News Weekly 
and the second half in Kaohsiung City working for the Taiwan Daily. The latter 
supported my intention to use news coverage as a vehicle to influence policies on 
several environmental and cultural conservation projects in Kaohsiung city. That 
coverage and subsequent lobbying led to successful campaigns and made me 
something of a household name in local activist and political circles. In relation to 
this research, my experience in local environmental campaigns and journalism 
provided me with access to key decision makers and key actors. Approximately one 
third of the interviewees in the research were my acquaintances or were introduced 
by acquaintances. Because of my pre-existing relations with, and knowledge about, 
the river basin, the interviewees may have found it easier to develop an in-depth 
dialogue with me and provide me with controversial or confidential information. 
Other researchers might not have been able to achieve the same level of mutual 
understanding or acquire the same depth of information as I could.  
 
The experience of being an activist led me to aspire to join a dissenting tradition 
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(Blaut, 1979) of ‘people’s geography’ (Bunge, 1971, 1977; Peet, 1977; Blaut, 1979) 
in which geographers should (i) prioritise the study of crucial social, economic and 
environmental issues with (ii) an aim to devise feasible solutions in (iii) a way that 
includes ordinary people who are subject to those problems and solutions (Castree, 
2000). While points (i) and (ii) correspond with the purpose of this research, point 
(iii) was not adopted. This is because although some researchers advocate the need 
to bridge the chasm between geographical ‘activism and academy’ (Blomley, 1994), 
and seek to do away with the academic/activist divide (Tickell, 1995; Routledge, 
1996; Lees, 1999; Ruddick, 2001; Chatterton, 2006), for others, being both an 
activist and academic is a ‘killing opposition’ for both parties (Routledge, 1996) 
because the two states can be regarded as mutually exclusive (Halfacree, 2004). As 
a preliminary study of East Asian environmental collaborative governance, this 
research had no intention of adopting an action-oriented stance (Kitchin and Tate, 
1999). Instead I situated myself in the position of seeking to gain ‘something’ more 
through the activism experience, rather than personally involving myself with the 
people and communities studied or intervening in the ‘real world’ (Castree, 2000). 
Also, I am aware that my activist background may draw questions on my position 
over my research perspective. One of the possibilities is to overpraise the actions of 
local activists. This awareness led me to be as circumspect as possible, though not 
necessarily as ‘neutral’, to both sides, i.e. the state and social actors, in their 
collaborative efforts. 
 
3.6. Research process: data collection, data processing, analysis, 
and reporting 
 
Based on the principles of methodology that critical realism suggests, the value of 
scientific research lies at probing beneath the surface of social events to discover the 
underlying generative mechanisms that make social phenomena and changes 
possible. That is to say, the research must start from analysing both the narrative and 
description of concrete social phenomena, and then proceed through iterative 
abstraction and mediation between theory and empirical material. By continuously 
abstracting the major mechanism and contextual contingencies of social events from 
the empirical material, this effort gradually theorises them. However, the theory 
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should be proven to be valid and transferable only when it explains empirical cases. 
A proposed procedure of realist research is illustrated in Figure 3.2. A review of the 
literature on governance theory and East Asian governance produced a set of 
assumptions regarding the emergence of collaborative governance in Taiwan, which 
led to the analytical model in Chapter Two. This research then sought to validate the 
assumptions empirically by the use of a retroductive approach, which moves from a 
descriptive account of a social phenomenon to its causal mechanisms and context 
contingency. The result is a mediation between theoretical conceptualisation and 
empirical validation. Thus the three core activities, namely data collection, data 
processing and analysis, and reporting, are not proceeded in a linear sequence, but 
rather in a circular and iterative one (Sarantakos, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
 
Figure 3.3: Research flowchart   
 
 
Details of each phase are summarised in Table 3.3. Most empirical work in the field 
took place between January 2006 and March 2007. After the field work, I started to 
process and analyse the empirical material which lasted until the end of 2008. The 
process of data processing and analysis is never linear, but moves between concrete 
social phenomena and theoretical abstraction. The report form will be the 
production of the thesis, mainly accomplished between April 2007 and Dec 2011. 
 
 
 
Empirical validations 
Triangulation: 
 Iterative  
Abstraction
Assumptions 
Literature review 
Causal 
mechanism 
Context 
Contingency 
Theorisation  
Re-conceptualisation 
Intensive 
data 
Retroduction 
Extensive 
data 
 84
Table 3. 3: Three research processes 
Phase  Activities  Time frames 
Press-cutting survey Jan 2006 – June 2006 
Participant observation Jan 2006 – Aug 2008 
In-depth interviews Aug 2006 – April 2007 Data collection 
Official documents and other 
data sources 
Jan 2006 – March 2007 
Survey summary April 2006 – Dec 2006 
Interview transcription Aug 2006 – April 2007 
Analysis of extensive data Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 
Data processing and 
analysis 
Intensive data coding Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 
Reporting  Thesis writing April 2007 – Dec 2011 
 
 
3.6.1. Data collection 
 
As critical realism suggests, research data are best produced from multiple sources, 
most feasibly from both intensive and extensive methods. Due to the lack of 
statistical materials on the research subjects, the relevant organisations, and the new 
environmental policies of collaborative governance, the extensive approach adopted 
a systematic analysis of press-cuttings. This produced an overall picture of the 
trends and regularities of collaborative governance in river management of the 
Kaoping River. The intensive methods adopted here consist of in-depth interviews 
and participant observation to explore the causal mechanisms of the emergence and 
development of collaboration.  
 
The research began with a survey of press-clippings to capture the overall contours 
of the study, specifically quantitative information around the topic of state-society 
collaboration in the Kaoping River basin, and key actors in specific events related to 
the topic. At the same time the researcher participated in major relevant events to 
conduct participant observation to explore information that was absent from, or 
contradicted, the respondents’ narratives. In the second half of 2006, the researcher 
asked key actors, identified from the news-archive analysis and participant 
observation, about their willingness to be interviewees in an in-depth interview. All 
consented. The first two data collection methods also benefitted the research by 
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allowing me to amend interview topics and to make my questions more specific. 
Between August 2006 and April 2007, I conducted the third data collection process- 
interviewing key actors (in related communities, organisations and government 
departments) using an interview guide approach. Secondary data sources also 
included a few documents from government statistics and an environmental internet 
newsletter released by environmental NGOs17. 
 
Table 3. 4: Focus of three methods of data collection  
Method of data collection Focus questions 
News-archive survey The trends and regularities of the emergence and 
development of collaborative governance in the 
Kaoping River basin 
Observation The transition of state-society relationship in 
collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin
In-depth interview The motivation and decision-making of interviewees 
to undertake collaborative governance in the 
Kaoping River basin and their perception about 
whether collaboration improves environmental 
governance 
 
 
3.6.1.1  News-archive survey  
 
Press-clippings obtained from an electronic news-archive were the main method 
used to understand the background to the case studies. The research analysed a large 
number of media reports covering a relatively long period of time (from 1961 to 
2006) and a large geographic scope (the four administrative areas in southern 
Taiwan). This activity facilitated the research chronologically and allowed 
investigation of the trend towards, and regularities of, collaborative governance in 
the river basin. Usually this method is referred to as content analysis and involves 
analyses of messages conveyed by the media. Its major benefit is cost-efficiency 
because the information is relatively complete and therefore can lead to sound 
statements regarding the social world (Jackson, 1995). This approach also identified 
many of the key civil actors and governmental officials involved in the case studies 
and organised major events as an ‘event history’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994). But 
                                                 
17 For example, one newsletter is from Taiwan Environmental Information Centre 
http://e-info.org.tw/. 
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it is not without its limitations. Certain newspapers have their political and/or social 
stance which dictates their press coverage. Also, as noted by some researchers, the 
result of news sampling was inevitably affected by factors external to the data itself, 
including the availability of resources, the object of the research and the capacity of 
the researchers (Weber, 1985: 42-3; Mason, 1994: 91-2; Bryman, 2001: 182-5). The 
samples examined can influence the results obtained (Flick, 2002). This led to the 
decision to acquire news-clippings as comprehensively as possible.  
 
Apart from the above two points, the search found one more major limitation which 
was that the necessary information is often unavailable or incomplete. The UDN 
news-archive18 used in this research is a privately-run electronic national press 
archive in Taiwan, which translated five mainstream paper-version newspapers, 
namely the UDN, Ming Sen Daily (MSD), Economic Daily News (EDN), United 
Evening News (UEN), and Star Daily (SD), into electronic data. All of these 
newspapers are distributed island-wide. The UDN archive was selected because its 
collection of electronic resources is comparatively comprehensive, dating back to 
1961, whereas other sources covered a shorter period. However, its political stance 
tends to be conservative. The UDN is a Kuomintang (KMT)19 supporter, but no 
obvious bias was found in its environmental coverage. For example, when the KMT 
was in power, a demonstration against water development projects took place in 
August 1998 in the capital, Taipei. The news-archive presented a more impartial 
report than another seemingly reform-oriented newspaper, the China Times, which 
faced the threat from one of the corporations involved to withdraw its 
advertisements. Also, the effect of its political preference was mitigated because of 
                                                 
18 In the initial stage of selecting news-archives to be my main extensive resource, I considered three 
sources, the United Daily News (UDN), the China Times and the Central News Agency. Eventually 
only one of them, the UDN, was chosen because the data of the other two were found to be 
fragmented and incomplete. 
19 Kuomintang, also called Chinese Nationalist Party by its word meaning, is the founding and 
ruling political party of the Republic of China (ROC). Established in Mainland China in 1894, the 
party’s major purpose was to overthrow the Chin dynasty and democratise the nation. However, it 
was defeated by the communist party and then retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Its rule of Taiwan was 
known as an authoritarian regime between 1949 to 1987 when it pronounced the lift of martial law 
due to rising social demands and its crisis of legitimacy. A slow progress towards a more transparent 
and localised party has taken place inside the party during the post-authoritarian regime. Today, most 
of its supporters still uphold the value of eventual unification with the mainland. The rule of the 
KMT over Taiwan has lasted until now, except for the period between 2000 and 2008 when the DPP 
took power. In comparison the DPP, called Democratic Progressive Party, was established in Taiwan 
in 1986 when social movements mushroomed. It has upheld the value of Taiwan’s independence and 
a variety of social reforms and pronounced itself as a partner of the social movements. 
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Taiwan’s democratic transition. The country had gone through two transfers of 
political power in the previous two decades, and had arrived at a position of 
democratic consolidation (Hsiao, 1987). The authenticity, credibility and 
representativeness (Scott, 1990) of the archive is derived from its position as the 
earliest, most complete and prestigious archive available from the 1950s onwards. 
Access to the press archive was not free. Access was restricted, based on 
subscription charges20.  
 
Press-clippings were sampled based on key words, including ‘the Kaoping River’, 
‘River Enclosure’, ‘Water Defence’, and ‘Riverfront Adoption’. A total of 6,080 
clippings, ranging from 1961 to 2006, were found. They were systematically 
reviewed and major events relating to collaborative river governance were extracted.  
The news-archive data acquired were summarised, explicated and structured as 
suggested by the method of content analysis (Mayring, 1983; cited in Flick, 2002: 
190-194).  
 
First, they were roughly categorised based on theme-related codes. These were:  
? pollution and prevention  
? clean action  
? ecological and environmental conservation  
? development of reclaimed land  
? management of sand and gravel  
? soil erosion  
? abusive use of the river bed  
? flooding and prevention  
? water resource and management  
? civil action 
? governance reform  
 
In order to probe the emergence of collaboration between the state and society, 
when an event related both to the categories of civil action and governance reform it 
meant that it was more likely to be related to the object of this research, and so was 
                                                 
20 The researcher got access to the archive as an alumna of San Yet-sen University in Kaohsiung 
which subscribes to the archive. 
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given more attention. Second, the volume of news-clippings was further managed to 
retain only those related to Water Defence, Riverfront Adoption, and River 
Enclosure. From this, the researcher acquired background knowledge of the 
emergence of collaborative action for the management of the river basin and 
produced an overall contour of it (see Chapter Four). This research also roughly 
identified the key actors in these events who then became interviewees. Last but not 
least, the data was further interpreted in terms of collaborative governance, and the 
internal structure of social events in the news-clippings was investigated whether it 
fitted (or not) into the analytical model developed in Chapter Two. This 
re-organisation and interpretation of data facilitates further comparison between the 
three major cases.  
 
The data derived from news-archive was analysed and examined based on a coding 
schema developed from the provisional analytical model (Figure 2.3) in a structured 
way and tried to be exhaustive in providing available codes for all possible relevant 
behaviours related to collaborative governance. By applying this coding schema, it 
was easier to distinguish and identify collaborative cases from the vast amount of 
news-clippings. Then I could further explore the process and political implications 
of collaborative governance in the detailed case studies in Chapters Five to Seven. 
The coding schema is comprised of six determined categories of codes: 
? Starting point (motivation, environmental problems/concerns, geographic issues, 
conflicts, dissension, resentment) 
? Initiation (leadership, strategy, solution, decision-making) 
? Factors (local politics, power changes, organisational capacity) 
? Process/development (public reaction, governments’ responses, available 
resources, policy ownerships, reciprocity, mutual respect, public participation, 
collaboration, volunteering, state-society cooperation, dialogues, negotiation, 
bargaining, persuasion) 
? Outcomes  
? Feedbacks (reflections, institutionalisations, policy reforms, adaptations, 
co-options)  
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3.6.1.2  In-depth interviews 
 
In-depth interviews permit researchers to explore subjective meanings and motives 
revealed from respondents’ narratives because they allow the subjects to speak for 
themselves (Jackson, 2000a). In addition, this research adopted an interview-guide 
approach, which is less structured than a standardised open-ended interview 
approach (Patton, 1990). With the interview guide approach the topics and issues to 
be covered are specified in advance in outline form (see Table 3.7 for the relation 
between research questions and interview questions). However, during the 
interviews the wording and sequence of questions can be varied. This is so that the 
interviewer has greater freedom to explore emergent topics of interest, while 
providing the interviewee with a conversational and informal context in which to 
express what they find important to convey (ibid). Free-form interviews are often 
adopted when people of high-status are involved. It is thought that such people do 
not respond well to a situation where a questionnaire is read to them (Jackson, 1995), 
and this applied to many cases in this research. 53 in-depth interviews of key actors 
were conducted (see Table 3.5 for the categories of interviewees and Table 3.8 for 
the full list of them)21. The interviewees were mainly divided into three types: (1) 
key actors from civil society (i.e. major actors in collaborative action, usually senior 
members in environmental organisations, community associations, and village 
representatives), (2) government officials (most of them practitioners of 
collaborative governance in the case studies), and (3) a number of other important 
stakeholders (i.e. scholars, fundamentalist environmental groups22 and business 
organisations in the river basin). The majority of interviewees were selected from 
the news-archive reviews and participant observation activities, where the 
researcher discovered who the key actors were. Very few of the interviewees were 
found through the snow-ball method, i.e. introduced by another interviewee. The 
researcher was also cautious about stratifying interviewees based on their age, sex, 
organisational occupation or social position. This was especially important in the 
case of Water Defence in which a variety of respondents (i.e. key actors) could be 
                                                 
21 Five of the interviewees played a role in more than one of the categories of collaborative action in 
this study. 
22 By fundamentalist environmental groups I mean those groups which hold eco-centered belief and 
refuse to compromise with political or economic conditions. In this study, they refer to groups such 
as Taiwan Citizens of the Earth and Taiwan Environmental Protection Union. 
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found. In contrast, in the cases of Riverfront Adoption and River Enclosure, it is 
unavoidable that most respondents were middle-aged males due to the nature of 
traditional leadership in Taiwanese rural society. 
 
The duration of the interviews ranged from two to three hours. This free-form 
interview required the interviewer to keep the conversation concentrated around a 
specific topic without digression. My experience as a journalist provided me with 
the ability to manoeuvre the interview process smoothly without the risk of letting 
the conversation wander too widely. Most interviews went well with productive 
dialogue and information. However, some of the respondents were more defensive 
than others, especially governmental officials and others who had factional interests 
in relation to a water-development project that generated severe conflicts in 2006, 
when I conducted the interviews. My strategy with defensive respondents was to 
show my knowledge of the events that they had experienced and display sympathy 
for his or her position, which usually encouraged them to reveal more intimate and 
detailed information.  
Some asymmetry occurred in the total number of interviews in the three types of 
collaborative governance categories. The number of interviews about Water 
Defence was significantly higher than the others. This was because Water Defence 
was a more complicated case than that of Riverfront Adoption or River Enclosure. 
The Water Defence interviewees were highly heterogeneous, and therefore required 
more interviewees than those in the other two categories. 
 
Table 3. 5: The Categories of In-depth Interviewees  
Action type  Interview number Categories of interviewee 
Civil actors x 23 
Governmental officials x 7 
Water Defence 31 
Other stakeholders x 1 
Civil actors x 4 
Governmental officials x 5 
Riverfront Adoption 10 
Other stakeholders x 1 
Civil actors x 11 
Governmental officials x 5 
River Enclosure 16 
Other stakeholders x 0 
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 3.6.1.3  Observation   
 
Observation was considered as being developed from a traditional scientific 
methodology, which implies that the researcher is an objective scientist seeing 
social phenomena from a neutral perspective. It assumed that the observer had no 
particular purposes or pre-existing assumptions when observing a social 
phenomenon (Kitchin and Tate, 1999). My way of conducting observations diverges 
from this model and is influenced by an ethnographic method called ‘participant 
observation’. Participant observation, originating in anthropological research on 
traditional societies in their natural settings, aims to produce first-hand data by 
entering a research site for prolonged and intensive observation in the field (Burgess, 
1984; Jackson, 2000b). Participant observation typically requires the researcher to 
gain entry into a group or an institution, and involves recording detailed interaction 
between members of the group. This can be done by taking part in the activities and 
sometimes by sharing in their life experiences or even becoming part of the action 
agency itself (Jackson, 1995). Whilst my method of conduction did not intend to 
follow strict participant observation, I amended the traditional ‘neutral and 
objective’ approach to a more participatory way. This means that I did not avoid 
personal interactions with my subjects and sometimes took part in the activities 
myself. This benefitted me as I was able to obtain more confidential information, 
especially regarding the practice of power relationships.   
 
During the observation process, social events unfold in their natural social settings 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1995:79), but it relies on the observer’s ability to interpret 
what is happening in a systemic way, and what are the mechanisms that lie behind it 
and the meanings of social events and peoples’ behaviour patterns. Observation, in 
this research, was conducted through a lens of collaborative governance theory 
reviewed in Chapter Two, which implied that the researcher observe social 
phenomena with a clear conscience in searching for a diversity of governance 
behaviours and forms.  
 
I conducted observation at 33 major events (see Table 3.9 for a full list of observed 
events and Table 3.6 for a brief categorisation of them). The purpose was to analyse 
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the political implications of the interactions between key civil actors and 
governmental officials in relation to collaborative governance by observing relevant 
events. In the research, while key actor interviews aimed to explore how 
interviewees perceive certain topics, observation was more about how the researcher 
perceived them when witnessing the dynamic interaction between key actors. This 
was also a process whereby the researcher could establish trust with those 
researched, so that they subsequently felt more at ease to articulate how they 
conceived certain events and issues (Herod, 1999; Jackson, 2000b). 
 
Nevertheless, in this research, observation is of minor importance in terms of 
producing data for analysis, but it plays an important contextual role for the 
researcher. It helped capture an overview of the processes of local collaboration and 
identified a potential list of interviewees in the early stages of the research 
(alongside the press-clippings). Unfortunately, the physical difficulty and time 
restrictions made the researcher unable to engage as thoroughly as wanted in local 
activities in all communities and villages, especially in the categories of Riverfront 
Adoption and River Enclosure, and this weakened the contribution of observation to 
the research. In contrast, Water Defence and related national/regional environmental 
events were more accessible and vibrant during the period of observation. This 
resulted in an asymmetry in the number of observations in different cases. However, 
observation remains an effective and productive way to highlight some of the 
contradictions between actors’ accounts and what the researcher witnessed. 
Moreover, observation in a few major national events also helped the researcher to 
identify key actors in local governance to interview at a later time. My impressions 
and reflections about the observations were recorded during the settings, sometimes 
immediately after the observed events. The notes of observation were analysed 
along with the interview transcriptions to highlight the contradictions between the 
respondents’ narratives and the researcher’s perception. 
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Table 3. 6: The Categories of Observation  
Collaborative action categories Number of participant observations  
National/regional environmental events  9 
Water Defence 18 
Riverfront Adoption 3 
River Enclosure 3 
 
 
3.6.2. Data processing and analysis 
 
The enormous amount of narrative material from interviews was transcribed and 
coded using a thematic coding system (Miles and Huberman, 1984), in which codes 
were based on in the conceptual framework established in Chapter Two derived 
from the governance literature, yet remaining open to the re-education that comes 
from the discovery of unexplored or unexpected outcomes (ibid).  
 
Both news-archive reviews and interview records invite the utilisation of content 
analysis. Traditional content analysis seeks to quantify content in terms of 
pre-determined categories in a systematic and replicable manner (Bryman, 2001; 
Flick, 2002) to minimise any possible bias (Reason and Garcia, 2007). The 
‘quantitative description’ (Berelson, 1952) that content analysis aims to generate 
indicates one of its limitations - that it focuses on counting text rather than analysing 
content (Philo, 1988) - and thus neglects the essential elements in a text (Ahuvia, 
2001). This leads to its inability to capture hidden meanings and the wider 
implications of the material (Reason and Garcia, 2007). However, a purely 
qualitative approach brings its own difficulties, not least that such data are mostly 
voluminous, unstructured and unwieldy (Bryman and Burgess, 1994: 216). It thus 
makes it difficult to increase the generalisability of the research findings, as well as 
making comparisons across several cases. Instead of producing a quantitative 
account from the clippings in the newspaper archive, this research aims to produce a 
more interpretative account of the evolution of governance in the Kaoping River 
basin.   
 
Case study findings are reported in Chapters Five to Seven of this thesis. Given the 
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nature of the writing process, the thesis is a story built from selected pieces of 
information. It is a narrative of state-society collaborative action in the river basin. It 
can be seen as ‘my story of their story’, while the complete stories are far more 
intricate and beyond that which can be shown in the thesis. In order to encourage 
information providers to discuss controversial issues, the researcher ensured their 
anonymity (French, 1993). Therefore interviewees and observation subjects are 
referred to by number in this Chapter and in Chapters Five to Seven. The thesis uses 
direct quotations from interview transcripts wherever possible in order to preserve 
the language of the research participants (Winchester, 1999).  
 
 
3.7. Ethical dimensions  
 
Some of the ethical dimensions of this research are commented upon earlier in this 
chapter. This brief section makes it clear that this study has been conducted within 
the guidelines laid down by the Graduate School at UCL23  although these were 
not as detailed as they are today when the field research was conducted. The 
guidelines require that all research involving human subjects should ensure that it is 
carried out safely and with the agreed consent of the interviewees, respecting their 
autonomy and privacy, and reflects concern for the power relationship between the 
researcher and the researched.  In this study, the researched, especially those less 
educated and less powerful in economic and social terms, were encouraged to speak 
in support of their rights and interests. Before each interview started, it was 
explained that the contents of the interview were to be kept confidential and in their 
presentation later in the thesis, great care is taken in the quoted parts of narratives to 
avoid including information that would identify the interviewee. This practice 
supports the policy of data protection and interviewee privacy. All interviewees 
were to remain anonymous and it was agreed that the transcription of the full 
narratives would not be revealed to any other party. All interviewees could decline 
to answer any of my questions. 
                                                 
23 Please find UCL related policy at http://ethics.grad.ucl.ac.uk/ and 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/research/images/research-ethics-framework retrieved at 2012-06-15.  
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 3.8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter explains that the underlying methodological decisions made in this 
research arise from the philosophy of critical realism, which responds to the world 
view of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two. The research adopts a 
multi-method research approach that combines in-depth interviews, participant 
observation and a newspaper archive survey in the form of a case study of the 
Kaoping River, Taiwan. This approach establishes a complementary relation 
between extensive and intensive methods to explore both the regularity of 
collaborative environmental governance and its causal mechanisms. For instance, if 
the examples of collaborative governance appear repeatedly and significantly to a 
level that we would call a general phenomenon rather than a handful of unique cases 
that occur only in a particular context and circumstance, then we can define the 
phenomenon as having certain regularity. 
 
This approach investigates the decisions and strategy of organised social actors (i.e. 
individual organisations/communities/tribal villages) in initiating collaboration with 
the state, without losing sight of the broader contextual influence (i.e. local political 
structure and global economic competition). It therefore represents a commitment to 
the combination of micro- and macro-level study of the implications of 
collaborative behaviour in state-society relations.  
Collaborative environmental governance in the Kaoping River basin was chosen as 
the case study setting because of its history of unbalanced power relations between 
state and society. By examining the development of collaboration, the case study 
explores how the state-society relation has been transformed and how and whether 
environmental governance has been improved. This research selected three 
categories of environmental action and each of them contains three to seven 
stratified examples based on their location and social composition. Interviewees 
were stratified based on their age, sex, organisational occupation, and social position. 
This strategy of stratification aims to increase the generalisability of the research 
findings. Following the strategy of critical realism, the research applies a three-step 
procedure of qualitative content analysis to reduce the amount of contextual 
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material and to find a common structure within the material. Then it adopts a 
retroductive method and iterative abstraction to analyse the material for the 
exploration of the causal mechanisms and context contingency. These actions enable 
a comparative study between, and within, the categories.
 
Table 3. 7: The Relation between Research Questions and Major Interview Questions  
Research questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview questions 
What have been 
the reasons that 
have motivated 
the emergence of 
environmental 
collaborative 
governance? 
Have different 
approaches to 
initiating 
environmental 
collaborative 
governance led to 
different 
processes and 
results? 
Does the emergence of 
environmental 
collaborative 
governance promise a 
new pattern for its 
long-term development 
through its 
institutionalisation 
within the policy 
structure generally? 
What are the levels 
of transformability 
and constraints of 
collaborative 
governance in the 
context of Taiwan?
Does the current 
practice of 
collaborative 
governance in 
Taiwan result in a 
true transition of 
the state-society 
relationship or is 
it just a disguised 
form of 
corporatist 
strategy? 
Please explain how your 
organisation is engaged 
in river governance and 
river protection. 
ˇ ˇ    
Please explain the 
reasons why you 
initiate/take part in the 
collaborative 
governance over the 
Kaoping River 
protection and the 
changing practice of the 
organisation.  
ˇ ˇ    
Please compare and 
contrast the major 
activities of your 
organisation and its 
interaction with the 
state and non-state 
actors in the 1990s and 
2000s. 
    ˇ 
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Extended questions:  
Please explain if the 
institutionalisation of 
collaborative 
environmental 
governance affects 
the effectiveness of 
collaborative 
practice. 
  ˇ   
Extended questions:  
Please explain if 
collaborative 
governance changes 
traditional corporatist 
politics. 
   ˇ ˇ 
Please evaluate the 
current collaborative 
practice in river 
governance. 
   ˇ  
Please predict if the 
future practice of your 
organisation in five 
years time will be 
consistent with the 
current collaborative 
practice. 
  ˇ   
Extended questions:  
Please predict, if 
current collaborative 
practice in 
governance is 
unsatisfactory, how 
your organisation will 
change its course of 
   ˇ ˇ 
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action and interaction 
with the state and 
non-state actors? 
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Table 3. 8: Full list of interviewees 
Environmentalists 
Number Age & 
Sex 
Position  Affiliation Interview date Engagement 
001 60~70, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
2006-12-30 WD 
002 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
Takao Green Association for Ecology and Humane 
Studies (TGA) 2006-10-21  WD 
003 40~50, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
2006-5-22 WD 
004 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
2007-02-06 WD 
005 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
2006-11-19  WD 
006 40~50, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
Wetlands Taiwan 
2006-11-18 WD 
007 40~50, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
2006-11-17 WD 
008 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
2006-12-6 WD 
009 30~40, 
male 
Paid Staff 
Kaohsiung Wild Bird Society 
2006-10-12 WD 
010 40~50, 
female 
Paid Staff 2006-10-17 WD 
011 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
2007-01-31 WD 
012 20~30, 
female 
Paid Staff 2006-12-7 WD 
013 30~40, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association 
2007-3-8 WD 
014 30~40, 
male 
Paid Staff Meinung People’s Association 2006-5-19 WD 
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015 30~40, 
male 
Paid Staff 2006-11-13 WD 
016 60~70, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
2006-04-02 WD 
017 20~30, 
female 
Paid Staff 2006-8-2 WD 
018 30~40, 
female 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
2006-8-2 WD 
Government officials 
019 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Public Works Bureau of Kaohsiung City 2007-2-12  WD 
020 40~50, 
male 
Paid Staff Water Resource Bureau of Kaohsiung County 2007-01-18 WD, RA 
021 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Planning Office, Kaohsiung County 2006-6-29 WD 
022 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Ecological Conservation Section in Agriculture Bureau 
of Kaohsiung County Government 
2006-11-9 RE 
023 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Kaoping River Watershed Administration Committee 2006-12-15 WD, RA 
024 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff 2006-12-15, 
2006-12-26 
WD, RA 
025 40~50, 
male 
Paid Staff Seventh River Management Office 2006-12-7 WD, RA 
026 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Dashu Township Office 2007-01-15 RA 
027 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Kaohsiung Aborigine Bureau, Kaohsiung Government 2007-01-15 RE 
028 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Water Resource Bureau, Pingtung Government 2007-02-07 WD 
029 40~50, 
male 
Paid Staff Pingtung Aborigine Bureau, Pingtung Government 2007-02-06 RE 
030 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Sandimen Township Office 2007-02-09 RE 
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031 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Management Office of Maolin National Scenic Area 2007-01-25 RE 
Grassroots groups 
032 40~50, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members Old Iron Bridge Association 
2006-11-11 RA 
033 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members Minchiuan Community Development Association 
2006-12-02 RE 
034 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
Sanmin Township Love Homeland Alliance (and 
Mintzu Community Development Association) 
2006-12-03  RE 
035 40~50, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members Gaujung Community Development Association 
2006-12-4 RE 
036 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
Tauyuan Township Love Homeland Alliance (and 
Meilan Community Development Association) 
2006-12-4 RE 
037 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members Tauyuan Township Love Homeland Alliance 
2006-12-4 RE 
038 40~50, 
female 
Paid Staff Fushing Community Development Association 2006-12-5 RE 
039 60~70, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members Association of Jhuokou River Protection 
2006-12-5 RE 
040 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
2006-12-29 RA 
041 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
A-Ligang Cultural Association 2006-12-29 RA 
042 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members Dashe Community Development Association 
2007-01-02 RE 
043 20~30, 
female 
Paid Staff Dashe Community Development Association 2007-01-02 RE 
044 40~50, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members Koushe Community Development Association 
2007-01-14 RE 
045 40~50, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members Local cultural development leader 
2007-01-14 RE 
046 50~60, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members Association of Mangrove Protection 
2007-02-13 RA 
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Fundamentalist groups 
047 40~50, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
Ecology Education Centre of Kaohsiung City Teachers’ 
Association 
2006-04-8 WD 
048 40~50, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU) 
Pingtung Branch 
2006-10-23 WD 
049 30~40, 
male 
Non-Paid Senior 
Members 
Ecology Education Centre of Pingtung County 
Teachers’ Association 
2006-12-26 WD 
Scholars 
050 40~50, 
male 
Paid Staff National Kaohsiung First University of Science and 
Technology 
2006-12-29 WD 
051 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Water Resources Education and Studies in National 
Pingtung University of Science and Technology 
2007-01-12 WD 
Economic groups 
052 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Pingtung Sand and Stone Association 2007-02-01 RA 
053 50~60, 
male 
Paid Staff Farm Irrigation Association of Kaohsiung 2007-02-08 WD 
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Table 3. 9: Full list of observations   
Events Case study Date  
National Conference on Environmental Action Plan Towards Sustainability- 
Environmental NGOs’ Regional Forum (Northern Taiwan Section) 
 
National environmental 
event 
2006-1-13 
National Conference on Environmental Action Plan Towards Sustainability- 
Environmental NGOs’ Regional Forum (Southern Taiwan Section) 
National environmental 
event 
2006-1-15 
National Conference on Environmental Action Plan Towards Sustainability- Regional 
Forum (Southern Taiwan Section) 
National environmental 
event 
2006-3-21 
National Conference on Environmental Action Plan Towards Sustainability- National 
Forum 
National environmental 
event 
2006-4-21/22 
2006 National NGOs Conference on Rivers  National environmental 
event related to river 
governance 
2006-3-11 
Wetlands Taiwan advocates for reserve establishments and rehabilitation in 3700 
hectares returned from salt pans due to the privatisation of the state-owned Taiwan Salt 
Company (TAIYEN). 
WD 2006-3-14 
The advocacy and construction of wetland eco-corridor in urban Kaohsiung. Wetlands 
reconstruction has been advocated since 1995, but mostly concentrated after 2000.  
WD 2006-3-21 
Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association’s activities as a project host to establish 
Life-Long Learning Mechanism in Pingtung area by empowering and training grassroots 
organisations to provide learning resources 
WD 2006-3-28 
Tenth anniversary of Wetlands Taiwan in 2006: publication, festival activities, film 
making, reviews 
WD 2006-2-1 
Discussions of the problems on organizational practices in Wetlands Taiwan WD 2006-5-1 
Forum towards Sustainability in Kao-Kao-Ping Area (including Kaohsiung city, 
Kaohsiung county, and Pingtung county) 
Regional environmental 
event 
2006-3-25 
 105 
Symposium of Trans-basin diversion between Laonong River and Tsengwen Reservoir, 
an open dialogue between the officials from Water Resource Agency, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, and indigenous activists, villagers and environmental organisations 
WD 2006-4-4 
Activities of Anti-Hushan dam projects and protest against destruction of the habitat of 
the Pitta (a kind of eight-coloured bird, also called Ching Ming Fairy because they 
migrate to Taiwan during Ching Ming Festival at the beginning of April)  
WD 2006-4-8 
National Forum on River Enclosure and Fish Conservancy organised by the Forestry 
Bureau, Council of Agriculture, and invited main village practitioners, officials, and 
stakeholders to discuss the mechanism, funding, and practices of the conservation 
movement 
RE 2006-6-25/24 
Anti-transbasin diversion construction press conference and pledge by villagers from 
Sanmin and Tauyuan Townships and officers from Kaohsiung County Government 
WD 2006-6-29 
Private communication and consensus meeting between urban environmental activists 
and officials from the Water Resource Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs, including 
the Director General himself 
WD 2006-7-5 
2006 Kaoping River Basin Water Resources Development and Management Conference 
organised by the Kaoping River Watershed Administration Committee 
Governance of Kaoping 
River 
2006-7-6 
Conference on Trans-basin Diversion Construction between Laonong River and 
Tsengwen Reservoir organised by the Kaohsiung County Government 
WD 2006-7-12 
Revival of Kao-Kao-Ping Water Protection Coalition WD 2006-7-16 
White Paper on Kaohsiung Environmental Policy- civil version Regional  environmental 
event 
2006-7-20 
Private policy seminar on the mergence of Kaohsiung County and Kaohsiung City and 
environmental issues 
Regional  environmental 
event 
2006-8-20 
Preparation discussion on the mergence of Kaohsiung County and City organised by 
Kaohsiung City Architects Association 
Regional  environmental 
event 
2006-10-4 
Regular Meeting of Kaoping Watershed Administration Committee to discuss about 
incorporating the management of Tsau-Gung Canal of Kaohsiung Irrigation Association 
Governance of Kaoping 
River 
2006-10-6 
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Meinung dam alternative- Planning of wetlands reconstruction for flood prevention and 
water environment restoration 
WD 2006-10-13 
Private communication and consensus meeting between urban environmental activists 
and officials from the Water Resource Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs, including 
the Deputy Director 
WD 2006-11-11 
Second meeting of the Kao-Kao-Ping Water Protection Coalition WD 2006-11-12 
Seminar on the improvement plan on the wetland park of the Kaoping River on the 
Pingtung side. 
RA  2007-1-11 
Report on the improvement plan to restore the local Wannian River in Pingtung County WD 2007-1-11 
The Governor of Pingtung county reported his policies on river and water resources to 
Kaohsiung environmental activists and sought the support of these groups and 
suggestions from them 
WD 2007-8-12 
Fundamentalist groups invited governmental agencies and other environmentalists to a 
site meeting about the current situation of mid-stream Kaoping River 
RA 2007-8-17 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Context 
 
4.1 The soft authoritarian state in transition 
 
In Chapter Two, this research commented on the preoccupation of the literature in 
the 1970s and 1980s on the nature of state-capacity in East Asian governance in 
terms of economic development (Amsden, 1994; Unger and Chan, 1995; Dauvergne, 
1998). It neglected a burgeoning civil society which played an essential role in 
governance reforms in the East in the 1990s (Yamamoto, 1996; Yamamoto and 
Ashizawa, 2001; Lee, 2004; Chiu, 2005). Civil society acted as a catalyst of changes 
by alerting existing institutions to problems of governance, by monitoring the 
performance of institutions and even by playing a role in the implementation of 
government programmes (McBeath and Leng, 2005). These actions explain why 
this research chose three types of environmental collaboration, in a particular river 
basin, to study how civil society has played a role in environmental collaborative 
governance from the 1990s onwards. 
 
This chapter first introduces the three phases of Taiwan’s environmental governance 
and its relation to the development of its country’s political economy in Section 4.2. 
It then lays out how the Kaoping River example mirrors the broader river 
governance in Taiwan in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 this chapter introduces the three 
case studies by explaining the background and origin of the three types of 
collaborative action in the Kaoping River basin.  
 
4.2 Three phases of Taiwan’s environmental governance 
 
4.2.1  Phase one: Authoritarian rule, economic boom and 
environmental deterioration 
 
Taiwan is well-known for its rapid economic growth during the post-World War II 
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era24, which was achieved, among other things, at the expense of environmental 
degradation (Edmonds, 1996; McBeath and Leng, 2005). This growth was closely 
associated with authoritarian rule under Martial Law between the 1950s and 1980s. 
This period of authoritarian rule led to a strong bureaucracy which monopolised the 
policy process and maintained a social corporatist order (Unger and Chan, 1995). 
This form of bureaucratic politics dominated the policy process and its 
implementation (McBeath and Leng, 2005). At the same time, its support of a 
meritocratic system aimed to establish a bureaucratic elite system which had the 
authority and expertise to decide and implement policies independent of pluralist 
interests and the control of local political factions. Most policies were decided by 
technocrats in central government.  
 
In the early stages of the rise of environmental consciousness, the government 
adopted a ‘command-and-control’ style of environmental management and 
suppressed social discontent arising from the external costs of industrialisation 
(Kirkpatrick, 1992; Arrigo, 1994). Although Taiwan’s environmental protection 
agency dates from the 1970s, its administrative position and influence in 
government was low and it lacked authority and resources. Although the first 
National Environmental Policy guidelines were introduced in 1979 as a common 
basis for the establishment of environmental programmes, central government 
continued with a ‘grow first, clean up later’ strategy by, for example, continuing to 
provide grants and give preferential treatment in its allocation of resources to 
heavily polluting industries, including the petrochemical and steel production 
industries.  
 
4.2.2  Phase two: The upsurge of civil environmental protests in 
Taiwan 
 
By the late 1980s, environmental problems had reached crisis levels, with some 
industrial complexes threatening the life and health of neighbourhood residents. 
Loose enforcement of regulations led to frequent environmental pollution around 
industrial complexes and several large-scale pollution events fuelled public anger. 
                                                 
24 Average GDP Growth Rates of 7.9% in the 1980s and 6.3% in the 1990s. 
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For example, the outrageous air/water pollution caused by the Ling Yuan 
petrochemical complex (in 1983) and the Lee Chang Rong petrochemical factory (in 
1986) led to an outburst of environmental protest catalysing environmental 
management bodies and civic groups. These serious pollution incidents coincided 
with the emergence of civil society more generally. Large-scale rallies, sit-ins, and 
even the direct blockage of polluting enterprises were organised, often led by local 
opposition politicians (McBeath and Leng, 2005). In the example of Lee Chang 
Rong, hundreds of residents blocked the factory for 425 days and finally forced the 
factory to close. At this stage, environmental protests often reflected ‘NIMBY’ism 
in their complaints and were often easily quelled by monetary compensation (ibid). 
For example, in the Ling Yuan case, several pollutant spill-over events were 
resolved by compensating local fishermen with USD $10 million.  
 
The lifting of Martial Law in 1987 further released social action and legalised street 
protests. It resulted in an increased number of, and the violence (Kirkpatrick, 1992) 
of, environmental protests against polluting industries (Hsiao, 1990). At this time 
the state saw environmental protests as a threat to social order and a disruption to 
the polluting industries that the state supported (McBeath and Leng, 2005). In 
response, in the same year, 1987, the state launched the bureaucratisation of 
environmental governance. The Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) 
was upgraded from its low political status to enforce environmental regulation, even 
if the purpose of the upgrade and related legislation was designed mainly to 
accommodate economic growth (Ho, 2005a) rather than to respond to social 
demands (Kirkpatrick, 1992). The EPA itself often became the target of 
environmental protests. Street protests reached their climax in 1991 with more than 
two hundred protests. Environmental activists remained highly active between 1992 
and 1999 (see Figure 4.1).  
 
Yet civic environmental actions gradually transformed into organised campaigns for 
environmental improvement during the mid-1990s (Ho, 2001). A large number of 
environmental organisations announced their establishment and registered as legal 
civil associations (otherwise these organisations would have been criticised as 
underground illegal associations). Many of them became more organised, expanded 
coalitions with environmental experts and established professional staff teams. 
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There were two major reasons behind this change. The first was the establishment of 
an institutionalised, deliberative system by the EPA which encouraged citizens’ 
participation in an institutional policy process. For example, Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIA) were introduced for assessing large scale development projects, 
a process that could be easily manipulated by those technocrats who prioritised 
development, but it also had the effect of encouraging environmental pressure 
groups to act within the bureaucratically-dominated institutional structure (Hsiao, 
1999).  
The second reason was the democratisation of the polity, transforming it from 
party-military rule to a soft authoritarian regime, and therefore it adopted a more 
accommodating stance towards social pressures (Hsiao, 1990). This transformation 
of the state encouraged environmental pressure groups to change their positions 
from destructive violent protests to a more organised civil society (ibid). For 
example, the state’s transformation encouraged some bureaucrats to collaborate with 
environmental, non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) in order to compete with 
development-first interests within policy institutions (McBeath and Leng, 2005). 
This transformation of Taiwan’s ENGOs also led them to master more complex 
skills in addressing governmental issues and when engaging with the bureaucracy 
(Hsiao, 1990). Mass demonstrations were less raucous and ENGOs developed a 
greater expertise in monitoring governmental policies. 
 
Figure 4.1: The Distribution of Environmental Street Protests in Taiwan 
(1980-1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ho (2001) 
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4.2.3  Phase three: From confrontation to cooperation 
 
Since the second half of the 1990s, growing commitment to cooperation between 
the state and society in environmental affairs has increased (Hsiao, 1995; Hsiao, 
1999; Chi, 2006). This cooperation has produced effective environmental 
improvements through organised public participation. It also reinforced the 
influence of social movements over environmental governance (Chang and Cheng, 
2003; Huang, 2004). As the official attitude toward ENGOs switched from 
confrontation to accommodation, the ENGOs also gained recognition at the 
policy-making level of governmental agencies. One type of recognition was that 
central ministries and agencies invited ENGOs and scholars to participate in 
advisory committees, such as the Wildlife Protection Advisory Committee, the EIA 
Review Committee, and the Sustainable Development Committee, all at cabinet 
level (McBeath and Leng, 2005). Another type of recognition was the delegation of 
governmental programmes, e.g. environmental monitoring, ecological investigation 
and promotion of environmental consciousness, to ENGOs by central or local 
governments 25 . This quasi-outsourcing of the work of government agencies 
improved the resource and standing of Taiwan’s ENGOs, the majority of which 
were small scale, and it also enhanced state policy performance. They acquired 
more complex expertise and confidential information through bargaining over 
policy (Hsiao, 1999). On the other hand, the experience of implementing 
government programmes incorporated ENGOs into state policy processes. This 
process led researchers to reach quite different conclusions. One argued that this 
type of cooperation remained marginal in its effects and largely helped enhancing 
the legitimacy of state policy and its processes (McBeath and Leng, 2005), while 
others called for greater and more effective cooperation along these lines (Hsiao, 
1999).  
 
What catalysed the reform movement in Taiwan was a conjuncture of several factors. 
The 2000 presidential election was a milestone in Taiwan’s democratisation and 
environmental governance. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate 
                                                 
25 This practice was different from the traditional corporatist strategy which had usually delegated 
government programmes to local officials or the organisations established/authorised by the state, i.e. 
GONGO (government-operated NGOs). 
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Chen Shui-bian won, the Kuomintang (KMT) lost, and Taiwan accomplished the 
first democratic power transition in its history. Once the DPP became the ruling 
party in 2000, observers expected it to enact its longstanding policy of 
environmental protection. However, these hopes were only partially realised. As the 
DPP altered from a protest party to a parliamentary party, vote-maximising became 
its prime concern. It converted the DPP’s radical pro-environmental position into a 
moderate one. The DPP’s performance in protecting the environment from industrial 
development was, seemingly, more aggressive than its KMT counterpart (McBeath 
and Leng, 2005), but in reality it was not. There are two well-known examples. Its 
failure to halt the building of a fourth nuclear power plant was one example, and the 
continuous development of water resources in southern Taiwan to meet industrial 
demands was another. The latter stimulated enormous protests. 
 
That said, the transfer of power did lead to a growing amount of state-society 
collaboration. Several ENGOs developed productive relationships with 
governmental agencies, operating as quasi-GONGOs (government organised 
non-governmental organisations), effectively promoting environmental protection. 
Nevertheless, despite the political democratisation in Taiwan, the state remained 
relatively strong and able to determine environmental policies (ibid). This explains 
why many have been sceptical about the rapid transition of the relationship between 
the soft-authoritarian regime and ENGOs from confrontation to cooperation. 
Without further consolidation of democratisation, this cooperation would have 
generated doubt about its effectiveness for environmental improvement and the 
sustainability of cooperation in the long-term. After 2000 environmentalists gained 
legitimacy and were appointed to government positions. This process was described 
as incorporation. Incorporation brought about a new way of raising environmentalist 
claims but the environmentalists' role in the DPP government was never 
friction-free. Environmentalists increasingly became 'polity members' who enjoyed 
routinised and low-cost access to governmental resources.  
 
Taiwan’s history of rapid political transition and economic development has created 
a complex state-society relationship (Hsiao, 1999; Chi, 2006). State hegemony has 
dominated the policy process and resources. However, its effectiveness in policy 
performance has increasingly relied on public participation. Although public 
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participation can be said to affect policy delivery in a positive way, it also often 
lacks the necessary social resources to sustain itself, often relying on government 
grants (Hsiao, 1999), raising the issue of civil groups being over-reliant on 
government resources.  
 
4.3 The Kaoping River basin and its governance 
 
4.3.1  Governing body  
 
Rivers in Taiwan are divided into two groups, namely primary and secondary. The 
former are controlled by central government and the latter by local government. 
River governance of primary rivers, like the Kaoping River, is linked to twelve 
government departments, but only three of them are the main governing bodies. 
They are the River Bureau, the Water and Soil Conservation Bureau and the Water 
Resource Bureau. There is an exceptional and additional administrative department 
for the Kaoping River- the Kaoping River Watershed Administration Committee- 
established to tackle river pollution.   
 
Early in the post-war era, jurisdiction over primary rivers belonged very largely to 
local governments. This situation led to several problems due to a lack of sufficient 
resources and personnel. In the case of the Kaoping River, local politicians abused 
the natural resources of the river. They turned a blind eye to the excessive extraction 
of sand and gravel that was severely damaging the riverbed and its surroundings. 
Part of the riverbank was treated as a free landfill site by unlawful businesses and, 
even, local township offices. Discharge of pollutants was ignored. This chaos led the 
central government to take over the jurisdiction of the primary rivers in 1999. Today, 
some central government agencies may delegate some of their management tasks to 
local governments with appropriate oversight and subsidies, or even deliver policy 
through collaboration with local community development associations and 
environmental organisations.  
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4.3.2  Geographic features 
 
The Kaoping River is 171 km in length and its basin covers an area of 3,257 km2. It 
occupies 9% of the total area of the island and is the largest river basin in Taiwan. 
The river runs through frigid, temperate, subtropical and tropical climate zones with 
plentiful biological resources along its course (See map in Chapter Three). The river 
has four upstream tributaries, namely the Laonong, Cishan, Ailiao and Jhuokou 
rivers, mostly located in the hills and mountain regions, which are also the locations 
of minority ethnic groups. 
 
The basin is also known as the Kao-Kao-Ping area because it covers two 
administrative areas, Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties. It makes a major 
contribution to the water supply of Kaohsiung City. The city is the major industrial 
conglomeration in Taiwan and in the 1990s was the world’s fourth largest logistic 
port. The river basin has a rapidly growing population of three million based around 
the city of Kaohsiung. The city grew rapidly during the post-World War II era as a 
site for heavy industries, which focused in particular on steel refineries, 
petrochemicals, shipbuilding and machinery manufacture. Most of these were 
state-run enterprises26 and allowed to consume large quantities of water, constantly 
placing greater and greater demands on water development. Since the early 1990s, 
the demands have caused a series of conflicts between economic development, river 
restoration and community conservation. 
 
The conflict over water resources is exacerbated because the river basin has high 
and low water level periods due to seasonal rainfall fluctuations. With a total annual 
water flow of 8.67 billion m3, 89.5% of the annual rainfall is concentrated in 
summer and autumn and only 10.5% in winter. In addition, recent climate change 
has caused a growing number of heavy storms in the summer and autumn months 
(Chen et al., 2004). As a result, growing difficulties in river and water management 
have emerged and are a source of regional tension. From 1992 onward, five water 
development projects were initiated, including two dam projects, two trans-basin 
diversion projects and one artificial lake project as a lowland reservoir (Huang, 
                                                 
26 But most of them were privatised in the 1990s. 
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1995; Jhong, 1996; Tseng, 1996). Most of the development projects are located in 
the river’s upstream area where minority ethnic groups reside. 
 
Twelve percent of the water from the Kaoping River is used domestically by 2.7 
million people. It supplies water for industry, farming (including agricultural 
farmlands, animal husbandries and fish farms), and domestic use in the 
Kao-Kao-Ping area (The Seventh River Bureau, 2006). It has been predicted that 
there will be a daily water shortage of 0.6 million m3 in the region by 2021 (The 
Bureau of Water Resource, 1996). However, extracting more water from the river in 
the mountain areas will have a severe impact on the river’s fragile ecological system 
and the livelihood of minority groups in upstream areas (Gu, 1994; Taiban, 1994; 
Wong, 1996).  
 
During the 1990s, the Kaoping River experienced abusive use, including gravel 
mining, agricultural development and illegal dumping. Even local township offices 
used high tidal flats as landfill sites due to a lack of incinerators and legal landfill 
sites. With a total of four billion tons of sediment per year27, the Kaoping River is 
among those with the highest yield of sediment, and its gravel is considered to be of 
the highest quality for construction purposes. Excessive gravel extraction is the 
main cause of the riverbed degradation and is also a threat to bridge piers (Chen, 
1994a; Kondolf, 1997). The deterioration of the riverbed was so severe that two 
major bridges collapsed in the year 2000. Its riverbank and ecosystem were further 
damaged due to widespread landfill, illegal dumping, fish farms, and cultivation on 
the riverbank (Chen, 1994b, 1995a). In 1996, more than a thousand barrels of toxic 
waste were found buried in the riverbed of the upstream area of the Kaoping River. 
 
Another serious cause of deterioration of the river environment is water 
contamination. The pollution sources include waste water from industry, livestock 
farms and households. In addition, excessive development in the upstream area (a 
mountainous region) has led to severe soil erosion (Chen, 1995a; Tseng, 1995a, b). 
In the 1990s, the river was severely contaminated by domestic waste water (7.7%), 
industrial waste (30.6%) and agricultural effluence (57.3%). Every day, in that 
                                                 
27 http://eec.kta.kh.edu.tw/kpbridge_html/a-kpbridge12.htm 
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decade, 30 tons of waste water was discharged into the water without cleansing 
(Chen, 1995a; Wu, 1995: 100). The multiple sources of contamination and lack of 
enforcement led the river to be the most polluted river in Taiwan. The poor quality 
of river water has affected people’s livelihoods (Tseng, 1995a, b). In Kaohsiung City, 
the quality of tap water was so bad that most citizens bought bottled water for 
drinking purposes in the 1990s (Wen, 1994). The worst problem occurred in 2000 
when the river was polluted by chemical waste leading to the greater Kaohsiung 
area being without clean water for a week. According to the EPA report28, the 
pollution condition of the river was worst between 1992 and 2000 (see Figure 4.2 
for details).  
 
 
28 http://wqshow.epa.gov.tw/ 
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Source: Adapted from the Environmental Protection Administration database29 
Figure 4. 2: River pollution index of the Kaoping River 
                                                 
29 http://www.epa.gov.tw/wqm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The collective grievances of local dwellers were so strong that they compelled 
politicians to undertake restoration action in the river basin. In the mid-1990s, a 
preliminary action, joined by the local governor of Kaohsiung County and social 
elites, included the cleaning up of duck farms in the downstream area30  and 
replanting of mangroves (Hong, 1996). The second wave of river restoration action 
did not occur until 2001. It was undertaken by the central government, following a 
collective appeal by local governors, to remove the pig farms from the midstream 
area of the Kaoping River (also within the Water Resource Protection Area). At the 
same time, a million tons of garbage that had been dumped on the riverbank was 
cleaned up. The action of removing pig farms significantly extended the unpolluted 
section of the river31 (see Figure 4.2). Up until 2008, improvement to the urban 
sewage system in the river basin remained the key policy to be accomplished (Li, 
2006b)  
 
 
4.4 Three collaborative actions in the Kaoping River basin: 
Water Defence, Riverfront Adoption and River Enclosure 
 
From the newspaper archives, the research identified three waves of collaborative 
river protection between the state and social groups which emerged between the late 
1990s and the early 2000’s. These three collaborative actions were ‘River 
Enclosure’ led by indigenous tribes32, ‘Riverfront Adoption’ by rural communities33, 
                                                 
30 United Daily News (UDN), 27 April 1993, Hundreds of police mobilised to alleviate the effects of 
duck farming on river quality. Thousands of ducks are removed, p.07. 
UDN, 24 March 1994, Governor of Kaohsiung county, the leading water company, environmental 
bureaucrats and environmentalists enforce ban on duck farming on the river, p.15. 
This action was based on the Law of Water Resource Protection. 
31 However, the river remained highly polluted after 2003 due to two reasons. One was the increase 
of suspended solids in the water body, resulting from a huge earthquake in 2000, and soil erosion in 
the upstream area of the river (The Seventh River Bureau, 2006). The other was that some pig farms, 
which were expelled from Water Resource Protection Area, moved to downstream areas and 
continued to pollute the river even more intensively than before.  
32 UDN, 22 Aug 2000, River enclosure in the Namasia reaches successful conservation, open for 
fishing next month, p.18. 
UDN, 30 Nov 2001, Jhuokou creek in Maolin to be enclosed for two years, p.18. 
UDN, 26 Dec 2001, Laonung creek to be enclosed for one year, p.19.  
UDN, 19 Oct 2002, Lagus creek to be enclosed for one year, p.18. 
UDN, 29 April 2003, Ailiao southern and northern creek extended enclosure for one and a half years, 
p. B2 
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and ‘Water Defence’ by environmental organisations34 . These cases had some 
similarities. First, they showed high civic spontaneity from the bottom-up in 
managing the environment. Second, the civilian groups in these cases were ‘de facto 
governing bodies’. Third, a large number of organised citizens got involved in these 
governing actions and produced significant results (see Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3).   
                                                                                                                                         
UDN, 16 July 2003, River enclosure of Nasadulu creek in Sanmin township preserve an ecology 
refugee, p. B2 
UDN, 19 July 2003, Six creeks in Sandimen township will be enclosed, p.B2 
33 UDN, 28 Aug 1995, 500 citizens replant mangroves in the wetland of the Kaoping River  
UDN, 10 April 1999, Old Iron Bridge area beside the Kaoping River is listed as highly dangerous 
site, p. 08 
MSD, 21 July 2000, Huge amount of toxic dumping found in one water origin of the Kaoping river - 
Douggang riverbed, p.A1 
MSD, 16 Dec 2000, Public participation in purifying the riverfront in Pingtung has become a fine 
example for the nation, p. CR2 
UDN, 16 Dec 2000, Hundred River Bureau staff witness the result of Riverfront Adoption, 
achievement attributed to community volunteers, p.18 
UDN, 1 Nov 2001, A-Ligang builds the image of Country of Stone on the riverbank park, p. 19 
MSD, 18 March 2002, Greening the Kaoping River- Hundreds of citizens plant thousands of trees in 
A-Ligang, p. C7 
MSD, 24 Nov 2002, The Seventh River Bureau purifies the riverfront of the Kaoping River, creates 
ten tourism spots, p. A3 
MSD, 29, Dec 2003, A riverside landfill site transformed to a garden in Lionhead (Shitou) 
community, Pingtung, p.CR1 
MSD, 30 Jan 2005, The Chief of the Seventh River Bureau urges collaboration across departments to 
achieve New River Movement, p. CR2 
34 EDN, 9 April 1994, Ministry of Economic Affairs makes a ten-year plan of water resource 
development project, p. 10 
UEN, 18 April 1994 Meinung people refuse dam construction. Hundreds of civilians present a 
petition to Legislators, p. 06 
MSD, 08 Oct 1995, International scholars urge the restoration of ‘the fountain of lives’- the Kaoping 
River- in the south, p.18 
MSD, 02 May 1997, Go fish watching in the Donggang Creek, p.28 
MSD, 14 June 1997, Niao Song wetland embodies the dream of conservationism, p.41 
MSD, 17 Nov 1998, Conservationists try canoeing in the Donggang Creek and watch rich ecology, 
p.17 
UDN, 16 April 2000, Building Hundred-miles wetland to alternate dam projects for water resources, 
p.19 
MSD, 29 May 2000, Meinung urges to preserve the landscape of the County of Tobacco, p. 3 
UDN, 08 Dec 2000, West wetland beside the Donggang Creek resides rich ecology and is being 
designed as an education park, p.18 
UDN, 13 Aug 2002, the Kaoping River increases one ecological park in Kaohsiung County, p. 18 
MSD, 24 Dec 2002, Wetlands Taiwan regenerates Chou-chai wetland, the first wetland in Kaohsiung 
City, to create an ecologic paradise, p.CR2  
MSD, 08 Feb 2004, Tobacco Making Tower in Meinung transformed into education center, p. CR1  
UDN, 26 March 2004, Eight hundred school teachers and students move classrooms and cycle to the 
wetland part beside the Kaoping River, p.B1  
MSD, 15 July 2004, Festival of Yellow Butterfly in Meinung opens, p. CR2  
MSD, 24 April 2005, Flood detention pond in Kaohsiung City transformed to ecologic paradise, 
p.CR1 
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 4.4.1 Water Defence 
 
Water Defence was a series of water environment restoration campaigns initiated by 
environmental organisations. Traditionally, Taiwan’s policy of water resource 
development had been monopolised by technocrats in central government (Chang, 
2001). There were few citizens’ voices in the development of policy until civil 
society mobilised against the exploitation of water sources from the Kaoping River. 
The mobilisation was a response to the water crisis which had emerged in the 1980s. 
A series of water development projects were set up to tackle a shortage of water to 
supply the expansion of the petrochemical industry (Tseng, 1995d). The water 
resource development projects had two phases and each initiated different waves of 
protests. The first phase, from 1992 to 2000, aimed to build two dams called 
Meinung and Majia. The second phase, from 2002 to 2007, included a twenty-mile 
trans-basin diversion plan and a seventy-hectare reservoir construction project 
(Huang, 1995). Both phases were located in areas inhabited by minority groups and 
indigenous tribes. 
 
The Meinung and Majia dam projects were to be sited in the upstream areas of the 
Kaoping River where the Hakka and Lukai minority groups have resided for 
generations and this proposal raised questions of fair access to environmental justice. 
An advocacy coalition formed by environmental NGOs and ethnic groups started 
the first wave of protest against the dam projects. Instead of the dam supplying more 
water, the coalition suggested river restoration to preserve water resources. This 
included removing livestock farms, cleaning river flats, regenerating wetlands and 
regulating industrial and domestic pollution. This water protection campaign formed 
the largest coalition in Taiwan’s environmental movement. Its members 
continuously mobilised to resist pressure from above, while at the same time they 
allied with local government officials to produce proposals for alternative 
development projects to improve water quality and its natural resources. The end of 
the first phase of the water protection campaign arrived eight years later, in 2000, 
when the opposition party (DPP) won the presidential election. They promised to 
abolish both the water resource development projects and the plan to expand the 
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petrochemical industry. The new administration also accepted the conservation 
suggestion of a ‘Hundred-Mile Wetland’ advocated by civil campaigners (Tseng, 
2000). 
 
Around that same year, the central government accepted alternative plans, including 
a three-mile Chi-San trans-basin diversion to an under-utilised dam located in 
another river basin, and moved the drinking-water pumping site to an upstream 
clean water source area. Civil campaigners pragmatically agreed to these 
alternatives which temporarily eased the tension that had arisen from the urban 
population’s demand for better water quality and more reliable supplies (Peng, 
2006). The temporary cessation of water tension led to a transformation in the 
nature of the protests among environmental organisations. Those organisations, in 
the first wave of Water Defence, turned to community involvement and away from 
confrontational actions. Activists returned to their communities to promote several 
wildlife habitat reconstruction projects and community environmental improvement 
campaigns. Several wetlands were regenerated, as a response to the call for a 
‘Hundred-Mile Wetland’ (Tseng, 1995c; Tseng, 1996). Two hundred and fifty 
hectares of wetland were regenerated via intense collaboration between 
environmental organisations and frontline officials. In doing so, environmental 
groups bridged government and local networks, negotiating public funding to aid 
local initiatives. These environmental organisations empowered local communities 
to take action on local environmental restoration. The empowerment included 
assisting local communal actors to build consensus over conservation plans and to 
re-direct government funding for local actions relating to landscape and water 
environment preservation linked to local culture (Huang, 2006a). 
 
In contrast to the achievements of the first wave of Water Defence, the second wave 
barely made any progress despite its extensive coalition. The second phase of water 
resource development projects stimulated a new wave of environmental protests led 
by a group of fundamentalist environmentalists who allied themselves with 
indigenous tribes threatened by the projects (Li, 2006a). The environmentalists from 
the first phase also supported them. Three governors of southern counties all stood 
by them and declared their opposition to the development projects. Even though the 
authority (i.e. Democratic Progressive Party) at that time was pro-environment 
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(Participant observation: 2006-7-12), the second phase water development project 
survived domestic opposition. Very often, international economic pressure was used 
as an excuse by the government to promote development projects. Nevertheless, the 
alternatives advocated by environmental organisations were also incorporated into 
water resource policy (Huang, 2006b; Ting, 2006). 
 
This research has examined in detail the collaborative actions undertaken between 
environmental organisations and the government in the two phases of Water 
Defence. Three major action groups of this campaign were selected as examples, 
namely Wetlands Taiwan, Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association, and 
Meinung People’s Association. 
 
 
Table 4. 1: Examples of Water Defence 
Organisation Location  Action   Result  
Wetlands Taiwan  Kaohsiung 
City 
Wetland restoration Restored more than 200 
hectares of wetland and 
created a series of urban 
wetland corridors 
Blue Donggang 
Creek 
Conservation 
Association 
Pingtung 
County 
Community 
environmental 
improvements  
Established a network 
which consisting of more 
than 100 grassroots groups 
to conduct local 
environmental 
improvements 
Meinung 
People’s 
Association 
Kaohsiung 
County 
Minority ethnic 
community culture 
and environmental 
preservation 
Conducted projects of local 
ethnic culture, landscape 
and water environment 
preservation  
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4.4.2 Riverfront Adoption 
 
Riverfront Adoption was a collaborative action initiated by the local bureaucrats in 
the Seventh River Bureau, a local branch of the central river administration35, to 
encourage citizens to participate in the regeneration and maintenance of 
neighbourhood riverside green spaces. The first example was established in 1997. 
This action programme aimed to tackle the problem of riverbank deterioration. 
Local county governments were originally the authorities that owned the 
jurisdiction of river management, but they failed to manage the riverbank well due 
to a shortage of river patrol crews. The Seventh River Bureau withdrew the legal 
responsibility from the local authorities and launched a series of clean-up actions36. 
Among these actions, illegal gravel mining was banned and more than a million 
tons of garbage and contaminated waste were removed from the riverbank. The 
Bureau improved the aesthetics of the riverfront after each clean-up action37 and 
launched a strategy called ‘Riverfront Adoption’, by which to encourage local 
participation in the maintenance of riverfront greenery. The Bureau authorised 
villagers to use publicly-owned riverfront places to create green spaces, for example 
by planting trees, and keeping the amenity of the green spaces intact. The aims were 
to meet the needs of local communities, to reduce the cost of riverfront maintenance 
and to prevent riverbank deterioration from occurring again.  
 
                                                 
35 UDN, 16 Aug 2000, Seventh River Bureau expands the action of transforming river bank, p. 18 
36 UDN, 10 Feb 1999, Large amount of mercury contaminated soil found in Kaoping River bank, p. 
01 
UDN, 10 April 1999, Old Iron Bridge area listed Highly Contaminated Area, p. 8 
MSB, 5 Oct 1999, Seventh River Bureau aims to clean up contaminated area in the Kaoping River 
banks and investigate the whole river basin, p. 39 
UDN, 19 April 2000, Six thousands barrels of contaminated waste in the riverfront of Old Iron 
Bridge area were cleaned up, p. 18 
UDN, 9 June 2000, Thirty six duck farms were expelled from the riversides of the Kaoping River, p. 
18 
UDN, 1 Aug 2000, Seventeen contaminated sites found in the Kaoping River banks, p. 19 
37 UND, 21 Jan 2001, Seventh River Bureau and Kaohsiung county government cooperate to 
transform Old Iron Bridge area into water accessible park, p. 17 
UND, 2 Jan 2002, Kaohsiung county government aims to wholly convert the high tidal flats of the 
Kaoping River, p. 17 
UDN, 11 July 2002, Two landfill sites in the Kaoping River bank begins to convert into riverfront 
parks, p.18  
UDN, 11 Jan 2003, The first riverside wetland park in Pingtung county was born, p.17 
UDN, 25 Sep 2005, 112.5 hectares of riverside wetland park in Kaohsiung county was born, p. C1 
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The government actions transformed the riverbank from a no-go area to a pleasant 
water environment38 and encouraged villagers to engage in the management of the 
local environment39. One commercial association even adopted one section of the 
riverfront40. The Bureau officials supported villagers in their attempts to organise 
themselves and gradually, this strategy attracted dozens of community 
associations41. Adopters were required to beautify the riverfront by planting trees, 
mowing grass, cleaning up garbage and constructing rest areas42. The riverside 
green space became a major recreation area for rural villagers. Enjoying a walk 
along the riverbank and watching the sunset became popular daily activities for 
local residents43. The policy won unprecedented popularity because Taiwan’s rural 
areas usually lacked green spaces for recreation. Some of the groups mobilised 
approximately one hundred villager volunteers monthly to maintain the riverfront. 
The Riverfront Adoption catalysed community-building and made local residents 
proud of their own communities. This pattern of cooperation between the bureau 
and communities gradually expanded to the whole river basin44.  
                                                
About twenty community associations have adopted their nearby riverfronts (Huang, 
2006a). Among them, the most well-known with the most information available on 
their activities are A-Ligang 45 , Old Iron Bridge 46 , Chung-yun community 
 
38 The transformed river section was 41.6 kilometre long.  
See UDN, 31 July 2003, River bank transformed into green space range from A-Ligang to Sandimen, 
p. B1; 
UDN, 30 Nov 2002, Two hundred staff of River Bureau witness and learn the new river bank 
culture- River Adoption- in A Ligang, p. 18 
39 UDN, 10 March 2006, Hundred members of A-Ligang Environmental Greenery Association 
adopt and beautify neighbourhood river bank, p. C1 
UDN, 30 Nov 2002, Two hundred staff of River Bureau witness and learn the new river bank 
culture- River Adoption- in A Ligang, p. 18 
40 UDN, 16 Feb 2004, Sand and Stone Association adopts riverfront, and no-go area becomes public 
park, p. B1 
UDN, 4 Jan 2003, Gravel businessman adopt riverfront and create 12-hectored park, p. 17 
UDN, 16 March 2000, Pingtung Sand and Stone Association adopts a riverbank section near gravel 
production area, p. 18 
41 UDN, 7 Sep 2001, A hundred people from Wandan township witness and learn River Adoption in 
A-Ligang for community building, p. 18 
42 UDN, 22 Nov 2005, Villagers in A-Ligang put effort and resource into riverfront transformation, 
p. C4 
UDN, 28 Nov 2008, Volunteers in Old Iron Bridge patrol the riverfront twice a day to keep the green 
and water environment pleasant, p. C1 
43 UDN, 15 Oct 2000, Kaoping riverfront green – a popular recreation area, p.18 
UDN, 24 Feb 2000, Kaoping River bank sides – the best location for flying kites, p.20 
44 UDN, 16 Dec 2000, River Bureau chief attributes the transformation of river bank to local 
adoptive actions, p. 18 
UDN, 7 April 2000, Twenty Riverfront greens competing for the best riverfront area, p. 18 
45 UDN, 16 Dec 2000, River Bureau chief attributes the transformation of river bank to local 
adoptive actions, p. 18 
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associations47, and Pingtung Sand and Stone Association48, and they were selected 
as examples to study.  
 
Table 4. 2: Examples of Riverfront Adoption 
Community  Location  Action   Result  
Old Iron Bridge 
community  
Kaohsiung 
County 
Adopting 
Kaoping 
riverfront green 
space 
32.5 hectares of riverfront green space 
was well maintained by a local 
community association and became 
popular among the regional 
population 
A-Ligang 
community  
Pingtung 
County 
Adopting 
Kaoping 
riverfront green 
space 
10 hectares of riverfront green space 
was created and maintained by a local 
community association 
Chung-yun 
community 
Kaohsiung 
County 
Adopting 
Kaoping 
riverfront 
mangrove forest 
4.5 hectares of mangrove were 
planted and continuously taken care of 
by local school teachers and students 
 
Pingtung Sand 
and Stone 
Association 
Pingtung 
County 
Adopting 
Kaoping 
riverfront green 
space 
12 hectares of riverfront green space 
was created and maintained by a 
commercial union 
 
                                                                                                                                         
UDN, 22 Nov 2005, Villagers in A-Ligang put effort and resource into riverfront transformation, p. 
C4 
46 UDN, 1 Sep, 2006, Old Iron Bridge Association established to adopt the neighbourhood riverfront, 
p. C1 
UDN, 13 Oct 2007, Volunteers of Old Iron Bridge Association sell coffee to get money for 
maintaining riverfront green, p. C1 
UDN, 28 Nov 2008, Volunteers in Old Iron Bridge patrol the riverfront twice a day to keep the green 
and water environment pleasant, p. C1 
47 UDN, 13 March 2000, Families replant mangroves in the mouth of the Kaoping River 
UDN, 5 Dec 2001, Kaohsiung county governor witnesses the conservation result of mangrove in the 
mouth of the Kaoping River, C1 
UDN, 23 Oct 2002, Chung-yun community school use mangrove ecology as teaching materials, p. 
19 
UDN, 21 Jan 2003, Chung-yun community successful conserve 5 hectares of various mangroves and 
establish Ecological Conservation Area, p. 18 
UDN, 8 Dec 2005, Chung-yun community pupils interpret the ecology of river mangroves to visitors, 
p. C2 
UDN, 30 Nov 2006, Two thousand school pupils join Mangrove Day hold by Chung-yun Mangrove 
Conservation Association, p. C2 
48 UDN, 16 Feb 2004, Sand and Stone Association adopts riverfront, and no-go area becomes public 
park, p. B1 
UDN, 4 Jan 2003, Gravel businessman adopt riverfront and create 12-hectored park, p. 17 
UDN, 16 March 2000, Pingtung Sand and Stone Association adopts a riverbank section near gravel 
production area, p. 18 
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4.4.3 River Enclosure 
 
River Enclosure was a spontaneous action against exploitative fishing. It was 
initiated by the most disadvantaged ethnic groups in Taiwan- the indigene49 . 
Riverside indigene traditionally owned their nearby rivers and the right to manage 
them based on a clan system50 (Tang and Lu, 2002; Yen and Kuan, 2004) in which 
voluntary labour was mobilised by the call of village heads. Most River Enclosure 
actions are located near to the river source where tributaries are less polluted and 
ecologically rich (Chen and Fang, 1994). The River Enclosure movement was a 
reaction to the issue of exploitative fishing (though not illegal behaviour), especially 
by external fish poachers, in most tributaries of the river (Lu, 2001, 2004). The 
enclosure initiative aimed to ‘conserve fish ecology by totally prohibiting fishing by 
both outsiders and locals’ (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02). 
 
The major issue for the indigenes was the elimination of their rights to manage the 
river by the government and an insufficient number of government patrollers to 
prevent abusive use of the river. Since the late nineteenth century, the hunting and 
farming territories of indigenous people were taken over by the colonial government 
of Japan, and this continued under the Kuomintang (KMT) regime, which retreated 
from China in 1947. Most of the indigenes’ traditional territories were under the 
supervision and management of the state apparatus. Only part of the land was 
designated as a reserve to support their livelihoods based on agriculture and fishing. 
This policy ruined their traditional clan-based mechanisms of common management 
of natural resources and their traditional lifestyle (Wang, 1999). As a consequence, 
indigenous people became passive about their ownership and stewardship of the 
environment. This passive attitude and the inability of state bureaucrats to manage 
the vast natural resources of these areas resulted in the degradation of river quality 
                                                 
49 There are twelve indigenous tribal groups in Taiwan with a population of 0.43 million, about 
1.9% of the national population. Their lifestyle and cultures are discernibly different from the vast 
majority of the Han population originating from China, and are comparatively disadvantaged 
economically, socially as well as politically. In the Kaoping River basin, four tribes of indigenes 
(including the Bunun, Tsou, Paiwan and Lukai ethnic groups) live in the remote mountain areas. 
50 UDN, 2002-10-16, Villagers’ voluntary labour mobilised to rebuild the river environment and 
fish-watch path in Koushe village, P. 18 
UDN, 2003-11-18, Laiyi village applies for River Enclosure and forms patrol team to stop fish 
exploitation, but traditional rules of river ownership becomes a barrier, p. B2 
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and over fishing51. For several decades, abusive fishing, including electrifying, 
poisoning and explosives, prevailed in the upstream area to satisfy tourist 
consumption52 (Lu, 2001; Tang and Lu, 2002; Lu, 2004; Liang, 2005, 2006).  
 
Today, the indigenes’ livelihoods do not wholly rely on income from river fishing, 
but the general degradation of the environment has increased the indigenes’ 
grievances against outsiders and the dominant political regime. For more than a 
century, the modern state apparatus had precluded the indigenous population from 
managing their traditional territory. At least the policy of River Enclosure represents, 
though not exactly in return for their land rights, recognition of the need to 
incorporate local knowledge and local involvement in the river management.  
 
The first example of River Enclosure, named Dannayiku, in San-mei Village, 
central-Taiwan, was successfully established in 199053 and legalised in 1995. The 
action was initially illegal54 because it challenged the jurisdiction of the central 
government, but it was later legalised based on Fishery Law because of its 
significant results in river restoration (Lu, 2001, 2004; Liang, 2005, 2006)55 . 
                                                 
51 http://www.e-tribe.org.tw/tanayigu/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabId=181 captured at 03 January 2008 
52 UDN, 2002-02-26, Jhuokou Creek applies River Enclosure for two years and township office 
form a patrol team to stop fish exploitation, p. 18 
UDN, 2004-02-21, Having practiced River Enclosure for two years, fish exploitation is still prevalent 
in Jhuokou Creek, p. B1 
UDN, 2004-07-14, Koushe villagers protect Sagaran creek from fish depredation, typhoon and 
deforestation, P. B2 
UDN, 2004-07-14, Poisoning fish event aroused River Enclosure, Koushe villagers protect Sagaran 
Creek, p. B2 
UDN, 2006-07-05, River Enclosure and patrolling for a year in Sanhe Creek, Liugui Township, 
Kaohsiung County, have successfully recovered fish ecology, p. C1 
UDN, 2000-08-22, River enclosure in the Namasia reaches successful conservation, open for fishing 
next month, p.18 
53 UDN, 2003-10-22, Dannayiku experience of fish conservation becomes a legend among the 
indigenous society, p. A11 
54 In Taiwan, jurisdiction over the rivers belonged to the government, and therefore River Enclosure 
was illegal when it was first initiated. It was later legalised because of its significant results in river 
restoration.  
55 There were two methods to legalise the River Enclosure. The first was to assign the River 
Enclosure sections as Wildlife Protection Areas (WPAs) based on Wildlife Protection Law; the 
second was to prove River Enclosure actions based on Fishery Law. Both required the political 
support of the local township offices and county governments in order to announce the scope and 
duration of River Enclosure (Lu, 2001, 2004). There was only one case of River Enclosure in Taiwan 
which applied the first method because under this law the income from issuing fishing licenses was 
only allowed to be used for conservation purposes, while the second method was more widely 
applied because of its flexibility in terms of land use and arrangement of income from issuing fishing 
licenses, e.g. public welfare, infrastructures, annual festivals and so on (Lu, 2001,2004). Fishery Law 
was a law initially established in 1929 to protect marine fishery resources, but it was ignored due to a 
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Around the year 2000, River Enclosure became a widespread reaction by 
indigenous villagers to prohibit fishing in their river sections and to conserve the 
ecology 56 . In order to start practising River Enclosure, which demanded 
mobilisation of every household, a consensus had to be passed in a village meeting, 
usually with all political leaders agreeing to the plan. With the River Enclosure, 
tribal villagers blockaded access to the tributaries and set up twenty-four hour 
patrols and prohibited any fishing behaviour during the set period of River 
Enclosure57. Every household was obliged to send one representative to join the 
patrol team. All fishing methods were strictly forbidden during the approved periods 
of River Enclosure, which ranged from one to five years58.  
                                                                                                                                        
River Enclosure won public praise and state recognition because of its 
unprecedented success in improving fish ecology and promoting of community 
consolidation (Lu, 2001, 2004; Tang and Lu, 2002; Liang, 2005, 2006). The 
government incorporated River Enclosure into its river management policy in 2003 
and promoted it elsewhere59, even though it conflicted with the jurisdiction of the 
 
lack of enforcement. This law was later applied to river fishery resources in 1995 and gained weight 
because of the rise of the movement of River Enclosure. 
56 UDN, 22 Aug 2000, River enclosure in the Namasia reaches successful conservation, open for 
fishing next month, p.18. 
UDN, 30 Nov 2001, Jhuokou creek in Maolin to be enclosed for two years, p.18. 
UDN, 26 Dec 2001, Laonung creek to be enclosed for one year, p.19.  
UDN, 19 Oct 2002, Lagus creek to be enclosed for one year, p.18. 
UDN, 4 April 2003, Ailiao southern and northern creek extended enclosure for one and a half years, 
p. B2 
UDN, 16 July 2003, River enclosure of Nasadulu creek in Sanmin township preserve an ecology 
refugee, p. B2 
UDN, 19 July 2003, Six creeks in Sandimen township will be enclosed, p.B2 
57 UDN, 2002-10-19, Fish conservation in Lagus Creek kicks off, thirty villagers form patrol team, p. 
18 
UDN, 2003-07-16, Volunteers watch over Nasadulu creek and made it an Eden garden, p. B2 
UDN, 2003-11-18, Laiyi village applies for River Enclosure and forms patrol team to stop fish 
exploitation, but traditional rules of river ownership becomes a barrier, p. B2 
UDN, 2006-07-05, River Enclosure and patrolling for a year in Sanhe Creek, Liugui Township, 
Kaohsiung County, have successfully recovered fish ecology, p. C1 
UDN, 2002-10-16, Villagers’ voluntary labour mobilised to rebuild the river environment and 
fish-watch path in Koushe village, P. 18 
58 The time length of the River Enclosure depended on how long the local township offices approved 
it, some even announced indefinite duration of the River Enclosure, e.g. Mintzu village. No one, 
outsiders or locals, were allowed to fish in the enclosed rivers. Violators risked arrest by police 
and/or a fine between US $1,000-5,000. Usually, within six months of enclosure, the river ecology 
could be successfully restored. 
59 UDN, 2001-12-26, Laonong creek will be closured based on Namasia model, P. 19 
UDN, 2002-01-01, Laonong Creek applies River Enclosure and Jhuokou will follow, p.20 
UDN, 2002-04-20, Successful river protection in Wutai faces difficulty to continue due to the end of 
paid patroller employment, P.18 
UDN, 2002-11-19, Mudan Township office promotes River Enclosure, p. 18 
UDN, 2003-04-29, Yila and Dawu continues the River Enclosure and preserves river wildlife, P. B2 
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Forest Bureau, and the legalisation of River Enclosure has still continued to arouse 
debate from time to time (Tang and Lu, 2002)60. In 2005 and 2006, the government 
funded environmental NGOs to hold two forums over the agenda of River 
Enclosure and Fish Protection to deliberate on how to improve related policies61.  
 
The importance of conservation and the benefit of economic rewards enabled the 
River Enclosure movement to spread to many indigenous communities throughout 
Taiwan. Local township offices approved most applications for River Enclosure. 
The central governmental agencies also provided various forms of financial support 
to encourage more indigenous villagers to make the initial move towards River 
Enclosure62. By 2006 there were 86 rivers practising River Enclosure in Taiwan, 
with most of them joining this movement between 2000 and 200663. Eleven rivers 
                                                                                                                                         
UDN, 2003-04-04, River Enclosure presents prominent results, Ailiao southern and northern creek 
extended, P. B2 
UDN, 2003-07-19, Six rivers in Sandimen township will be closured. All fishing methods will be 
forbidden, P. B2 
UDN, 2003-11-04, Wanan community practices River Enclosure without applying government 
permission, anglers complained to township office, p. B2 
UDN, 2003-11-18, Laiyi village applies for River Enclosure and forms patrol team to stop fish 
exploitation, but traditional rules of river ownership becomes a barrier, p. B2 
UDN, 2003-11-22, Wutai tourism package presents the result of the River Enclosure in Yila village, 
p. B3 
UDN, 2004-01-06, Six Creeks in Mudan Township, Pingtung County, practice River Enclosure, p. 
B2 
UDN, 2004-02-26, Laiyi and Taiwu Township offices apply River Enclosure in their jurisdictions, p. 
B2 
UDN, 2005-07-14, Four creeks in Chunri Township, Pingtung County, apply River Enclosure and 
river patrol for a year to recover fish ecology, p. C2 
UDN, 2003-04-29, Ailiao southern and northern creek extended enclosure for one and a half years, p. 
B2 
60 See also interview: 033, 2006-12-02; participant observation: 24-25 June 2006. 
61 This first government-funded conference gave recognition to the results of the movement of River 
Enclosure and raised several issues which needed to be addressed for the future development of the 
movement. The first was to define the purpose of the River Enclosure, ecologic conservation or 
economic development. The second was to delimit the right of recreational fishing. The third was to 
clarify the ambiguous part of Fishery Law which related to River Enclosure (Participant observation: 
24-25 June 2006). 
62 The government funding sources included Demonstrative Tribe Project in Council of Indigenous 
Peoples, Executive Yuan, Autonomic Tribe Project Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan, 
River Protection Project in Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan, Multiple Employment 
Project in Council of Labour Affairs, Executive Yuan, Community Forestry Project in Forestry 
Bureau, Council of Agriculture, Community Building Project in Construction and Planning Agency, 
Ministry of the Interior. The financial support, included funding for paid river patrollers, 
environmental improvement projects, and community development projects, aimed to help poor 
tribal communities to continue practising River Enclosure and Fish Protection, and hopefully develop 
local eco-tourism industries. 
63 http://e-info.org.tw/node/9803 and Forest Bureau, Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan (2006). 
The Current State of River Conservation and Promotion. Forum of River Enclosure and Fish 
Conservation, 24-25/6/2006, Taipei, Society of Streams Taiwan, ROC.p.8-11. This related to the new 
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in the Kaoping River basin were among them. In order to study the process of 
developing a collaborative relationship with the state, this research selected the 
seven most well-known cases, successes or failures, in the Kaoping River basin as 
examples, namely Gaujung64, Koushe65, Dashe, Mintzu66, Fushing67, Maolin68, and 
Minchiuan69 Villages. These cases were also chosen because of their difference in 
locations and social composition (see Section 5.1 in Chapter Five for details), which 
provides a basis for comparative study between them. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
regime started in 2000 which gave recognition to indigene’s right over traditional territory (Chao, 
2005). 
64 UDN, 2004-2-18, Promoting eco-tourism in Lagus and Tataparu Creeks should limit total tourist 
numbers for sustainability, p. B1 
UDN, 2004-3-23, Gaujung community has protected Tataparu Creek for a year and is now 
promoting eco-tourism, p. B2 
65 UDN, 2002-08-29, Deforestation prevails in the upstream area of Koushe village and causes 
landslides, P. 17 
UDN, 2002-09-04, Protecting Sagaran for nine months, Koushe village recovers river ecology, p.17 
UDN, 2004-07-14, Koushe villagers protect Sagaran creek from fish depredation, typhoon and 
deforestation, P. B2 
UDN, 2004-07-14, Poisoning fish event aroused River Enclosure, Koushe villagers protect Sagaran 
Creek, p. B2 
UDN, 2002-10-16, Villagers’ voluntary labour mobilised to rebuild the river environment and 
fish-watch path in Koushe village, P. 18 
UDN, 2005-10-07, Koushe encounters typhoons destroying tourist facilities, P. C3 
66 UDN, 2003-07-16, Volunteers watch over Nasadulu creek and make it an Eden garden, p. B2 
67 UDN, 2004-2-18, Promoting eco-tourism in Lagus and Tataparu Creeks should limit total tourists 
number for sustainability, p. B1 
UDN, 2002-10-19, Lagus creek to be enclosed for one year, p.18 
68 UDN, 2002-01-10, Jhuokou creek in Maolin will be closured for two years, P. 18 
UDN, 2002-01-13, Kaohsiung County governor listens to a briefing of how Maolin Scenic Area will 
develop eco-tourism, P. 18 
UDN, 2002-01-31, Wang, an non-indigenous, guarding Jhuokou creek conservation in indigenous 
village, P. 20 
UDN, 2002-02-26, Jhuokou Creek applies River Enclosure for two years and township office form a 
patrol team to stop fish exploitation, p. 18 
UDN, 2004-02-21, Having practiced River Enclosure for two years, fish exploitation is still prevalent 
in Jhuokou Creek, p. B1 
UDN, 2001-11-30, Jhuokou creek in Maolin to be enclosed for two years, p.18. 
69 UDN, 2000-08-22, Namasia successfully restores river fish and will open application for fishing 
license, P. 18 
UDN, 2003-04-29, Namasia will hold River Festival to celebrate successful river conservation, P. B2 
UDN, 2003-08-13, Minchiuan holds an river festival to celebrate successful conservation, P. B1 
UDN, 2000-08-22, River enclosure in the Namasia reaches successful conservation, open for fishing 
next month, p.18. 
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Table 4. 3: Examples of River Enclosure 
Village  Location  Action   Result  
Koushe 
Village 
Pingtung 
County 
Protecting a 
tributary of the 
Kaoping River- 
Sagaran 
Protecting an 8-kilometre long 
river section after a fish-pirating 
event in 2001 
Consolidated villagers’ collective 
action against outside fish poachers 
and won different kinds of support 
from central government, NGOs and 
scholars who helped them develop 
eco-tourism 
Dashe 
Village 
Pingtung 
County 
Protecting a 
tributary of the 
Kaoping River- 
Davalan 
Protecting a 20-kilometre long 
river section and combining river 
enclosure with an ethnic culture 
movement since 1994 
Insufficient resources and outside 
support to sustain protection action 
due to remote location, unreliable 
telecommunications and 
inaccessibility 
Gaujung 
Village 
Kaohsiung 
County 
Protecting a 
tributary of the 
Kaoping River- 
Tataparu 
Protecting a 10-kilometre long 
river section since 2002 
Considered one of the most 
successful examples of River 
Enclosure and won government 
grants to improve the environment 
for eco-tourism 
Mintzu 
Village 
Kaohsiung 
County 
Protecting a 
tributary of the 
Kaoping River- 
Nasadulu 
Protecting a 10-kilometre long 
river section since 1998 
Issuing fishing licences and 
brought economic rewards to the 
village; however the prosperity did 
not last long due to a lack of outside 
support from the local government 
office  
Minchiuan 
Village 
Kaohsiung 
County 
Protecting a 
tributary of the 
Kaoping River- 
Namasia 
Protecting a 20-kilometre long 
river section since 1990 
The earliest example of River 
Enclosure because it is within a 
designated Wildlife Protection Area; 
but this also led to a lack of villagers’ 
spontaneity to participate in River 
Enclosure actions  
Maolin Kaohsiung Protecting a 
tributary of the 
Protecting a 20-kilometre long 
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Village County Kaoping River- 
Jhuokou 
river section since 1995 
The only case not launched by 
indigenous people and refused 
government subsidy, thus remaining  
a small scale action 
Fushing 
Village 
Kaohsiung 
County 
Protecting a 
tributary of the 
Kaoping River- 
Lagus 
Protecting a 20 kilometre long 
river section since 1995 
A case that failed to develop the 
River Enclosure movement and 
eco-tourism because landslides struck 
the river section they were protecting 
in 2004 and 2005 
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4.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter explained the empirical context to the case studies, including the 
political-economic context of Taiwan since World War II, the institutionalisation and 
development of Taiwan’s environmental governance, the origin of state-society 
cooperation and the institution of river governance. There are three reasons why this 
research emphasises the importance of contextualising the study of collaborative 
river governance. The first is that the existing literature has neglected the context of 
the emergence of collaborative governance. The second is that critical realism 
emphasises the empirical spatial and temporal scale of particular social events, in 
which the researcher must explore the underlying mechanism and contextual 
contingencies. The third is that an aim of this research is to explore how 
collaborative governance in the East Asian context differs from that of the West. 
 
This chapter highlighted how collaborative governance emerged from the transition 
of Taiwan’s political economy from an authoritarian rule, giving priority to 
economic development, to a political climate which is more democratic and 
sympathetic to environmental concerns. Under pressure from political protests, the 
state opened up the space for public participation in the processes of policymaking 
and implementation. The social actors themselves also transformed their strategy 
from one of confrontation to one of collaboration as a pragmatic choice to increase 
the effectiveness of environmental management.  
 
Regarding the three case studies, this chapter only provides a preliminary 
introduction which is linked to their wider backgrounds. More detailed information 
is provided in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, which focus on each one of the case 
studies. 
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Chapter 5 Case Studies: River Enclosure 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
During the last two decades, the management of the Kaoping River basin has been 
reshaped by various forms of collaborative governance. Initiators in these 
alternative governance forms have ranged from indigenes, lay villagers, 
non-governmental organisations, and local-based government agencies. This chapter 
focuses on one of them, the indigene, to see how they launched a bottom-up River 
Enclosure movement (see Section 4.4.3 for an introduction), which was a strategic 
collective action to recover river ecology that had deteriorated due to over-fishing. 
In the end, River Enclosure became an innovative form of governance capable of 
tackling environmental issues. The types of action they took spread to the whole 
island and led to government recognition of the role of lay villagers in governing 
rivers.  
 
In this chapter, Section 5.2 introduces the selected examples of River Enclosure and 
their differentiation. Section 5.3 lays out seven preliminary findings of this case 
study. Section 5.4 concludes this chapter with reflections on how its findings rewrite 
the original model of environmental collaborative governance. 
 
5.2 Examples of River Enclosure 
 
This research has selected seven examples of locations that have practised River 
Enclosure, namely Gaujung, Koushe, Dashe, Mintzu, Minchiuan, Maolin, and 
Fushing villages (See Figure 5.1 for their sites). Each one sheds a different light on 
the process (see Table 5.1). The following is a brief introduction to the selected 
villages. 
Table 5. 1 Examples of River Enclosure and their characteristics* 
Village  Starting 
year/ 
length 
Motivation  Accessibility**  Leadership/ 
institution   
Faction 
politics*** 
Social 
capital/ 
resources/  
capacity 
**** 
Initiation 
approach 
Process summary Outcomes 
***** 
Gaujung 2002 Protecting 
environment 
and developing 
eco-tourism 
Easy  Church priest  Not obvious High social 
capital as 
well as 
capacity 
Endogenous  Spontaneous RE actions 
were considered one of 
the best examples, but 
government intervention 
with good intention 
turned out to reduce the 
spontaneity  
Good  
Koushe  2001 Halting 
abusive fishing 
and developing 
eco-tourism 
Easy  Political faction 
leader 
Obvious High social 
capital, 
resources 
and 
capacity 
Endogenous Spontaneous RE actions 
were considered one of 
the best examples and 
thus acquired significant 
resources from both the 
state and society for 
developing eco-tourism, 
but was divided by 
faction politics 
Good  
Dashe 1994 Protecting 
neighbouring 
environment 
and developing 
eco-tourism 
Difficult   Ethnic movement 
and Political 
leader 
Not obvious High social 
capital but 
low 
capacity 
and 
resources 
Endogenous Spontaneous RE actions 
in combination with 
ethnic movement, but 
acquired few outside 
resources due to 
geographic remoteness 
Medium  
Mintzu  1998 Protecting 
neighbouring 
environment 
and developing 
eco-tourism 
Easy  Clan leader Obvious  High social 
capital  
Endogenous Spontaneous RE actions 
with an interest in the 
economic rewards which 
turned out to be less than 
expected, and thus 
caused the reduction of 
RE 
Medium  
Minchiuan 1990 Being 
designated as 
Wildlife 
Protection 
Area (WPA) 
which 
Easy  Political faction 
leader 
Obvious  Low social 
capital 
Exogenous RE action as an response 
to the designation of 
WPA led to 
government-oriented 
action rather than 
citizen-oriented  
Medium  
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prohibited 
fishing and 
developing 
eco-tourism 
spontaneous action, but 
major actors are good at 
acquiring government 
grants  
Maolin 1997 Being 
designated as 
Scenic Area 
and Protecting 
neighbouring 
environment 
Easy  Environmental 
activist 
Not obvious Lower 
social 
capital  
Endogenous Spontaneous action 
organised by outsider 
activists rather than local 
indigenes, and led to 
community indifference 
and limited action  
Medium  
Fushing  2001 Protecting 
neighbouring 
environment 
and developing 
eco-tourism 
Easy  Social leader Not obvious High social 
capital 
Endogenous Spontaneous RE action 
mainly for developing 
eco-tourism, once 
successful, but stricken 
by landslides which led 
to the end of the action 
Poor  
 
* The evaluation part of this table is produced based on interview content. More details are revealed in the following section. 
** Accessibility refers to the geographic accessibility of the village. Although most of the River Enclosure villages are located in 
mountain areas, some of them are more accessible than others. This factor has had a significant influence in their receipt of outside 
support and resources.   
*** Faction politics refers to local political competition which often reduced the collective effort of River Enclosure to one faction 
against another in local environmental affairs.   
****Social capital/resource/capacity these three items altogether refer to the resources that a village leader can mobilise. When a 
society’s social capital is identified that means that the society retains networks, norms, and meditative mechanisms which facilitate 
the practice of the River Enclosure. Resources refer to labour and materials that are essential to the practice of River Enclosure. 
Capacity means, in particular, an organisation’s administrative working skill or its adaptability to bureaucratic routines that relate to 
the long-term development of River Enclosure.  
***** If the outcome of River Enclosure is identified as good that means that the collective enclosure action successfully 
recovered the fish ecology. 
Gaujung Village 
 
Gaujung village, with three tributaries of the Kaoping River passing through it, only 
chose one of them, Tataparu, in which to practice River Enclosure because of 
limited available labour. In 2002, the villagers reached a collective consensus to 
practice River Enclosure and initiated the action to conduct 24-hour river patrols70. 
‘Within a year the surrounding ecology recovered’ (Interview: 035, 2006-12-4). The 
positive result of the local River Enclosure became a model for the local county 
governments, and a regional governors’ summit took place there to learn about their 
conservation experience (Interview: 022, 2006-11-9)71 . Every weekend several 
tourist coaches arrived either to appreciate the natural beauty or to learn about the 
experience. 
 
At the beginning, a local Christian priest initiated the River Enclosure and then 
handed the leadership over to a local community development association (CDA). 
Because one of the core members in the association worked in the local township 
office and took charge of conservation affairs, this increased the local capacity in 
relation to River Enclosure administrative work, especially regarding government 
support (Interview: 035, 2006-12-4). The support consisted of a group of paid 
patrollers funded by the government for six to twelve months. However, this input 
reduced the spontaneity of the villagers in their support. ‘Some villagers complained 
about why they had to patrol voluntarily while others got paid’ (Interview: 035, 
2006-12-4). In addition, the income from the eco-tour guides became mostly 
concentrated in the hands of the followers of the Director of the local CDA, and this 
also caused participants’ discontent (Interview: 037, 2006-12-4). 
 
Koushe Village 
 
Koushe village is located beside one of the tributaries of the Kaoping River, Sagaran, 
                                                 
70 http://www.nownews.com/2005/03/17/11060-1765945.htm, 
http://www.ettoday.com/2004/03/27/738-1607338.htm, 
http://www.wingfly.com.tw/tauyuan/main04.htm, http://www.wingfly.com.tw/tauyuan/main04.htm 
and 
http://www.tncsec.gov.tw/b_native/index_view.php?act=home&c03=36&a01=0203&c04=2&num=1
341 captured at 06 August 2006. 
71 http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/6/2/17/n1227505.htm captured at 06 August 2006. 
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which is eight kilometres long. Koushe villagers started the River Enclosure 
because of an outrageous event in 2001. The event took place when an annual 
Harvest Festival commenced and the villagers found the river fish had been taken 
by outside fishermen. The villagers were furious and responded to the call of the 
village chief to launch the River Enclosure72. During the first two years the villagers 
voluntarily embarked upon river patrols without any outside support or assistance. 
They patrolled twenty-four hours a day, and called for the mobilisation of obligatory 
labour to build wooden paths along the river in order to facilitate patrolling. Their 
action on river conservation gradually attracted the attention of outsiders (Interview: 
010, 2006-10-17; 023, 2006-12-15). 
 
In 2003, a group of urban environmentalists and scholars ‘found’ the spontaneous 
nature of the River Enclosure action of the villagers and the rich fish population the 
action had brought back. They were deeply impressed and volunteered to seek 
resources for the villagers. They helped Koushe to obtain the largest government 
grant among River Enclosure villages, US $340,000, for a three-year project to 
develop sustainable local tourism (Interview: 043, 2 Jan 2007). The grant was used 
to construct more facilities for both river patrolling and the development of tourism, 
including constructing more wooden paths, stone walls and river flats, and 
traditional raised cottages 73 . School students, tourists and local governmental 
officers came to witness their performance. Despite this, an internal struggle in the 
village followed the government’s intervention. ‘Non-paid volunteers withdrew 
from the collective effort and handed over the work of River Enclosure and tourism 
development to paid staff’ (Interview: 042, 2007-1-2; 043, 2007-1-2). In other 
words, the River Enclosure gradually became ‘institutionalised and professionalised 
and lay villagers became less involved and indifferent’ (Interview: 043, 2 Jan 2007).  
 
Dashe Village 
                                                 
72 UDN, 13 Aug 2003, Six rivers in Sandimen township conduct the River Enclosure, P. B2 
http://www.ettoday.com/2003/07/08/738-1480417.htm and 
http://www.outgoing.idv.tw/travel_view/2004/09/20040926Korser/20040926KS.htm captured 06 
Aug 2006. 
73 At the beginning, the outside funding consisted of small grants to develop river protection; later, 
the funding increased to US $ 340,000 for a three year project. With only 700 villagers, the grant was 
considered excessive in comparison to the average income of the local villagers. The head of the 
local CDA, who was the village chief at the same time, worked with his team to decide how to 
allocate the grant. 
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 Dashe is situated along one of the tributaries of the Kaoping River, Davalan, which 
is approximately twelve kilometres long74. Possessing rich artistic culture, ethnic 
development awareness and renowned indigenous movement activists, Dashe 
villagers raised their ‘awareness of river protection as a mechanism for tribal revival 
early in 1994’ (Interview: 045, 2007-1-14). Dashe village has a strong community. 
For example, villagers exercised twenty-four hour patrols. When the government 
started to provide funding for River Enclosure patrollers, but with only a few 
day-time vacancies, Dashe villagers adapted well to the new policy design. Core 
members in Dashe coordinated wages and labour among paid and non-paid 
patrollers. This strategy avoided the negative impact of paid patrollers and staff 
which might discourage voluntary action as it had elsewhere. In addition, the village 
leadership (including the village chief, the director of the CDA and church leaders) 
cooperated in mobilising their constituents. The village issued recreational fishing 
licenses to outside anglers which brought several thousand US dollars annual 
income and generated greater vitality in the village. This encouraged the younger 
generation to return home from urban areas to volunteer, work and for recreation. 
The licensed income also financed public activities, e.g. the annual Harvest Festival. 
However, when the local township office transferred these paid patrollers to other 
villages, Dashe found it difficult to acquire alternative government resources partly 
because of their ‘lack of modern abilities of administrative work, for example 
writing proposals to apply for governmental grants’ (Interview: 044, 2007-1-14). 
 
Mintzu Village 
 
The River Enclosure movement in Mintzu aimed to protect a tributary of the 
Kaoping River called Nasadulu in order to develop eco-tourism for the future75. 
Mintzu is a comparatively small village and it was quite easy to build a consensus 
among the villagers. The local CDA coordinated local fishermen to join the action 
and earn their income from fish protection rather than the exploitation of the fish 
resources (Interview: 034, 2006-12-3). The former fishermen formed a patrol team 
                                                 
74 http://www.ettoday.com/2003/07/08/738-1480417.htm captured at 06 Aug 2006. 
75 UDN, 2003-07-16, Volunteers watch over Nasadulu creek and made it an Eden garden, p. B2 
http://aborigine.kscg.gov.tw/tourism2_k.asp captured at Tuesday, 06 Aug 2006. 
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to conduct twenty-four hour monitoring of fishing activities. Before they could start 
issuing recreational fishing licenses, they charged a US $ 1 swimming fee per 
person. However, this income was not enough to satisfy the patrollers’ needs for 
daily life and therefore several patrollers withdrew from the team (Interview: 033, 
2006-12-2). Also, because the leader of this local CDA belonged to a different 
(political) faction from the upper level of the Sanmin township office, the village 
appeared to ‘be more isolated from government resources’ (Interview: 034, 
2006-12-3). However, even though its scope on developing conservation and 
eco-tourism was small, the outcome influenced its neighbouring village, Minsan, to 
launch a river enclosure plan to protect its local creek. 
 
Minchiuan Village 
 
Minchiuan’s history of practising River Enclosure dates back to 1990 and was the 
earliest example in the Kaoping River basin. Minchiuan Village protected one 
tributary of the river, Namasia, which is more than 20 kilometres long. Namasia was 
designated a Wildlife Protection Area which authorised the prohibition of fishing 
from the river, only opening for fishing in the non-breeding season76. But that was 
exclusively for regulated recreational fishing.  
 
River Enclosure was called for by the local township office, i.e. from top-down, 
making it the first example of River Enclosure led by local government in the 
Kaoping River basin. The local township office provided the village chiefs in its 
jurisdiction US $3,000 a year to conduct river protection from abusive fishing. 
Within a year, the river ecology had fully recovered making it possible to open for 
recreational fishing on the condition of buying a fishing license. The fishing license 
system only lasted for two years due to the aftermath of typhoons, and the change of 
town mayor in 1998 led to the cessation of this policy. Nevertheless, ‘the license 
issuing income reached US $ 84,000 and was spent on conservation expenses and 
still had some surplus in 2006’ (Interview: 033, 2006-12-2). Unfortunately, people’s 
                                                 
76 UDN, 2000-8-22, Namasia successfully restores river fish, and will open application for fishing 
license, P. 18  
UDN, 2001-12-26, Laonong creek will be closured based on Namasia model, P. 19 
UDN, 2003-04-29, Namasia will hold River Festival to celebrate successful river conservation, P. B2 
http://www.seewa.org.tw/kaoshung/spec.html, http://076701001.travel-web.com.tw/ and 
http://www.trongman.com.tw/abook/a070.HTM captured at 06 August 2006. 
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enthusiasm was depleted by local government intervention. The original team in the 
township office formed Minchiuan CDA and restarted the River Enclosure in 2004. 
This time they practised River Enclosure in one much smaller tributary of the 
Kaoping River, Natzilan, which is only three kilometres long. Although Natzilan 
was on a much smaller scale than the Namasia, there were two main reasons why 
the team moved there. One was that after the typhoons in 2004 and 2005, fish were 
only available in small creeks. The other was that it was much easier to build 
consensus and to practice twenty-four hour patrols in smaller villages. 
 
Maolin Village 
 
Maolin was the only case initiated by non-indigene in an indigenous village77 that is 
also in a National Scenic Area. They protected one tributary of the Kaoping River, 
Jhuokou Creek. Although the regulation related to scenic areas they authorised the 
action of River Enclosure78. Two difficulties arose in the village. One was that the 
local villagers seemed indifferent to fish protection. The other was that the patrollers 
enlisted by environmental activists received little support from the management 
office of the National Scenic Area, partly because they were non-indigenous people 
(Interview: 039, 2006-12-5). Nevertheless, by 2006, Maolin Village had practised 
River Enclosure for more than a decade. One reason for this was that the head of 
this group of environmental activists was originally a local frontline government 
official who took charge of conservation, and even continued this work on a 
voluntary basis after his retirement. He called for collaboration between 
non-indigenous and indigenous people and by practising twenty-four hour patrolling, 
and slowly transferred the organisation to local indigenous people. However, due to 
their ‘concerns over the constraint of government grants, they refused to accept 
subsidies from the government, preferring to raise funds from society’ (Interview: 
039, 2006-12-5). This meant that their scale of action remained small and mainly 
focused on education programmes. 
 
                                                 
77 UDN, 2002-1-31, Wang, an non-indigenous, guarding Jhuokou creek conservation in indigenous 
village, P. 20 
UDN, 2002-1-13, Maolin Scenic Area will develop eco-tourism, P. 18 
UDN, 2002-1-10, Jhuokou creek in Maolin will be closured for two years, P. 18 
78 http://www.maolin-nsa.gov.tw/maolin/ captured at 06 Aug 2006. 
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Fushing Village 
 
Among the villages which practised River Enclosure, Fushing was the only one that 
did not apply for government subsidies and also the one stricken most seriously by 
landslides in 2004 and 2005, which resulted in the collapse of the patrol team. Most 
core members went back to agriculture or left for urban employment. Since 2001, 
Fushing Village has protected Lagus Creek, one tributary of the Kaoping River, 
seven kilometres long, via twenty-four hour patrols. They developed a tourist 
programme of creek tracing which was once popular79. Every week there were 
nearly a hundred visitors who brought in economic rewards for the villagers. The 
villagers formed a corporation consisting of twenty members. Each of them 
contributed US $30 per month as a membership fee to keep their qualification of 
being tour guides and to hire three paid patrollers (Interview: 038:2006-12-5). Their 
purpose for River Enclosure was mainly to develop tourism. However, after a year, 
the villagers found that they ‘had difficulty paying the membership fee continuously, 
especially in the aftermath of strong typhoons in 2004 and 2005, which ruined the 
excitement and amenity of the river landscape’ (Interview: 038:2006-12-5). Since 
then, tourists have stopped coming and the River Enclosure has been halted. 
 
79 
http://www.tncsec.gov.tw/b_native/index_view.php?act=home&c03=36&a01=0203&c04=2&num=1
341, http://www.wingfly.com.tw/tauyuan/main04.htm and 
http://traffic.kscg.gov.tw/CmsShow.aspx?Parm=20074214340890,2007327153636718,5 captured at 
06 August 2006. 
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Fushing 
Gaujung 
Minchiuan
Mintzu 
Dashe 
Koushe 
Maolin 
 
Figue 5. 1: The locations of the villages practising River Enclosure
5.3 Findings  
 
In Chapter One, this thesis raised five research questions about collaborative 
environmental governance in Taiwan: (1) What have been the reasons that have 
motivated the emergence of environmental collaborative governance? (2) Have 
different approaches to initiating environmental collaborative governance led to 
different processes and results? (3) Does the emergence of environmental 
collaborative governance promise a new pattern for its long-term development 
through its institutionalisation within the policy structure generally? (4) What are 
the levels of transformability and constraints of collaborative governance in the 
context of Taiwan? (5) Does the current practice of collaborative governance in 
Taiwan result in a true transition of the state-society relationship or just a disguised 
form of corporatist strategy? In order to answer these research questions, each of the 
following sections, from Section 5.3.1 to 5.3.5, are devoted to them. 
  
 
5.3.1. The reason motivating the emergence of environmental 
collaborative governance  
 
There were mainly four reasons why, in the Kaoping River basin, indigenous people 
initiated River Enclosure. First, the degradation of the river environment and 
ecology triggered their collective grievance and provoked them to ‘take action 
against abusive fishing behaviour, mainly by poachers’ (Interviews: 033, 
2006-12-02; 034, 2006-12-03; 035, 2006-12-04; 038, 2006-12-05; 042, 2007-01-02). 
Minchiuan80 and Koushe81 had similar dramatic experiences. A community leader 
in Minchiuan said: 
‘About a dozen years ago, our river fish were depredated and we were left 
with none. When I went fishing, what I could find was only garbage in the 
river.’ (Interview: 033, 2006-12-02) 
                                                 
80 UDN 13 August 2003, Minchiuan holds an river festival to celebrate successful conservation, P. 
B1 
81 UDN 14 July 2004, Koushe villagers protect Sagaran creek from fish depredation, typhoon and 
deforestation, P. B2 
UDN 19 July 2003, Six rivers in Sandimen township will be closured. All fishing methods will be 
forbidden, P. B2 
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A community leader in Koushe village described a similar situation:  
‘On the day of our annual Harvest Festival in 2001, we found all river fish 
in our river had been harvested by poachers. All villagers were furious. At 
that moment I decided to launch River Enclosure and request my fellow 
villagers to volunteer for patrolling.’ (Interview: 042, 2007-01-02) 
Another community leader in Mintzu village said: 
‘In the old times, there were so many fish in our river that people did not 
dare to step in it. However, in the 1990s, fish started to disappear from the 
river and the wildlife in the surrounding environment had all been captured 
for sale. Therefore I made the decision to enact River Enclosure in order to 
recover the river ecology.’ (Interview: 034, 2006-12-03) 
The second reason related to the geographic remoteness of the state as an 
environmental manager. The state took away the ownership and the rights of 
management of the indigene’s traditional territories. However, the state apparatus 
did not function effectively because it was too far remote from the site and the 
environment kept deteriorating. Along with the democratisation of Taiwan’s 
politics, the control over society loosened, making it possible for the indigenous 
people to seek a higher level of autonomy and regain the ownership of their 
surroundings. An indigenous township mayor described the effect of the state 
taking their traditional territory: 
‘The Japanese and KMT colonial regimes had ruined our traditional system. 
Indigenous tribes had a system of managing traditional territory. We knew 
who each river section belonged to, and who it was managed by. However 
the government did not respect the indigenous system and allocated the 
jurisdiction of rivers to different bureaus...When river management was 
removed from indigenous institutions, numerous destructive events occurred. 
Even though the government established a lot of regulations, no one 
respected or followed the law…if the government can devolve some 
authority to the tribes, let tribal people protect and manage the environment, 
they will consolidate and discipline themselves… the result will be better for 
the environment as well as for the indigene.’ (Interview: 030, 2007-02-09) 
A core member of the River Enclosure in Koushe Village explained how 
indigenous villages were invaded: 
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‘Since the government took over the jurisdiction of river management, the 
river valley was like an anarchic area. No one really cared about it.’ 
(Interview: 043, 2007-01-02) 
‘The River Enclosure was closely linked to a resentment of outsiders who 
invaded indigene land. The outsiders behaved so brutally to the 
environment like no one lives here. Sometimes it was the government 
systematically exploiting our environmental resources like river dredging 
in order to acquire gravel for construction purposes. None of the locals 
were informed about these exploitative actions.’ (Interview: 043, 
2007-01-02) 
To some extent, the launch of River Enclosure was only possible in the late 
1990s, because this generation still remembered their legacy of tribal norms 
and the lost beauty of nature. Community leaders in Dashe and Koushe said 
that:  
‘The current generation still have the memory of rich river ecology that 
we used to have in the river. This is also the reason why they are full of 
longing to recover it and volunteer.’ (Interview: 044, 2007-01-14) 
‘Tribal rules still exist in river management, but are not observed. For 
example only fish for what you need and no fishing in breeding 
season…the existence of a mechanism for voluntary labour for the 
common good was also key to the emergence of River Enclosure. People 
are still mindful that everyone is obliged to do voluntary service for the 
public if the leader requests it. River Enclosure is one of the products of 
traditional voluntary service.’ (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02) 
 
Thirdly, because the first example of River Enclosure, Dannayiku, in central 
Taiwan, successfully developed eco-tourism which brought a fortune to the 
village, since then, the villagers who launched River Enclosure had the goal of 
improving the community economy, as at least one important objective. A core 
member in Fushing village said: 
‘We heard the story of Dannayiku and how they successfully developed 
tourism by protecting fish, therefore we wanted to try, too. Our location 
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was as good as theirs.’ (Interviews: 038, 2006-12-05) 
A community leader in Dashe Village described how the economic rewards of 
River Enclosure improved the village economy: 
‘After River Enclosure, we opened for fishing applications which brought 
job opportunities and cash to the village. The money went into public 
welfare and expenses. For example senior people did not have to pay for 
Harvest Festival anymore. They were very happy. The younger generation 
could get jobs in the village and did not have to leave home for the city. 
Families no longer had to be torn apart.’ (Interview: 044, 2007-01-14).  
 River Enclosure brought significant economic benefits82 to Dashe village because 
of the development of community-run eco-tourism. Many other indigenous villages 
followed spontaneously and together they became an environmental movement 
(Liang, 2006)83. River Enclosure brought three types of economic reward. First, 
when the villagers successfully restored the river ecology, most of them expected to 
issue fishing licenses84 because the income from them could significantly improve 
village finances (Participant observation: 2006-6-24/25). Secondly, by improving 
the aesthetic landscape of nearby rivers and its wildlife resources, the villages were 
able to attract tourists. Thirdly, when the government recognised the positive 
outcome of River Enclosure, they incorporated it into river policy and provided 
subsidies and government funded job opportunities to villages for developing 
eco-tourism. 
 
The final reason builds upon the last. The government subsidy for practising 
River Enclosure motivated some of the villagers. A senior officer in Pingtung 
County government said that:  
‘Most River Enclosure in my county was not spontaneous action, just a 
few were, like Dashe and Koushe. We hired local unemployed to be paid 
patrollers and sent them to several township offices which applied for 
River Enclosure… The results depended on the executive ability of local 
                                                 
82 In the first example of River Enclosure, the annual income of eco-tourism reached US $ 383,000 
in 1999 and US $ 1m in 2003 (Liang, 2005:128; Tang and Lu, 2002). 
83 Many commentators considered River Enclosure as an action against state hegemony and a 
capitalistic economy (e.g. Yen and Kuan, 2004; Liang, 2006).  
84 These fishing licenses were not for commercial fishing, but only for recreational fishing using a 
fishing rod.  
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villages and political consolidation. While some villages failed to respond 
to this policy, some other villages did well and thereafter built their own 
tourist resources.’ (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06) 
 
River Enclosure was initiated by indigenous people, the most disadvantaged 
ethnic group in Taiwan. The fishing crisis was obvious to them but the state 
lacked the capacity to respond and so civil society stepped in to fill the vacuum. 
The bureaucracy was not the key initiator, even though it provided some 
assistance later. River Enclosure is a good example of an endogenous approach 
to environmental management achieved on the basis of local indigenous 
capacities, resources, and politics.                                                
 
5.3.2. The endogenous approach of initiating environmental 
collaborative governance and its results 
 
The initiation of the River Enclosure movement in the Kaoping River basin 
reflected a dynamic that shifted from an endogenous to an exogenous approach. 
It later developed a hybrid model when the government decided to incorporate 
this practice into policy and sponsor related activities. At the beginning, the 
movement rose internally and was called together by internal political or 
religious leadership. It would shape an endogenous approach to River 
Enclosure. For example, in Dashe, Koushe, Gaujung, Fushing and Mintzu 
Villages (Interviews: 044, 2007-01-14; 042, 2007-01-02; 043, 2007-01-02; 035, 
2006-12-04; 037, 2006-12-04; 038, 2006-12-05; 034, 2006-12-03), the 
proposal of River Enclosure was advocated from within. As a core member of 
River Enclosure in Koushe said: 
‘It was actually the village chief’s idea to call for the River Enclosure 
rather than all villagers’ (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02).  
Other interviews showed a similar situation of how local leaders launched this 
action: 
‘It was when I became the mayor of this township that I started the action 
of River Enclosure.’ (Interview: 033, 2007-12-02) 
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‘I launched the River Enclosure to teach my church followers the concept 
of river conservation. A fish’s life is more meaningful and valuable if it is 
in the river rather than in someone’s belly. ’ (Interview: 037, 2006-12-04) 
 
However, the movement gradually became an exogenous initiative for many 
villages because of the intervention of the government. After the emergence of 
River Enclosure, the government realised that this initiative could go beyond fish 
conservation to tribal community-building and eco-tourism. Thus, seeing River 
Enclosure as a multi-functional development strategy, central government 
incorporated it into river policy and hired the unemployed to patrol the river 
banks (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06). The more insightful government officials 
also realised that ‘this action would possibly reduce the spontaneity of local 
villagers’ (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06), therefore they worked continuously on 
improving the policy design to ensure the involvement of local people. Therefore, 
for some villages, government agencies became the main body that promoted the 
policy of River Enclosure and formulated an exogenous approach to advocate it, 
such as with the situation in Minchiuan and Maolin Villages (Interviews: 033, 
2006-12-02; 039, 2006-12-05; 029, 2007-02-06). Moving from an endogenous to 
an exogenous approach, requires street-level officials working closely with the 
locals and empowering villages that lack modern administrative capabilities to 
practise River Enclosure, like in the cases of Gaujung, Koushe, Yila and Wutai 
Villages (Interviews: 035, 2006-12-04; 042, 2007-01-02; 029, 2007-02-06). 
 
Endogenous collaborative governance was initiated within the communities by 
non-state participants. Internal leadership mobilised the constituency to launch a 
participatory pattern of governance and share the process of consensus building 
collectively. The initiators suggested a mechanism which suited the village’s 
domestic politics85 and social conditions, so that they could tackle the issue they 
faced collectively. The most important element is that the mechanism was designed 
                                                 
85 Tribal politics usually has multiple institutions of political leadership, including traditional clans, 
churches, modern elections and CDAs. The last two were of particular importance. If the leader from 
these two institutions was the same person, it was easier for a village to reach a consensus on 
collective action; if not, the political competition would be more complicated. There are also 
exceptional cases where multiple leaders in a village can reconcile or coordinate their actions for the 
public good. 
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based on the social resources the village could mobilise, and the terms the 
community members could agree to. In other words, it could work sustainably and 
mobilise resources. The process of building consensus among their constituents, 
mediating social interests, and organising villagers, were key to its success. One of 
the major elements facilitating internal mediation was social capital, i.e. the trust, 
norm and network a community possessed, which helped the community members 
to place common benefits above personal interests. Social capital was also a key 
element in helping the community to overcome obstacles.  
 
An endogenous pattern of collaborative governance derived from autonomic actions 
on small scale experiments of environmental improvement tended to lead to small 
scale results. However these were often very effective as they built on villagers’ 
consensus achieved in village meetings 86 . The weakness lay in the fact that 
environmental issues can be complex, multifaceted and large scale, demanding a 
greater level of financial support than was available locally. If the bureaucratic 
system had no related measures, it was more difficult for the social pioneers of 
collaborative governance to continue alone. On the other hand, more sustainable 
solutions were often raised by local society than the government because it often 
held greater knowledge and a comprehensive perspective on local environmental 
issues as most examples in this case study showed. Using this knowledge. In 
Gaujung, Dashe, Koushe, Fushing, Mintzu and Maolin villages, the villagers 
mobilised different resources, including voluntary labour, natural materials from the 
mountain and equipment for patrolling, persisted in their self-determined goals, 
even when faced with obstacles, and maintained their individual development logic 
(Interviews: 034, 2006-12-03; 035, 2006-12-04; 037, 2006-12-04; 042, 2007-01-02; 
043-2007-01-02; 044, 2007-01-14; 045, 2007-01-14). Under these circumstances, 
their arguments and methods acquired greater esteem from outsiders, including the 
state participants (Interviews: 010, 2006-10-17; 022, 2006-11-09; 023, 2006-12-15; 
029, 2007-02-06; 030, 2007-02-09). But to what degree the lessons from these local 
initiatives could be promoted regionally or nationwide is another matter.  
                                                 
86 There were two reasons why River Enclosure needed consensus in village meetings in order to be 
put into practice. First, in an indigenous society, each river section belongs to a certain clan, 
therefore it is necessary to acquire agreement from each clan. Second, to conduct River Enclosure it 
needs each family to send one person to patrol the river and therefore whether each family can agree 
on this action is essential. 
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 The Taiwanese state learnt how the practice of public participation could 
effectively resolve environmental issues and therefore it incorporated River 
Enclosure into policy/legislation, providing legitimisation and a budget, and 
promoted it to broader society (Interview: 027, 2007-01-15; 029, 2007-02-06; 
031, 2007-01-25). This incorporation transformed the local spontaneous 
conservationism into formal government policy, and led to an exogenous pattern 
of collaborative governance. The exogenous pattern was initiated from outside by 
state agencies to promote public participation in environmental management, 
assuming it was possible to generalise local success but this approach to policy 
design did not necessarily match the range of conditions of the localities where 
River Enclosure was applied. For example, the policy of hiring unemployed 
outsiders to patrol rivers was an attempt to solve the problems of unemployment 
and environmental issues together, but its result on river protection was not as 
effective as sending locals to patrol because the former did not have the sense of 
stewardship of the latter (Interviews: 035, 2006-12-04; 042, 2007-01-02). The 
outcome was the reappearance of fish poaching. Another difficulty arose because 
government funding needed to be spent within the fiscal year rather than allowing 
the villages to use the funding more cautiously and effectively (Interview: 043, 
2007-01-02).  
 
Under this circumstance, the success of an exogenous pattern of collaborative 
governance relies very much on the villagers’ capacity for adaptability. For 
example, several members of Minchiuan and Koushe Villages possessed good 
administrative skills, writing proposals and project reports, demonstrating River 
Enclosure outcomes in writing, and operating in conjunction with the government 
fiscal system and thereby acquiring government resources to construct tourism 
facilities (Interviews: 043, 2007-01-02; 033, 2006-12-02). Other members in 
other villages did not have such skills. 
 
Furthermore, for some villages, these exogenously initiated policies ‘reoriented 
the development logic and spontaneity of tribal villages’ (Interviews: 039, 
2006-12-05; 035, 2006-12-04; 043, 2007-01-02). This might have been an 
unanticipated consequence of the well-intentioned policy-makers. For example, 
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in Koushe and Gaujung Villages the initial river patrol was carried out by 
voluntary village mobilisation. After three or four years of mobilisation, most 
villagers were fatigued and this coincided with the government’s decision to pay 
river patrollers. Thus the River Enclosure and related development efforts shifted 
from a community-centred to a state-centred activity almost by default. Again, the 
local patrolling and environmental improvement efforts were performed by paid 
staff, but the results were less accomplished than those achieved by voluntary 
villagers because of the loss of commitment and spontaneity. Some poaching 
behaviour reappeared. More than that, some volunteers withdrew after the paid 
staff joined the team because they thought to ‘leave the labour to people who 
received payment’ (Interviews: 035, 2006-12-04; 043, 2007-01-02; 029, 
2007-02-06).   
 
The exogenous pattern of collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin 
encouraged community participation through sponsorship and facilitation. The 
essence of an exogenous pattern is that an indifferent and immobilised public 
could be both encouraged and enabled to participate in public affairs through a 
policy mechanism (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06). Government agencies, both the 
high-ranking bureaucrats and street-level officials, needed to appreciate that 
collaboration would not just occur spontaneously and that the chance of success 
would be increased if  governmental officials were willing to promote public 
participation, including informing community groups of the policy opportunity 
and training new groups of volunteers in processes of participation. A difference 
can be observed between Kaohsiung and Pingtung Counties. While officials in 
the latter county went into mountain villages themselves in order to encourage 
and assist the locals, both to acquire government resources to develop community 
building and eco-tourism (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06), those in the former 
county stayed in the office revealing a lesser commitment towards the livelihoods 
of local people (Interview: 027, 2007-01-15).   
 
A former chief in the local River Bureau explained his concern that outside help 
might bring undesirable results: 
‘When I saw local villagers in Koushe had spontaneously conducted River 
Enclosure for three years without asking for any government funding, I was 
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deeply moved. I immediately approved an NT $1m87 subsidy to the village. The 
next day, our staff in the River Bureau went to discuss with the villagers about 
how to use the money well in order to create desirable results rather than 
cause destruction.’ (Interview: 023, 2006-12-15) 
Another official in the County Government explained how an exogenous 
initiation of River Enclosure might not function as well as an endogenous 
approach: 
‘Designating a Wildlife Protection Area in Minchiuan Village ended up with 
only the public sector promoting river conservation. The result was less 
effective and only looked at the number of fish. In contrast, in Gaujung 
Village, the mobilisation of the whole village in river protection also induced 
the development of eco-tourism which made the village prosperous.’ 
(Interview: 022, 2006-11-09) 
 
The social capital of the community involved was as decisive as the attitude of 
the government agency. Collaboration was more likely to succeed in those 
communities which possessed higher social capital. This is because the 
communities themselves retained norms, networks and trust on which to initiate 
public mobilisation, solve disputes and adjust policy design to suit local 
conditions. For example, in Dashe, when villagers agreed to launch River 
Enclosure ten years ago, village leaders asked them to hand in the equipment 
used for exploitative fishing, such as battery boxes, used to electrify fish, and 
every household was assigned an area to watch over (Interview: 044, 2007-01-14). 
This collective consensus and strict execution was based on the village’s strong 
solidarity and boundedness (Interview: 043, 2007-1-2; 044, 2007-01-14; 045, 
2007-1-14), which may be seen as a sort of social capital. Therefore when the 
government promised to provide funding for paid patrollers to the village, 
villagers mediated the salary among paid and non-paid patrollers, so that most 
patrollers could get some subsidy and therefore maximise the effect of 
government funding (Interview: 044, 2007-01-14).  
 
For those communities which lacked solidarity, the mechanism for encouraging 
                                                 
87 About US $ 33,000。 
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participation might only be utilised by a few members (usually those local 
political faction heads or opinion leaders). For example, in Minchiuan Village, the 
decision in favour of River Enclosure was initiated from top-down, by 
government officials, and the vast majority of villagers played no role other than 
passively obeying the River Enclosure no-fishing rule. The result was that most 
government funding was allocated by a few political leaders (Interview: 033, 
2006-12-02). 
 
Outside support for River Enclosure was thus a two-edged sword. It became so 
popular among government agencies and urban environmental activists (including 
NGOs and academia) that many of them were keen to ‘help’ River Enclosure 
villagers in terms of assistance in writing project proposals for funding and sharing 
professional environmental knowledge. But outside support sometimes reduced 
local spontaneity and manipulated the villagers to pursue developmental goals 
(Fang, 2006)88 favoured by state agencies, professionals or activists, which may 
have been incompatible with their internal objectives or their preferred timing. For 
example, a core member of River Enclosure in Koushe complained that the 
suggestion of developing eco-tourism made by outsiders was too early for their 
village: 
‘At the beginning what we did was simply protect the fish, but soon outsiders 
came to advise us on how to develop tourism…The whole process of moving 
from river protection to tourism development was encouraged by outsiders 
and government projects before the villagers themselves had determined 
their own initiatives.’ (interview 043: 2006-01-02) 
Whether River Enclosure villages can adapt themselves to outside resources (and 
the conditions that follow) is a major issue. In fact, most villages found 
themselves faced with the dilemma of institutionalising the River Enclosure in 
order to acquire government grants. In some cases the villagers gave up applying 
for them and in others only a few core members could follow the conditions of 
government grants and this often led to internal disputes. In Koushe the split 
between villagers was obvious: 
‘Community building became one government project after another rather 
                                                 
88 See also interview: 043, 2007-01-02 
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than spontaneous actions. When some villagers got paid and the rest did not, 
the split between them became obvious. In village meetings, those who did 
not get paid became interrogators and those who got paid interrogated. This 
was not fair for those doing a lot.’ (interview 043: 2006-01-02)  
 
More generally, the role of the state in relation to River Enclosure was internally 
inconsistent. On the one hand the state was the traditional dominant ruler over its 
jurisdiction of forest and river resources. On the other, it was a good-willed 
supporter and enthusiastic in its attempts to ‘nurture’ tribal spontaneity and 
participation in governing natural resources. River Enclosure, symbolising how 
indigenes could reclaim their autonomy as well as ownership of traditional 
territories, challenged the compatibility between the existing polity and 
alternative governance. 
 
Both the endogenous and exogenous approaches of River Enclosure had their 
challenges. The former faced the fact that villagers became weary of long-term 
voluntary patrolling thus making spontaneous action difficult to maintain. The 
latter faced a problematic institutionalisation of River Enclosure that reduced the 
spontaneity of villagers. In some examples, the combination of endogenous and 
exogenous approaches seemed to overcome individual problems, but it required 
strong social capital and organisational capacity to mediate internal interests and 
the ability to adapt to administrative work.  
 
 
5.3.3. The long-term development of environmental collaborative 
governance and its institutionalisation 
 
The long-term development of collaborative governance faces the dilemma of 
institutionalising the River Enclosure movement. Is it necessary to institutionalise 
the process? Institutionalisation aims to sustain the collaboration by incorporating 
it into government policy. However, institutionalisation often leads to less 
flexibility, more professionalism and bureaucracy, as well as more administrative 
labour, which tends to undermine the original value of collaboration and cause 
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the collapse of the civic teams that originally joined the collaboration 
spontaneously. 
 
The institutionalisation of an environmental movement requires several different 
processes, including routinisation, professionalisation and bureaucratisation, even 
the end of movement politics, but also the standardisation of behaviour based on 
new normative processes and goals. It also suggests the establishment of new 
organisational forms of civil society. The purpose of institutionalisation aims to 
place the environmental conflicts within rather than outside of the polity (Brand, 
1999: P35-36). From the perspective of resource mobilisation theory (Zald and 
McCarthy, 1979) or political theory (Tilly, 1978), the opportunity to access the 
polity relates to the levels of professionalisation and bureaucratisation of social 
movement organisations in contemporary liberal society (Lo, 1992). However, 
this situation faces many challenges, not least that the opportunity to enter the 
polity does not promise success.  
 
In this research, the institutionalisation of collaborative governance means an 
innovative type of governance gradually accepted by the state and incorporated 
into the policy process. The government arranges a budget for the innovative 
governance and provides related assistance through administration work. The 
non-state actors may develop organisations and professionalism in order to 
engage effectively with the administrative system. The dilemma collaborative 
governance faces is that institutionalisation can undermine the resilience of 
collaborative governance and the spontaneity of civic society. As a result, 
collaborative governance can find it difficult to adapt to the complexity, diversity 
and dynamics of society (Kooiman, 2003). But from the perspective of social 
resource mobilisation, how environmental protection action can be sustained 
when local enthusiasm in volunteering decays due to individual or organisational 
fatigue, as in the case of River Enclosure, which demands intensive labour and 
resources, and with villagers who are often too poor to continue volunteering 
after a couple of years.  
 
Inappropriate government incentives can cause irreversible consequences. In the 
case of River Enclosure, one of the government’s measures, namely 
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government-selected paid patrollers, easily leads to bureaucratic habits and a lack 
of enthusiasm. Most of the empirical cases showed that ‘paid patrollers cannot 
reach the same degree of effectiveness in fish protection that voluntary villagers 
can’ (Interviews: 035, 2006-12-04; 029, 2007-02-06; 043, 2007-01-02). It can 
also undermine cohesion at the grassroots level. While ‘some of the villagers 
might become paid patrollers and receive monetary rewards for patrolling, the 
rest did not’ (Interviews: 035, 2006-12-04; 043, 2007-01-02). This often caused 
disharmony and reduced commitment towards River Enclosure. Also, because 
having paid patrollers is often only a short term arrangement (usually 6-12 
months), once the governmental support stopped so did the patrolling. Another 
government measure, which directed the core members of the River Enclosure 
towards community production or eco-tourism, required the preparation of a 
three-year development schedule. All recipients of government grants were 
expected to present a proposal of how to reach self-sustainment by local 
communities in their development projects. This goal was ‘more easily said than 
done’ and: 
‘Most core members found themselves chasing the written goals and left 
their villagers behind and turned some villages from devotees of river 
protection into calculating business units’ (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02). 
 
Many River Enclosure villages complied with government requirements 
following grant approval, but at the same time they also tended to neglect the 
value of consensus building among villagers over development orientation and its 
pace. The original simple River Enclosure had become a stepping-stone towards 
eco-tourism rather than eco-tourism acting as a supporting element of river 
protection. This change in the nature of River Enclosure often did not achieve 
collective village recognition and turned into ‘a struggle between the core 
members and lay villagers’ (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02). Even some core 
members argued that ‘democratic discussion was a neck breaking-process and 
consumed too much energy without producing an efficient and effective outcome’ 
(Interview: 035, 2006-12-04). 
For example, Koushe Village, which received the largest government grant, 
started a series of projects to prepare for eco-tourism, including restoring 
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traditional buildings, constructing tourism infrastructure and setting up 
information and service centres. These tasks attracted a huge amount of 
administration work which was labour intensive and concentrated efforts on the 
paid staff of the community organisation. The organisation became more and 
more professional but gradually ‘distanced the lay villagers’ who were once the 
focus of the River Enclosure (Interviews: 043, 2007-01-02; 042, 2007-01-02). 
 
Gaujung Village faced the same issue. On one hand, voluntary villagers 
concluded that the heavy work of patrolling could be left to paid patrollers. On 
the other, paid patrollers refused to work in the evenings or through the night, just 
when the fish poachers were active. ‘Paid patrollers were usually passive and 
arrogant, saw the government as their real boss and disregarded the directions of 
villagers.’ This phenomenon resulted in the reappearance of abusive fishing 
(Interview: 035, 2006-12-04). 
 
Minchiuan had enjoyed plenty of government financial support since 1990 
because it was situated in a Wildlife Conservation Area. Assessing the attraction 
of government grants, a Minchiuan interviewee revealed the contradictions when 
he argued that: 
‘The autonomy of the tribe was the most important element in practising 
collaborative governance and it was not absolutely necessary to apply for 
government support. But it is undeniable that without government grants, we 
might not have been able to produce an effective outcome.’ (Interview: 033, 
2006-12-02) 
More generally, the interviewees agreed that ‘villagers’ enthusiasm in voluntary 
service would inevitably face exhaustion, and that it is difficult to continue 
mobilising whole villages to practise River Enclosure, especially when the 
economic incentive is low (Interviews: 022, 2006-11-09; 043, 2007-01-02; 035, 
2006-12-04). Usually, the voluntary service of River Enclosure could mobilise 
the greatest number of participants when collective grievances and anger were at 
their peak. The effort to follow government requirements gradually put the 
environmental actions at risk- distancing the movement from the real goals of 
collective action. One core member of River Enclosure in Koushe Village said 
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that: 
‘In order to close up the government project on time and efficiently, we have 
to sacrifice all the real goals…the targets of government grants are usually 
different from what we really need and expect. We have to adapt to the 
administration’s requirements and procedures. The public sector cannot 
catch what our true social demands are. A burdensome administration 
system is influencing and orienting the development of our organisation…it 
is so burdensome that it caused us to lose our visions and goals.’ (Interview: 
043, 2007-01-02) 
Their village, with a population of only seven hundred, received several 
government contracts and one of them was for more than US $300,000 for a 
three-year project. With such a large project and budget there was not sufficient 
time for the core members of the village to think about their common 
expectations, and the project turned out to be disabling rather than empowering.  
‘The village became a channel for the government to outsource their policy 
business. Dozens of projects flowed into the village that the government 
agencies considered capable of producing a satisfactory performance. The 
community building became simply numerous government projects, rather 
than spontaneous plans instigated by the villagers’. (Interview: 043, 
2007-01-02) 
 
The effort that communities had to put into the administrative formalities reduced 
local incentives especially as they focused on the details and not the overall 
picture. Although the government policy had good intentions, the implementation 
mechanisms were problematic and generated a lack of trust. Administrative red 
tape prevented the River Enclosure communities from having real autonomy, and 
the programme became oriented towards projects and tangible outcomes rather 
than process-oriented public association, deliberation and collaboration. This 
form of ‘target-orientation strangled the networking, innovation and spontaneity 
of public spirit’ in civil society (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02). Thus although 
institutionalisation was one of the means used to help collaborative governance to 
be sustainable, it was never thought through. Hindsight reveals that it was 
essential to ‘adjust the policy incentive slowly to what society needed’ (Interview: 
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029, 2007-02-06). The process of institutionalising collaborative governance 
demands a change in bureaucratic culture. Mutual learning needs to lead to an 
equal collaboration between state and society, rather than social actors having to 
adapt to the notions of a bureaucratic system, and it also requires collaborating 
organisations to advance their capacities in response to administrative procedures. 
 
As a result, the major factor which can possibly guarantee successful 
collaborative governance is spontaneous social mobilisation. It has been the 
major force behind the initiation of collaborative governance in the Kaoping 
River basin. Civil participation in policy reform and environmental governance 
seeks to connect different resources and networks while encouraging partnerships 
which will overcome the bureaucratic culture of being ‘confined to established 
rules’. An official in county government explained the importance of autonomic 
association at the local level: 
‘Koushe had strong autonomy and thus could overcome difficulties. For 
example, last year a typhoon destroyed a lot of the tourist infrastructure they 
had built, but they soon re-mobilised to rebuild it. The village had strong 
commitment and execution ability. Yila and Wutai Villages also encountered 
a typhoon that caused destruction of public infrastructure, like wooden paths, 
but soon recovered because they had consensus on goals among villagers. It 
is this kind of case that the government likes to provide funding for to help 
them develop.’ (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06) 
Many interviewees emphasised that government support was a short-term 
solution. Recipients should not expect to come to rely on it permanently. Instead, 
‘spontaneity of the tribal village is the fundamental element to successful 
collaboration’ (Interviews: 033, 2006-12-02; 030, 2007-02-09). Only then should 
the government assess what they can provide and what communities need in ways 
that they can retain their autonomy. The importance of the autonomy does not 
constrain or reduce the wish to ‘establish a more equal and productive 
state-society relationship’ as it also helps the community to build up an ‘internal 
mechanism of independent sustainable development’ and understand ‘what 
support they really need from the outside world’ (Interviews: 030, 2007-02-09; 
029, 2007-02-06; 022, 2006-11-09).   
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 Of course, collaboration in river governance needed both the input of a budget 
and social efforts, but it was social efforts that really mattered. Government input 
should correspond to what the civic actors need to empower them to participate in 
governance. To make River Enclosure work, we must let the civic actors make 
the first move, otherwise it is impossible to know what the goals and key points 
of civic actors are and what kind of support is needed. ‘If the government initiates 
the movement, then it will not be what the community really needs’ (Interview: 
022, 2006-11-09). Only an endogenous initiative can identify and highlight what 
civic actors or community members are concerned about and suggest an effective 
resolution. A local frontline official in a township office, who was also a core 
member of the local CDA, explained that: 
‘Government resources are limited and, thus, cannot supply whatever the 
social actors demand. Therefore the spontaneity of communities is important 
in a way to clarify in what direction the community wants to develop, how to 
allocate available labour and resources, and how to distribute economic 
rewards. Only the local people can envision their future in a diverse and 
sustainable way’. (Interview: 035, 2006-12-04)  
Another official in county government agreed that: 
‘If the community raises its own projects, it will be easier to produce an 
outcome which benefits both the community and the government. In contrast, 
if the government actively provides assistance without prior negotiation with 
the community to establish the common willingness, it will often achieve 
only half the result with twice the effort. The consensus building and 
coordination between itself and the local leadership is the key to success.’ 
(Interview: 029, 2007-02-06) 
 
5.3.4. The transformative capability and constraints of 
environmental collaborative governance in Taiwan 
 
The ability of River Enclosure to motivate public-minded citizenship and to 
ensure long-term social commitment to untangle environmental issues is often 
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limited. Could it catalyse a new form of governance? The limitation is two-fold. 
One is that grassroots participation in the Kaoping River basin is often 
constrained to the final part of the policy process, i.e. policy implementation, 
rather than being involved from the decision-making stage. At best, locals were 
consulted to provide their views on established policies for environmental 
management and planning. In such situations, the grassroots can only decide 
whether to adopt new practices in their area, or how to conduct their River 
Enclosure strategy, rather than to determine policies towards their environmental 
affairs on their territories. But, so saying, some public participation has the 
capacity to reform policies, politics and institutions and this kind of 
transformative capacity should not be overlooked.  
 
For example, River Enclosure often encouraged the villagers’ latent commitment 
to environmental stewardship, a stewardship rooted in the ‘traditional culture of 
tribal environmental management’, which was often regarded as more sustainable 
than modern bureaucratic approaches to management (Interviews: 043, 
2007-01-02; 030, 2007-02-09). Indigenes in the Kaoping River basin traditionally 
managed nearby river sections on a clan system. In other words, the ownership of 
and rights to rivers belonged to the heads of the tribal groups. Traditionally, the 
head of a clan took charge of river management and could call for a collective 
effort towards its achievement. In contrast, contemporary River Enclosure was 
more democratic as in all the cases the procedure began by reaching a collective 
decision on whether or not to commence it in formal village meetings. Then the 
village chief or head of local Community Development Associations (CDAs) 
would mobilise the whole village to river patrol against abusive fishing. 
‘The River Enclosure action revived the environmental- and 
community-minded awareness of the indigenous population. Villagers who 
had left the community to work in the cities came back to work for their 
people and environment as well as the elders who stayed.’ (Interview: 043, 
2007-01-02).  
 
Without a strong commitment to environmentalism and home protection, it was 
impossible for the villagers to persistently engage in River Enclosure because 
River Enclosure was labour-intensive and sometimes life threatening. This 
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became more so when some villages experienced two landslide disasters in 2004 
and 2005, which were so tremendous that the local river environments were 
seriously damaged. Some of the village teams collapsed, but some were revived. 
For example, the action of River Enclosure in Koushe and Dashe survived the 
destruction of typhoons (Interviews: 044, 2007-01-14; 042, 2007-01-02), but in 
Fushing it did not and their team broke down (Interview: 038, 2006-12-05).  
 
The transformative capacities of the River Enclosure groups improved the solidarity 
and environmental consciousness of their own communities, built community 
connections, solved collective environmental issues, raised their awareness of the 
environment, enhanced public participation and regained the sense of ownership of 
their traditional territory and related management policies. Some of them obtained 
economic rewards from the eco-tourism they developed based on river protection. 
Community participation, like the River Enclosure actions, usually aimed to recover 
the local environment rather than delivering on broader policies or political change. 
But in a few cases local actions led to a policy response, changed social values and 
sought to get the approach institutionalised. For example, when River Enclosure in 
Koushe and Dashe became so successful in Pingtung County, the spirit of public 
participation in communal environmental affairs spilled over into neighbouring 
villages (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06). Small scale community actions could inspire 
other communities into adopting the same action pattern (Interview: 034, 
2006-12-03). The county government decided to promote River Enclosure to the 
whole county, including more than eighty rivers89. In so doing the River Enclosure 
movement obtained broader recognition and was able to compete with powerful 
recreational fishing associations for management solutions (Participant observation: 
The Forum of River Enclosure and Fish Protection, 2006-6-25, 24) 90.  
 
But it is doubtful that these limited actions could gain enough political leverage to 
compete with economic development. River Enclosure seemed ‘powerless to 
oppose large scale development projects’ (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02). For 
                                                 
89 http://www.ettoday.com/2003/07/08/738-1480417.htm 
90 Conflicts between river protectors and anglers occurred from time to time. Anglers, mostly urban 
residents, organised an association to promote their legal right to river fishing and blamed River 
Enclosure for introducing charges for fishing. They raised several petitions to legislators. See 
http://fishing-right.org.tw/shownews.asp?newsid=778 
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example, Koushe Village obtained a good reputation for its River Enclosure, but 
could not ‘battle with deforestation run by the underworld’ (Interview: 043, 
2007-01-02) in their upstream area which was under the jurisdiction of the Forest 
Bureau in central government91. In the worst case, the River Enclosure in Fushing 
Village was forced to suspend its operation due to the landslides caused by upstream 
deforestation that totally destroyed the river. Other villages, like Mintzu, Minchiuan 
and Tauyuan, are facing the threat of a transbasin water diversion which could well 
undermine the river environment that they spent resources protecting. They failed to 
stop the project even though they had numerous social and political supporters who 
joined their protests (Participant observation: 2006-4-4; 2006-6-29; 2006-7-5; 
2006-11-11; 2006-11-12). 
 
The other limitation of the River Enclosure movement was its deep embeddedness 
in the context of local politics, including both tribal politics and modern political 
competition- democratic elections. Tribal politics are not as simple as people might 
assume. Internally, they are multi-layered and highly antagonist, i.e. political 
competition exists among traditional hereditary Tou-Mu 92 , the elected heads, 
informal political leaders from CDAs and even church leaders in a village. The 
colonial regime of the KMT had manipulated tribal politics with a corporatist 
strategy by allocating resources between different political institutions in villages 
(Chen, 2003). 
 
In a village, even if a political leader successfully led his constituents to recover 
river ecology and brought new opportunities to the village, he might still face 
external resistance from other leaders. The village political leader also had to 
compete with other villages for government resources for environmental 
governance. Most government resources are distributed through a township office 
to local villages, and therefore the relationship between the village and township 
office determined, to a large degree, where the resources went. This explains the 
contrast between Minchiuan and Mintzu Villages in terms of the government 
                                                 
91 UDN 6 Oct 2004, Landslides occur in the upstream area of the Kaoping River, P. B2 
UDN 29 August 2002, Deforestation prevails in the upstream area in Koushe Village and causes 
landslides, P. 17 
92 Tou-Mu is an appellation of traditional tribal leaders in indigenous communities which also refers 
to the head of each indigenous clan. 
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resources they obtained. The political leaders in the former belonged to the same 
faction as the mayor in their upper level- Sanmin Township, and therefore 
Minchiuan obtained greater resources than Mintzu, whose leader belonged to 
another faction (Interviews: 033, 2006-12-02; 034, 2006-12-03).  
 
A paid member of staff in a CDA explained that the competition of political 
factions hindered the efforts of River Enclosure:  
‘River Enclosure has its roots in traditional indigenous culture in that every 
indigenous household was obliged to work for public infrastructure in 
response to the call of the Tou-Mu. The success of River Enclosure relied on 
its combination of village political leadership and the tradition of voluntary 
service. However, the present political competition might offset the efforts of 
river protection. Many villagers see river protection as one faction 
competing against the other, with only a few villagers recognising it as being 
for the common good.’ (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02)  
Traditionally, a river belonged to the local Tou-Mu and so did the right of river 
management, but over the last century the indigenes have been deprived of river 
ownership and the right of management by the state. River Enclosure aimed to 
devolve management back from the hands of the state to community groups, which 
were not the same as the Tou-Mu. This led to a backlash from the traditional elites, 
including both the state and the Tou-Mu. For example, in Koushe, Dashe, Mintzu 
and Gaujung, the ‘traditional Tou-Mu of the clan resisted both the allocation of river 
stewardship to the state and the collective consensus over devolution to the 
community’ (Interviews: 042, 2007-01-02; 043, 2007-01-02; 044, 2007-01-14; 034, 
2006-12-03; 035, 2006-12-04). However, if the village meeting generated a 
consensus over River Enclosure and the result turned out to be good, River 
Enclosure legitimised the devolution of power from the state more than the process 
of democratisation did in the village meeting. This was particularly obvious when 
fish conservation in a River Enclosure village was good enough to issue fishing 
licenses93, thus financially rewarding villagers. In this way it informally legitimised 
devolution and overcame the resistance of the Tou-Mu.  
                                                 
93 The right of issuing fishing licenses also triggered disputes. Whether the village, the CDA or their 
supervisors in the township office had this right was not defined by the Fishery Law or Wildlife 
Protection Law. In practice, they all played a role in issuing fishing licenses. 
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 The competition between modern local political leaders, e.g. the heads of villages 
and the heads of local CDAs, affected the solidarity of villages. There was often a 
conflict of political interest between village chiefs and the directors of local 
CDAs. The declining traditional Tou-Mu were replaced by a system of elected 
village chiefs imposed by the colonial state in the post-war era. The system of 
CDAs, started in 1994, was a pre-emptive corporatist arrangement introduced by 
the state to out-source government projects related to community building. It was 
also designed to instigate political competition in the localities so that the state 
could dominate local politics via manipulation of resource allocation (Fang, 2006; 
Tsai et al., 2007). CDAs were a type of semi-NGO, often viewed as a rival 
competitor to a village chief (ibid). If the village chief and the head of the CDA 
were the same person, then it would be much easier for the community to reach a 
consensus. 
 
This is an aftermath of traditional Taiwanese corporatist politics. In the earlier 
authoritarian phase, the regime sought to repress autonomic associations and 
introduced the CDA system in the 1980s as a formal recognised community 
organisation in order to limit independent local political activity. However, the 
influence of a CDA depended on how much governmental resource was released 
exclusively to them. In the mid-1990s, political control over community 
associations was relaxed and the state encouraged the trend of community building. 
This encouraged the development of the CDA system throughout Taiwan94. Every 
community established at least one CDA either through the village chief or his or 
her political rival. The budget of the CDA came from central government for the 
purpose of community-building activities, although this process often turned out to 
serve political purposes as well. In addition, the budget needed for the CDA 
sometimes was more than the village office could acquire, usually from local 
governments. This, therefore, often led to conflict between the village chief and the 
director of the CDA. Today, many environmental activists ally with ‘CDAs as an 
interface to engage with local environmental affairs and hence bring progressive 
concepts into the community mechanism’ and push for self-reform (Interview: 043, 
                                                 
94 Until 2007, there were 6,402 CDAs, containing 20 million members in Taiwan based on the 
Annual Statistic Report of the Administration of Domestic Affairs in 2007. 
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2007-01-02) in order to ‘advance the performance of contracted government 
projects’ (Interview: 010, 2006-10-17). 
 
In Koushe Village, the director of the CDA and the elected village chief was the 
same person at the start of River Enclosure. Political leadership was concentrated 
in one person and this made it possible to produce a consensus over River 
Enclosure. However, later on, the village chief lost his re-election bid and thus the 
local leadership was split. The ‘environmental restoration slowly disconnected 
with the rest of the village and was promoted by the CDA alone’ (Interviews: 010, 
2006-10-17; 042, 2007-01-02; 043, 2007-01-02). River Enclosure in Koushe later 
became only relevant to a small group of villagers (Interviews: 042, 2007-01-02; 
043, 2007-01-02), an example of what community building must avoid at all 
costs. In Koushe, one community core member said that: 
‘The conflict between the Tou-Mu, head of CDA and the elected village chief 
was embedded into the traditional social structure’ (Interview: 043, 
2007-01-02).  
Therefore a River Enclosure leader said: 
‘Whenever River Enclosure encountered frustration, the Tou-Mu always 
argued to withdraw their right of river management. The conflict existed in 
the election of the village chief too. The new leaders disrupted the action of 
River Enclosure and left the work to be done by me [the former village chief] 
and my faction on behalf of the CDA.’ (Interview: 042, 2007-01-02) 
A senior officer in Pingtung County government explained how local political 
competition offset the effort in community development: 
‘Government intervention will unavoidably bring a non-indigenous system 
into villages. I go to a local village to help them build a tourism institution 
based on river protection. But the village chief and the leader of the CDA 
belong to different factions. They have different opinions and both want to 
hold government grants. Neither of them is willing to reconcile their 
differences. I do not know how to allocate the resources if their struggle 
continues.’ (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06) 
 
Local political competition, as a leftover of traditional corporatist politics, often 
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still overrode the new emerging participatory democracy. Sometimes faction 
politics divided the communities and set back collaborative governance, and the 
work of environmental improvement was left to a few of the villagers. Both 
endogenous and exogenous approaches find it difficult and time-consuming to 
overcome such political cleavages in a community. 
 
5.3.5. State-society relationship in transition 
 
The River Enclosure Movement demonstrates how the relationship between an 
indigenous society and the state can change from one dominating the other to a 
comparatively mutually-respecting partnership. During the post-war era, the state 
established an authoritarian regime which gradually weakened Taiwanese 
indigenes culturally, economically, and socially. Its corporatist strategy 
manipulated tribal politics. Altogether, the regime led to ‘the indigene’s reliance 
upon the state’ (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02). The River Enclosure movement 
symbolised an alteration to the state-society relationship, as revealed by the 
state’s concession to River Enclosure which represented a demand for 
self-government from bottom-up, and in its provision of resources to encourage 
more indigenous communities to act to improve their environment.  
 
State hegemony overwhelmingly excluded indigenes from their traditional 
territory in the post-war period, while manipulating political leadership in tribal 
villages by introducing a mainstream election system and by selectively 
allocating government resources (Chen, 2003). The spontaneous River Enclosure 
by indigenous people was a combination of their reactions to environmental 
degradation, exploitation of river fish, anti-outsider sentiment, and the loss of 
local sovereignty. The successful outcome of River Enclosure legitimised the 
action itself and forced the state to give the indigenes recognition and gradually 
introduced a state and society partnership in environmental management. For 
example, this case study has found that civil actors can be equally contributive in 
initiating an innovative form of river governance. One reason is, as a county 
government official explained, 
‘It is impossible for the government to manage everything everywhere. It 
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is better devolving the right of management to locals, especially voluntary 
locals. Because the locals will have their own perspective and priority on 
how environmental issues should be solved, the government decision and 
policy does not always correspond to their views…It is better if the locals 
take the initiative and the government follows and assists.’ (Interview: 
022, 2006-11-09)  
 
Nevertheless, this kind of state-society partnership is still fragile in Taiwan. 
The indigenous people are still developing their identity and prospects which 
have been repressed for a long time. The sudden input of assistance from a 
strong state can disorientate them. Once the state has intervened, it has often 
directed the development of the local community rather than allowing the 
community to make its own decisions. As a result, a new clientele relationship 
was formed between the reformist state apparatus and the autonomic civil 
society. This kind of relationship was, perhaps, unavoidable at this time, as a 
leader and a paid member of staff in Koushe said: 
‘I felt bad when I did not help much in the governor’s re-election. He [a 
local politician] has provided us with a lot of assistance. But our villagers 
did not know how to give feedback to the politician who helped us. It was 
because the township mayor and village chief belonged to another 
political party.’ (Interview: 042, 2007-01-02) 
‘The River Enclosure received resources from one politician and then we 
needed to help him when the election year arrived. Sometimes we were 
asked to publicise our support for his re-election and win a certain 
amount of votes for him… This clientelist relationship became very 
obvious at particular moments, [for example during the election 
campaign,] and it actually ruined our efforts in community building.’ 
(Interview: 043, 2007-01-02) 
 
But, at least, this process of learning how to develop collaborative governance 
provided the state agencies with a lesson that environmental governance is less 
plausible when exercised by the state actors alone. The River Enclosure 
movement integrated the capacity and knowledge of government agencies and 
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civil actors to work together on solving particular environmental problems. The 
collaborative effort reinforces the legitimacy, resources, opportunity, and 
legality of both the state actors and non-state actors in governance reforms. 
Moreover, through the process of collaborative governance, the communities 
or civil actors retain/regain their ownership, recognition and participation in the 
solution, which enhances the result of policy implementation. However, the 
state remains a powerful dominator leading to a new clientelist relationship 
with the civic actors through the processes of resource allocation and the 
institutionalisation of collaborative governance. 
 
5.4 Conclusion: Re-thinking the model of environmental 
collaborative governance  
 
With reference to the provisional model described in Chapter 2, this case study 
draws particular attention to some aspects of the model. Firstly, the nature of the 
environmental action was not designed only to achieve environmental recovery 
but also for its potential economic rewards, for example tourist income and job 
opportunities combined with river protection revealing key incentives to 
collaborate which developed beyond the scope of the environment. Secondly, 
River Enclosure was closely linked to the geographic features of indigenous 
society. The current working and older generations in indigenous villages retain 
the memory of their traditional territory and the definition of a good environment, 
which has been undermined by the modern state and the commercialisation of 
natural resources. At the same time they retained the legacy of tribal norms and a 
voluntary system. Even though it had not been practised for a long time, tribal 
leaders’ call for River Enclosure aroused villagers’ awareness as indigenes with 
long held environmental concerns and traditions. In other words, the emergence 
of River Enclosure was exclusive to the time and the place. 
 
Thirdly, the change in political climate increased the incentive for the indigene to 
collaborate. A more liberal political climate after the year 2000, when the new 
administration gave recognition to the indigenous right of self-governing as a 
‘New Partnership’ (Wang, 1999; Chao, 2005), further motivated the villagers to 
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participate in managing the environment. In addition, the environmental issue 
was more than simply a case of addressing environmental degradation, it also 
represented a response to the deprivation of their ownership of natural resources. 
These three reasons instigated a collective emotion among the indigene towards 
intrusion from outside the local community, especially the depredation of their 
fish resources. Their leaders converted this sentiment into a positive action, 
namely River Enclosure, to promote their right of river management.  
 
As the model suggests, the success of River Enclosure action also depended on 
how many resources the leaders could mobilise, employing local social capital, 
traditional norms, networks, and the mechanism of mediating profits. Other 
resources like voluntary labour, and the administrative capacity to deal with 
government programmes, were also vital in defining the success of River 
Enclosure. But also, as the model suggests, the environmental action was 
embedded in a particular social-political context where the internal competition 
of political leadership in an indigenous village often undermined the attempt to 
make River Enclosure a success. 
 
This case study also brings some new elements to the model (see Figure 5.2). The 
first is the focussing event, as Kingdon (1995) suggests, which draws peoples’ 
attention to create necessary change. Attention-attracting problems function as 
focussing events to drive agenda change and to attract the attention of bureaucrats, 
elected officials and the general public to the issues involved (Birkland, 1997). In 
this case study, dramatic depredation of river fish led to an outburst of villagers’ 
anger and grievance and a demand for a change in river governance. Despite the 
general decline in river fish and wildlife resources since the 1980s, worried 
villagers did not make a move until fish predation events by outsiders provoked 
them into protecting the river resource themselves, rather than waiting for the 
government to solve the issue for them.  
 
The second discovery is the complication of the feedback mechanism between the 
outcome/process of collaborative governance and the continuity of it. The 
conduct of collaborative governance altered organisational behaviour 
encouraging continued participation, despite participants’ complaints of 
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bureaucracy. This is because the process of collaborative governance required the 
major organisations in River Enclosure to engage with government procedures 
and learn administrative skills. This, in turn, reinforced the wish and capacity of 
most of the organisations to continue to collaborate. 
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Figure 5. 2: A revised model of the emergence and development of environmental collaborative governance 
 
 
 
Chapter 6  Case Studies: Water Defence 
 
6.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter investigates (a) how non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
launched a bottom-up Water Defence movement (see Section 4.4.1 for an 
introduction), which was initially a reaction to the industrial exploitation of river 
water and later became a forum for innovative water conservation strategies for 
Southern Taiwan. This chapter is devoted to unveiling (b) how the Water Defence 
actions successfully persuaded the government to undertake a more sustainable 
method to manage river water resources and led its member organisations to the 
further development of environmental activism. By uniting NGOs across the 
divide of urban and rural areas, it became the biggest social mobilisation in 
Taiwan during the 1990s. Many key social actors of that movement became key 
members of decision making on river policy.   
 
The three NGOs in this case study participated in confrontational protests to 
defend the water resources of the Kaoping River in the 1990s. As their issues 
were gradually taken into policy and their protests paused, they entered the policy 
community more generally. Coincidentally, they all chose to adopt a collaborative 
approach to governance for environmental conservation, their suggestions for 
alternative water resources were put into practice, and they raised new 
environmental initiatives. For example, Wetlands Taiwan restored the ecology 
and water resources by regenerating wetlands along the river high flat known as 
the ‘Hundred-Mile Wetland’. Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association 
empowered community groups to resolve their environment problems by 
introducing debates over groundwater utilisation and recharging. Meinung 
People’s Association devoted itself to community conservation programmes 
which combined multidimensional actions including landscape, culture and 
industrial preservation.  
 
In this chapter, Section 6.2 introduces the selected case studies of Water Defence. 
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Section 6.3 lays out the findings, while Section 6.4 reflects on how the findings 
adjust the original model of environmental collaborative governance. 
 
6.2  Example organisations of Water Defence 
 
This research examines the activities of Wetlands Taiwan, Blue Donggang Creek 
Conservation Association (BDCCA), and Meinung People’s Association (MPA). 
All were key organisations in the Water Defence movement (see Figure 6.1 for 
their major active areas), and each sheds a different light on the process of 
collaborative governance (See Table 6.1). There follows a brief introduction to 
the selected organisations. 
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Table 6.1 Examples of Water Defence and their Characteristics 
Organisation Starting 
year 
Motivation  Accessibility  Leadership/ 
institution 
Faction 
politics 
Social capital/ 
resources/ 
capacity 
Initiation 
approach 
Process summary 
Wetlands 
Taiwan 
1994 Protecting wildlife 
habitat against 
industrial development 
Easy  Urban 
professionals 
Not obvious High 
organisational 
capacity with 
limited resources 
from the 
government, but 
low social capital
Endogenous  Spontaneous social 
organisation which 
strived to decrease 
industrial exploitation 
of water and later 
became a de facto 
governing body of 
several wetland parks 
Blue 
Donggang 
Creek 
Conservation 
Association 
1997 Protecting rural water 
resources and the 
environment 
Easy  Rural 
intellectuals  
Not obvious High social 
capital, 
organisational 
capacity, and 
resources from 
the government 
Endogenous  Spontaneous social 
organisation worked on 
protecting natural 
resource and culture. It 
later devoted resources 
to empower more than 
a hundred local small 
communities to 
improve the local 
environment. 
Meinung 
People’s 
Association 
1994 Conserving minority 
culture and landscape, 
and engaging the 
community against dam 
construction project 
Easy  Rural 
intellectuals  
Not obvious High social 
capital, 
organisational 
capacity and 
resources from 
the government 
Endogenous  Spontaneous minority 
communal organisation 
which opposed water 
development project 
near the community, 
and later became an 
initiator of local 
landscape and cultural 
conservation 
programmes 
 
 
Wetlands Taiwan 
 
Wetlands Taiwan is located in Kaohsiung city. Most members of Wetlands Taiwan 
are professional people, including environment professors, journalists, medical 
doctors, ecologists and young activists. Since 1994, Wetlands Taiwan has 
successfully campaigned for designating wildlife protected areas against 
industrial development projects, including Shi-cao Wildlife Protection Area, 
Anti-Binnan Industrial Complex Development Project, Kaoping River protection 
action, and wetland restoration95. It later engaged in the management of wetland 
parks, which they lobbied central and local governments to establish. 
 
In 1997, Wetlands Taiwan joined the protest against the development of two dam 
construction projects, using river water of the Kaoping River, which aimed to 
provide a water source for the Binnan Industrial Complex Development Project. 
These projects threatened the Kaoping River in terms of river water, landscape 
and ecology. The organisation proposed that the government should change river 
policy from developing water resources to restoring groundwater by constructing 
wetlands along the riverside. This proposal became a policy called the 
‘Hundred-Mile Wetland’.  
 
Eventually, the two dam projects and the industrial development project were 
abandoned. Restoring and constructing the ‘Hundred-Mile Wetland’ became the 
new focus of the organisation. In 2007, local governments entrusted the 
organisation to regenerate and/or manage seven wetland parks, partly because 
these wetland parks were established under their advocacy, and partly because the 
government did not possess the capacity and personnel to manage wetlands. Four 
of them are located in the Kaoping area. The role of the organisation has 
transformed from whistle-blower to a government-partnership in the policy 
process. Some researchers called it a ‘de facto governing body’ (McBeath and 
Leng, 2005) which signified a new form of governance in managing natural 
resources. Most of the environmental issues they campaigned for successfully 
became part of the government’s river policy, but the organisation then found that 
                                                 
95 The wetland network they created in the Kaohsiung area is called ‘the Kaohsiung eco-corridor’ 
(observation: 2006-3-4). 
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it had lost organisational focus and public attention. By managing wetland parks 
(some of them were award-winning), the organisation acquired a new objective.  
 
Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association (BDCCA) 
 
The BDCCA is located in Pingtung County. The majority of its members are 
school teachers, elected officials and young activists. Starting as a local group of 
rural intellectuals against highway construction projects, the association soon 
achieved its anti-road goal and sought a new focus for further environmental 
action. The organisation thus joined the Kaoping River Protection Movement, not 
only because the development project of water resources was geographically 
related to the organisation, but also because they discovered that the abundant 
underground water of this area could be a solution to the water supply for the 
Kao-Kao-Ping area without sacrificing water conservation.  
 
When the water crisis of the Kaoping River was resolved, the organisation 
devoted itself to local environmental restoration in the basin. However, they 
found that without local residents’ awareness and consensus, it was difficult to 
make the restoration action sustainable. The organisation thus decided to dedicate 
itself to community building to raise local awareness of environmental 
deterioration.  
Up until 2007, the organisation had established a network of more than a hundred 
community groups, which have experienced the benefit of generating an 
environment combining both the interests of nature and the social demands of 
local people. In addition to increasing local awareness of environmental 
protection, this network often became an ideal channel for the government to 
devolve the management of social development programmes. 
 
Meinung People’s Association (MPA) 
 
The MPA is located in Kaohsiung County. Its membership is comprised of local 
intellectuals, artists, successful business people, elected officials, and young 
activists. Established to campaign against a dam development project at nearby 
Meinung Town, which was a threat to the existence of the local ethnic minority 
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Hakka, the MPA extended its care beyond environmental issues. It drew up a 
multi-dimensional strategy to revive the Hakka community, including ecological, 
cultural, architectural, landscape, and agricultural conservation and development. 
It prepared an integrated Meinung Master Plan96 since the end of the 1990s in 
order to avoid community decline, which might in turn lead to the threat of the 
area being designated as a dam site. 
 
In 2000, when the dam project was renounced by the newly elected Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) regime, the organisation sought to convince central and 
local governments that they should put into practice its multi-dimensional 
community conservation programme. This has developed into a series of 
innovative actions and gradually made the little town of Meinung an 
exceptionally successful case of community conservation that included organic 
agriculture development, Hakka cultural preservation and tourist development. 
These endogenous innovation programmes attracted local youths to return from 
urban areas to volunteer or work. It not only helped a once declining town to 
regain its vitality, but it also recruited talented people to participate in local 
development and Hakka culture promotion. The organisation was seen as an 
embodiment of local leadership transcending the local township office.
 
96 Its major theme was to assign Meinung as a ‘water source and landscape protected area’ which 
would be supported by compensation from urban water tax/revenues. 
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Figure 6.1: The Locations of the Organisations Practising Water Defence 
6.3  Findings 
 
In Chapter One, this thesis raised five research questions about the collaborative 
environmental governance in Taiwan: (1) What have been the reasons that have 
motivated the emergence of environmental collaborative governance? (2) Have 
different approaches to initiating environmental collaborative governance led to 
different processes and results? (3) Does the emergence of environmental 
collaborative governance promise a new pattern for its long-term development 
through its institutionalisation within the policy structure generally? (4) What are 
the levels of transformability and constraints of collaborative governance in the 
context of Taiwan? (5) Does the current practice of collaborative governance in 
Taiwan result in a true transition of the state-society relationship or just a 
disguised form of corporatist strategy? In order to answer these research 
questions, each section from 6.3.1 to 6.3.5 examines each one in turn. Section 
6.3.6 discusses a unique phenomenon that emerged in this case study.    
 
6.3.1  The reason motivating the emergence of environmental 
rative governance collabo
 
First of all, this example shows that several groups of environmentalists, although 
located in different areas (including rural and urban), could initiate a new form of 
collaborative governance spontaneously from the bottom up. The main reason for 
their actions was to break through three types of bottleneck they had encountered 
in the post-social movement phase. 
 
The first bottleneck was the need to create new agendas and renewed 
mobilisation. When most of the controversial water resource issues, like dam 
projects and industrial water demands, were temporarily put into abeyance in the 
late 1990s, the organisations experienced a loss of public attention and support. 
Part of the reason was that the organisations were incorporated into the policy 
mediation process and this process isolated them from the public and led to a lack 
of public exposure. These organisations needed to develop new agendas for social 
mobilisation and public visibility if they were to continue to demonstrate their 
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local value (Interviewees: 013, 2007-03-08; 003, 2006-05-22). 
 
Core members of Wetlands Taiwan suggested: 
‘Some groups among [the Kaoping River Protection Alliance] kept growing 
and transformed from single issue groups to multiple functional groups…If a 
group only cares about one thing, they lose the will to fight when the target 
disappears. If a group wants to continue its growth, it needs to introduce 
new agendas and new memberships.’ (Interviewee: 004, 2007-02-06)  
‘Participating in the policy meeting was very routine and regular mediation. 
Often in the process we were isolated from the public [and the media] and 
gradually lost public attention and support. It also affected our opportunity 
to recruit new members and made us become an organisation of a few elites.’ 
(Interviewee: 003, 2006-05-22) 
 
For Wetlands Taiwan, when the water resource controversy was alleviated, they 
were able to return to their fundamental aim- environmental conservation. Their 
two director generals said:  
‘After we defeated the dam construction projects and related industrial 
development projects, the water use of the Kaoping River then returned to 
normal. So we returned our organisational task to basic ecological 
conservation.’ (Interviewee: 004, 2007-02-06)  
 
Two chief executives in the BDCCA mentioned how the organisation started to 
conduct community empowerment projects in 1999 in order to promote 
environmentalism in each community and thus acquire support from the 
grassroots: 
‘We started to conduct community building because we had experience of 
setbacks. We constructed one artificial wetland on a tidal flat of a tributary 
of Donggang Creek. Local residents did not appreciate it; on the contrary, 
they accused us of occupying the tidal flat. In another case we suggested 
that the local government recover the streamlined nature of Donggang Creek 
after it had been straightened to make it more ecologically friendly. However 
the local residents preferred concrete dikes, which they felt safer than the 
ecological method of dike building due to concern about flood control.’ 
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(Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17) 
‘Our old method was to improve the environment directly by ourselves. But 
we found that if the local community did not recognise the work as being in 
the local interest it would be much more difficult to do the job. Now we work 
with the communities. We care about the primary need of the locals, thus 
making the job much more diverse. Usually it will combine with social 
demands.’ (Interviewee: 012, 2006-12-07) 
 
A former director general explained how community building extended their 
movement repertoire: 
‘The anti-dam campaign in Meinung played the role of catalyst to provoke 
different kinds of social activities. A lot of creativity was embodied. Many 
young people joined the activism. Different networks were established. Even 
after the mobilisation for anti-dam, MPA must continue to do things that are 
meaningful for our hometown. When we were not in the battlefield of 
anti-dam action, we were in the field of cultural rebuilding. This extended 
anti-dam activism to ecological and cultural dimensions.’ (Interviewee: 016, 
2006-4-2)  
‘Environmental activism always emphasises that a movement must be rooted 
in communities, but during the policy defence it was difficult to work in 
communities…It was not until political pressure and conflict was much 
relieved, that we had the opportunity to turn to communities and try to 
realise the idealism of a social movement. It gave us a chance to really face 
the public and gain their support.’ (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13) 
 
The second bottleneck was how to solve those unsolved environmental issues that 
demanded cooperative actions. The solution lay in these NGOs teaming up with 
various government agencies (Interviewees: 019, 2007-2-12; 020, 2007-1-18; 023, 
2006-12-15; 024, 2006-12-26). 
 
Two director generals of Wetlands Taiwan explained how they cooperated with 
different government bodies on restoring wetlands after the controversial issues 
were resolved: 
‘When the appeals of protecting the Kaoping River were accepted by the 
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government and an integrative institution, the Kaoping River Watershed 
Administration Committee, was established to integrate related authorities, 
our organisation returned to our basic aims and worked with the Seventh 
River Bureau on wetland regeneration on the high tidal flat of the river.’ 
(Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22) 
‘The personnel in both the Seventh Bureau and the Kaohsiung Municipal 
Government did not have the necessary expertise of wetland design and 
ecology conservation, so they consulted us on these topics and invited our 
participation.’ (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22) 
 
The head of the Seventh River Bureau and the Kaoping River Watershed 
Administration Committee illustrated how they have come to count on NGOs and 
outside experts for support: 
“There was no emnity between government officials and environmental groups. 
We could sit down and talk. I think the dialogue process could change the 
perspectives of officials. It was very a positive interaction. We could even 
become friends 97 ...Urban environmental groups usually raised intelligent 
suggestions and at the same time put effort into helping us to improve the 
environment.” (023, 2006-12-15) 
“Their basic ecological investigations were more complete than official ones, 
so was their knowledge of river ecology. What they suggested was what we 
never thought of and desperately needed. When we first contacted them, we 
strongly felt the inadequacy of our river management. We made a sudden 
U-turn to ecological-oriented river governance. We listened to the 
suggestions of environmental groups and tried to fulfil them with our 
empirical experience. It demanded both sides of expertise to achieve 
environmental protection.” (024, 2006-12-26)  
 
One head of the government Water Work Bureau emphasized how participatory 
policy-making stimulates public servants’ thinking and work: 
‘After we entered public office, our thinking increasingly narrowed. The 
opinions of outside experts and environmentalists stimulated our thinking… 
                                                 
97 Several core members in the three organisations in this study truly developed friendships with 
these two officials (observation: 2006-7-5, 2006-7-6, 2006-7-12, 2006-10-6, 2006-10-13, and 
2006-11-11).  
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public officials often need outside pressure to force us to face the problems 
and this will also drive us to present better work.’ (Interviewee: 028, 
2007-2-7)   
 
One chief executive of the DBCCA said that the local government had a budget 
for environmental protection and community building but had no concrete plan, 
and therefore needed an NGO to draw up a plan and implement it: 
‘At the beginning the [county government] had this budget but did not know 
how to use it. Therefore our former chief executive suggested that the 
DBCCA could help by putting a community building project into practice. 
Even without this budget, our daily work was exactly  the same . Other 
organisations had shown their appreciation for our work of community 
networking.’ (Interviewee: 012, 2006-12-07)  
 
The third bottleneck was the need of NGOs for organisational growth, including 
new expertise and membership, and a change of activities in the post-movement 
phase. In the case of Wetlands Taiwan, wetland regeneration and ecology 
restoration became the mechanism for the organisation to advance its expertise 
and recruit new members. Their two director generals said: 
‘Our approach has gradually moved towards wetland adoption and 
management to demonstrate best practice to government and to train others in 
our expertise of wetland planning and management.’ (Interviewee: 003, 
2006-5-22) 
‘The growth of Wetlands Taiwan originated from our will to adopt the work of 
regenerating habitat for the Jacana98. Wetlands Taiwan accepted from various 
government agencies their trust in managing habitat regeneration. We have 
been reborn since then. The new approach implies that what we can do is more 
than just protest. We learned new methods, acquired new strengths and 
introduced new, talented people.’ (Interviewee: 004, 2007-02-06) 
 
Nevertheless, the timing of the emergence of collaborative governance on 
restoring the Kaoping River coincided with the establishment of the new DPP 
                                                 
98 Here it refers to pheasant-tailed Jacana, a wildfowl which was endangered. Wetlands Taiwan and 
bird societies suggested that the government should regenerate habitat for the endangered species and 
accept its entrustment of the habitat management.  
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regime. This inevitably provokes the debate as to what extent the new regime 
facilitated this new environmental movement. Although some interviewees think 
the emergence of collaborative governance does not necessarily relate to the new 
regime because there was cooperation between the two parties during the old 
KMT regime (004, 2007-02-06), most interviewees value how the new DPP 
regime has actively improved environmental policies, released resources to 
environmental groups and sought opportunities to collaborate with them. This has 
led to the emergence of collaborative governance (Interviewees: 013, 2007-03-08; 
003, 2006-05-22; 002, 2006-10-21; 015, 2006-11-13). As a leader of Wetlands 
Taiwan said: 
‘The transformation of Wetlands Taiwan was closely related to the fact that 
the DPP came to power. The former ruling KMT party was hostile to 
environmental issues, therefore environmental groups had to ally with the 
former oppositional party DDP for environmental campaigns. This is why 
most leading politicians in the government are our former allies. We now 
have access to, and trust with, the current political leaders. After the DPP 
came to power, seventy percent the environmental activist elites were 
recruited into the government, most environmental issues were incorporated 
into policy, and therefore many groups lost their focus…Nevertheless, 
environmental groups can now obtain more government resources and gain 
the recognition of society. Our struggle skills have advanced and our 
organisation employs more formal staff.’ (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22) 
 
But core members of these NGOs also thought the opportunity of committing to 
collaborative governance was not only provided by a friendly regime, but also 
produced by the past efforts of the Water Defence movement: 
‘The power transition was a crucial turning point. The idealism that 
environmental groups campaigned for suddenly jumped to official tables 
when the DPP came to power. It was not caused simply by the DPP’s 
contribution, but also the energy the environmental groups had accumulated 
to fulfil their idealism.’ (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13) 
‘Many people attribute our fulfillment of community building to the 
presidential power transition, but it should not be seen this way. This 
neglects the effort that the environmental and social movements have put in.’ 
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(Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13) 
 
Some core members of environmental groups considered the support of 
politicians as just complementary, not decisive. They might still be able to 
achieve environmental targets through the bureaucracy even without a power 
transfer. 
‘The success of environmental organisations has nothing to do with 
politicians. We had similar cooperative experience with the former KMT 
regime too…During the ecological campaign, we needed all sorts of support 
from every party and faction…We sought to utilise every possible resource. 
The Green government can make our progress quicker, but it does not mean 
that the Blues did nothing. I did not get any advantage because of the Greens 
coming to power. They know that we will support them even without 
releasing resources to us. Therefore, I stand for neither Green nor Blue. I 
acted based on laws and any method I could utilise.’ (Interviewee: 004, 
2007-02-06) 
‘Politicians are not absolutely critical, but they make our progress quicker, 
shorten the administrative process and provide opportunities…Nevertheless, 
even if a politician makes promises, the following detailed collaborative 
process needs to deal with technocrats. Privately, the Green government still 
needs the support of technocrats, especially in terms of managing habitats, 
which demands much more elaborate administrative resources and 
networks.’ (Interviewee: 004, 2007-02-06) 
 
This perspective of avoiding overestimating the political support of the Green 
regime is similar to what the leader of the Green Association said: 
‘The Green regime99 is only a transition on the surface. The bureaucracy is 
a leftover of the old regime. Not only the personnel but also their ideology 
stayed. The old policy will affect the new party in power. It becomes a new 
synergy which is more difficult to deal with than the traditional KMT 
regime.’ (Interviewee: 001, 2006-12-30)’ 
 
This situation of how political support made the environmental collaboration 
                                                 
99 The DPP is often called the Green, while its opposite party is called the Blue, which does not 
necessary imply that it is environmentally friendly. 
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grow faster and bigger was also happening at the local level. The founder of the 
BDCCA, Tsao Chi-hung (originally a high school teacher), has pursued a political 
career by joining elections on behalf of the DPP and later became the governor of 
Pingtung county. His political position has brought plentiful resources to his 
affiliated environmental organisations and related environmental reforms. This 
highlights that political connections are vital for acquiring significant government 
resources in Taiwan. However, his involvement in election politics has raised 
doubts about the relations between community groups and himself. 
A former chief executive of the BDCCA defended the governor saying that: 
‘The BDCCA has taken advantage of Mr. Tsao’s political position to acquire 
information, resources and funding…the BDCCA has acquired many 
resources from the public sector because of Mr. Tsao’s help’ (Interviewee: 
010, 2006-10-17) 
 
To conclude, the main reasons that led the three environmental NGOs to develop 
collaborative governance are linked to the three bottlenecks- the need to mobilise 
public attention, recognition that the unresolved environmental issues required 
public and private cooperation, and the need of NGOs to continue developing 
their organisations. But the sudden rise of political support in both local and 
central government is also a major reason for the emergence of collaborative 
governance. In this situation, collaborative governance served as a strategy to 
explore new territory for the NGOs while at the same time extending their 
influence in order to stay relevant. 
 
6.3.2  The endogenous approach of initiating environmental 
rative governance and its results collabo
 
This section explores what form the collaborative governance took and how 
different types of environmental collaborative governance led to different 
processes and results. NGO thinking and concerns extended beyond ‘NIMBYism’ 
in order to promote wider environmental reform. 
A former director general of Wetlands Taiwan made a similar analysis: 
‘During the confrontational phase, the linked groups in the Kaoping River 
Protection Movement were very similar and grew together as the movement 
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developed. However, afterwards, they introduced different elements leading 
to different development patterns. For example, the MPA introduced local 
culture, and the BDCCA did likewise, while Wetlands Taiwan introduced 
habitat restoration. Each group introduced new elements and this led to 
differentiation in organisational development. The development route they 
chose was often related to key people. For example, Wetlands Taiwan chose 
to promote habitat restoration because we had key individuals with the right 
expertise and financial support.’ (Interviewee: 004, 2007-2-6) 
 
Wetlands Taiwan decided to develop the best model of wetland regeneration and 
management they could and to collaborate with government as necessary. For 
example,  
‘The Kaoping River Protection Movement suggested the use of high tidal 
flats as a “Hundred-Mile Wetland”, which could provide both the functions 
of waste water remediation and wildlife conservation. This proposal halted 
the original Kaohsiung County government’s plan to develop high tidal flats 
as sports parks and residential areas.’ (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22) 
 
Core members of the MPA sought to lead local development through several 
conservation programmes, including Hakka culture preservation, ecology 
protection100, traditional architecture conservation101 , organic agriculture, water 
landscape preservation and ecological flood retention ponds.  
‘The MPA, as the think tank of Meinung’s development, argued for an 
integrated development plan more broadly than the dam project. The 
practice of water resource conservation was related to the surrounding 
culture and land use. Simply put, we seek to establish Meinung as an 
underground reservoir. The water stored underneath the earth can resolve 
the water resource issue in the Kaoping area on the premise of seeking a 
balance between recharge and extraction of groundwater.’ (Interviewee: 015, 
2006-11-13)  
 
The BDCCA has become the major force behind local community group 
empowerment. It encouraged local groups to participate in public affairs and 
                                                 
100 This especially relates to the ecology of Yellow Butterfly Valley. 
101 Local famous architecture is also known as the Tobacco-Making Tower. 
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through these actions to promote their vision: 
‘In recent years, we have devoted all efforts to empowering locals to acquire 
their own resources and have avoided most resources becoming concentrated 
in our own organisation. We helped the locals to realise the future of their own 
communities, training them to be self-dependent for community management 
and then, finally, to network them so that they could help and learn from each 
other…Under the best circumstances we hope to enable local groups to play 
the role of regional platforms 102  able to empower other grassroots 
organisations either existing or newly established.’ (Interviewee: 012, 
2006-12-07) 
‘We teach them how to acquire government resources to do what they want. 
Not force them to do what the BDCCA wants, but to lead them to explore 
what they want to do...’ (Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17) 
 
On the one hand, environmental NGOs obviously had a stronger capacity than 
community groups to acquire and integrate support and funding from multiple 
government departments in order to initiate endogenous collaborative governance. 
For example, Wetlands Taiwan has cooperated with several county and city 
governments on wetland regeneration and management, including Kaohsiung city 
and county governments, Tainan county government, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, and Construction and Planning Agency. Annually nearly US $ 
1M from the government was spent on wetland regeneration based on Wetlands 
Taiwan’s suggestions (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22). The BDCCA raised 
approximately US $ 400,000 for community empowerment each year 
(Interviewee: 012, 2006-12-7) from both central and local governments. The 
MPA also acquired multi-source funding for community building in every aspect 
(Interviewee: 014, 2006-5-19). On the other hand, the reliance on government 
funding both enabled and restrained the activities of these NGOs. Government 
budget oriented NGOs’ activities kept them occupied with local environmental 
affairs rather than extending their focus to wider environmental issues 
(Interviewee: 013, 2007-3-8), for example new development projects of industrial 
complexes and water supply projects.  
 
                                                 
102 There were ten intermediate groups in this environmental network.  
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But in terms of local development, the influence collaborative governance 
brought was beyond what local administrations could do. For example the MPA 
had become the essential planner of local diverse development (Observation: 
2006-10-13). A core member of the MPA said: 
‘The local township office has withdrawn to a pure administrative unit. It 
has no capacity to govern and only maintains a basic social function. It 
cannot envision the community’s future. The major mechanism of local 
development is from the collective decision-making and public deliberation 
of local associations.’ (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13) 
 
‘The target of the MPA’s work now is to enforce the foundation of Meinung’s 
culture, including natural environment, landscape, industry and ethnic 
culture. This unique Meinung culture has dwindled no matter from which 
perspective, space, education, or heritage conservation. Our current project, 
Meinung integrative planning, aims to produce an essential strategy to 
tackle this problem.’ (Interviewee: 014, 2006-5-19) 
 
A chief executive of the Green Association, which led the Kaoping River 
Protection Movement, revealed how early activism tended to be elite oriented:  
‘The southern green movement dates back to 1992. In the initial stage of the 
movement, Dr. Tseng Kuei-hai103 saw that the embankment of the Kaoping 
River was piled up with all sorts of waste. He was very shocked. All press 
coverage related to the River was negative. He then called out to save the 
Kaoping River. Because he was highly renowned, many environmental and 
culture groups responded to his call and formed the Kaoping River 
Protection Movement. Most members at that time were lawyers, architects, 
physicians, writers and journalists.’ (Interviewee: 002, 2006-10-21)  
 
As the nature of these organisations’ work has changed, their membership has 
expanded fast. For example the BDCCA has networked more than a hundred 
associated community groups (Interviewee: 012, 2006-12-7); Wetlands Taiwan 
has approximately two hundred volunteers helping habitat regeneration 
(Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22); and the MPA has around a hundred volunteers 
                                                 
103 A prestigious medical doctor, who led the early urban green movement during the 1990s, is a 
government consultant today. He won the title ‘Southern Environmental Godfather’.  
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from community residents, local administration, schools and local groups 
(Interviewee: 014, 2006-5-19).  
 
One director general of a department in Kaohsiung municipal government 
explained his observations of these NGOs’ transition from elitism to 
participatory: 
‘Chouchai wetland104 was originally advocated by environmental elites of 
Wetlands Taiwan but gradually opened to local people to participate in its 
management. This was an internal transition of the environmental 
organisation. Again and again the organisation experienced local 
generations taking over the wetland from the original elites. The municipal 
government has also learnt to tolerate and embrace the interaction with the 
civil society.’ (019, 2007-2-12) 
 
The core members of these environmental NGOs held several memberships of all 
sorts of governmental committees in both central and local governments. They 
have won direct access to policy-making. But while the consultative mechanism 
of government committees did not guarantee membership and influence, 
conducting collaborative governance has reinforced their skills and expertise. 
This experience has consolidated their position in the policy process. 
 
A chief executive of the Green Association explained how the repertoire of 
engagement among environmental organisations has changed:  
‘Initially, the ways NGOs promoted their idealism were by calling for press 
conferences, conducting policy lobbies, and pushing the government to 
reinforce implementation and public authority. In the future NGOs should be 
part of the decision making. In the Kaoping River Watershed Administration 
Committee, NGOs have several seats and participate in the policy process.’ 
(002, 2006-10-21) 
 
The Kaoping River Watershed Administration Committee, established in 2001, 
was designed to integrate the dispersed authority of river management. It made 
available several seats for environmental groups. Not only did the Kaoping River 
                                                 
104 One of the wetlands that Wetlands Taiwan regenerated and managed. 
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Watershed Administration Committee adopt a more participatory form, other 
water resource related committees also arranged seats for environmental NGOs 
(002, 2006-10-21). But this arrangement is subject to political manipulation. The 
chief-executive of the Green Association, who was one of the committee 
members, explained: 
‘When the DPP came to power in 2000, it promised to establish an 
integrated river management organisation. This promise was fulfilled at the 
end of 2001 and the organisation allocated three seats for environmental 
groups105. We thought our goal was going to come true. In the first four 
years, both the MPA and the BDCCA were committee members…, so the 
influence of civil society was very strong. But now most civil seats are not 
occupied by real local environmental groups in either Kaohsiung city, county 
or Pingtung county…This is a political phenomenon directed by Frank 
Hsieh106.’  (002, 2006-10-21)  
 
A more nuanced view is spelled out by a core member of Wetlands Taiwan: 
‘When we attend the meetings of the government committee, our opinions 
are not necessarily incorporated into policy; but when we do wetland 
regeneration, we increasingly train new specialists and accumulate real 
knowledge. The results of wetland regeneration are very good too, and 
numerous wetlands follow our examples. Although our organisation is an 
NGO, we mobilise every resource we can get in time for the wetlands. It is 
impossible for the government to achieve this because governmental works 
have to go through a bidding process and bureaucracy often lacks 
spontaneity.’ (Interviewee: 005, 2006-11-19) 
 
A further point made by another interviewee observes that: 
‘Habitat management is a more concrete target and approach [in 
comparison to an issue campaign]. It demands much more labour, expertise 
and finance as well as closer relations with the government and sponsors. 
Without the support of volunteers, sponsors and governments, it is 
impossible to do this task well.’ (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22) 
 
                                                 
105 Every administration area has been allocated a seat for environmental groups. 
106 A former mayor of Kaohsiung city who once was in conflict with the Green Association  
 194
These comments reveal that the form of collaborative governance initiated by the 
environmental NGOs adopted an approach which prioritised the demands and 
conditions of these organisations. As a matter of fact, these forms of collaborative 
governance were more like strategies to meet the organisational survival of the 
bodies concerned. The environmental problems they were dealing with were 
shaped in part according to the internal composition of the organisation and in 
part by geographic conditions. This suggests that it may be inappropriate to 
replicate the model of collaborative governance in other areas that lack the same 
conditions and spontaneity of civil society. (These were also the key reasons 
behind their decision of whether to continue collaborative governance which is 
discussed in Section 6.3.4.) 
 
These endogenous governance actions mobilised government resources (political 
and administrative commitment and funding), supporters and networks to develop 
new solutions for environmental issues. As a result it performed a highly 
mobilised and integrated governance action on improving the environment while 
at the same time strengthening the position of these environmental NGOs in the 
policy process. It has benefitted both their development and the environment to 
an extent which cannot be achieved by either a government-oriented policy or a 
consultative form of participation within governmental institutions. But it later 
faced a dilemma on how to combat the newly emergent water crisis raised by 
their collaborative partner- the state (see Section 6.3.5). 
 
6.3.3  The long-term development and institutionalisation of 
mental collaborative governance environ
 
Collaborative governance has contributed to environmental improvement and the 
growth of associated organisations in this study, but these organisations do not 
think they will all necessarily follow the same direction. Major reasons include 
the instability of local politics and policies, and that the financial and labour 
requirements of collaborative governance are extensive. In addition, collaboration 
per se is an end-in-itself for the society as a whole in terms of its democratic 
value, but it is also a temporary strategy for the organisations. 
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 For Wetlands Taiwan, the resource demand for wetland management is huge and 
has led to resource reliance on government and enterprise funding. Their core 
members have different opinions about this and one senior board member has 
even left the organisation because of a difference of opinion (Observation: 
2006-2-1, 2006-5-1). Donations from society are never sufficient enough to cope 
with the expenses and they are not sure if they will continue with collaborative 
governance. There is still debate about the route of their organisation (Interviewee: 
003, 2006-5-22; 005, 2006-11-19). Two director generals and one core member 
said that:  
‘[Since we started to collaborate with the government on managing the 
wetlands], our work on the policy campaign has decreased, and we have 
also encountered internal cultural conflicts and competition for resources. 
The thinking and focus of policy campaigns are different from those of 
managing wetlands. Habitat managers have a deep commitment to the 
wetlands but are indifferent to public policies. Focussing attention on both 
sides of the work is difficult for us in terms of finance and personnel and 
easily causes conflict.’ (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22)  
‘In the confrontation phase, Wetlands Taiwan only had to raise questions but 
not solutions; now doing habitat conservation is the opposite. Our role has 
become a bit awkward. It is exhausting to be in a managerial role because it 
needs all sorts of resources in comparison with being a critic. The 
government provides only limited resources but we have to achieve the 
results by any means…I believe this route is right for us, but it needs society 
as a whole to change values and input resources…What will happen in the 
future is not something we can decide alone. Habitat regeneration needs 
society and the government to get involved.’ (Interviewee: 005, 2006-11-19)  
 
A director general in a department of the Kaohsiung municipal government 
expressed his opinion that cooperation between NGOs and the government 
cannot be guaranteed to last forever, and it is also very difficult to institutionalise 
this kind of cooperation. However, in his opinion, there are good reasons for 
various forms of future cooperation:  
‘It is difficult to judge to what extent we should institutionalise our 
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cooperation and how flexible it should be. At least the policy attitude toward 
Chouchai wetland and the goodwill of the NGO will continue even if all the 
responsible officials change. Nevertheless, it is possible that the cooperation 
will eventually face a weakening point when, for example, bureaucrats 
cannot cooperate… Nowadays, it has become common sense that 
governance is not a monopoly of the government but an incorporation of 
civil society in the policy process. For the government its new role is to play 
a catalyst of the forum of regional and cross-boundary governance and to 
motivate the participation of civil society.’ (Interviewee: 019, 2007-2-12) 
 
Another source of tension between NGOs and government is the higher 
expectation placed on NGOs by government now that they receive support from 
government. 
One director general of the BDCCA said that: 
‘Sometimes I feel our organisation has been kidnapped by the government. 
The government insists on us helping in implementing some community 
related policies so that they can have peace of mind. It results in us having to 
release many talented people to do things irrelevant to the environment. Our 
work is gradually distanced from our early goal of conservation…We need a 
further transformation, but everyone has an opinion about where to start 
and to what extent we should transform. Personally I hope that we can look 
at environmental issues that relate to the wider Kao-Kao-Ping area, but 
there is another question about how we can financially afford to do this.’ 
(Interviewee: 011, 2007-1-31) 
 
A further source of dispute arises from the dissatisfaction among some core 
members who feel working with government has shifted the organisations’ 
original goal, not least a greater focus on community development rather than 
ecological restoration. Furthermore, the MPA, which has been devoted to 
community conservation and development, now faces a shift in the central belief 
of newly recruited paid staff and core members. The potential threat of political 
change implies that the Meinung dam project might be raised again, which might 
be difficult for their new generation of cadres to tackle. One chief executive said 
that: 
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‘It is highly possible that we will be forced to change direction because the DDP 
have not yet drawn up a long term perspective for the Kaoping River. The Water 
Resource Agency still insists there is shortage of water supply. But it has not put 
an equivalent effort into water saving and constraining water demand as what it 
has put into water development. The water issue still needs these NGOs’ attention, 
but most of our cadres are now unfamiliar with the issue. As a chief executive, 
this makes me very anxious.’ (Interviewee: 104, 2006-05-19) 
‘Our current employees never participated in the anti-dam movement; their 
central concern is to maintain the organisation rather than the mission. It might 
make the organisation practice bureaucratic and routine.’ (Interviewee: 015, 
2006-11-13)  
 
This last point is taken further by a director general of a department in Kaohsiung 
municipal government. He suggests:  
‘Cooperation with Wetlands Taiwan is now regular and taken for granted. 
The related funding is also budgeted…But the institution is rigid; it will hurt 
both the NGOs and government officials and cause conflict. There are too 
many side issues, grey zones, and inefficiency in institutionalisation. We need 
a new mechanism which can ensure the position of the NGOs in 
collaborative governance but with highly flexible procedures. But the 
problem is that we cannot simplify cooperation with the NGOs as this is laid 
down in law. (Interviewee: 019, 2007-02-12) 
 
To conclude, although the results of the endogenous approach of collaborative 
governance initiated by environmental NGOs is inspiring in many ways, its 
long-term development often seems problematic. The first difficulty is the 
tremendous resource demands of collaborative governance which have resulted in 
the NGOs’ reliance on government funding which in turn is influenced by 
political shifts. The second is the dilemma the NGOs face when they are expected 
to devote their energy into emerging critical environmental issues, e.g. new water 
development projects, since most resources have been invested in other 
collaborative governance programmes. The third difficulty lies in the 
institutionalisation of collaborative governance because any form of 
institutionalisation reduces the flexibility of operation. Finally, the emergence of 
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new generations of supporters will inevitably lead to changes in organisational 
focus and purpose. 
 
6.3.4  The transformative capability and constraints of 
mental collaborative governance in Taiwan environ
 
The NGOs in this study have changed from confrontation-oriented to 
collaboration-oriented organisations, but their capacity is limited when it comes 
to preventing and combating the second wave of water resource conflicts which 
arose in 2006 (Observations: 2006-1-15, 2006-3-21, 2006-4-21/22, 2006-3-11, 
2006-3-25, 2006-4-4, 2006-4-08). These organisations and other water defence 
groups tried to re-establish the Kaoping River Protection Alliance after ten years 
since it was first established in 1997, but failed to mobilise it effectively 
(Observations: 2006-7-16, 2006-11-12). This was because:  
‘Every group which survived from the first wave of mobilisation in the 1990s 
has committed to new issues and are unavailable to focus on the new crisis 
and can only provide a limited contribution.’ (Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17) 
 
Although the DPP was a more environmentally friendly party, its rule of the 
nation still produced many controversies in river and water resource management. 
The environmental NGOs were preoccupied by the affairs of collaborative 
governance, hence were unavailable to tackle newly-emerging issues 
(Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22). This is also because of their allocation of 
resources to local conservation programmes and their gradual loss of political 
savoir-faire at a national level (Interviewees: 015, 2006-11-13; 012, 2006-12-07). 
Whilst senior members worry about the overall political situation of the 
environment, their new members and staff, attracted by collaborative programmes, 
did not approve of confrontational strategies, but preferred mild action methods 
such as advocacy and promotion (Interviewee: 014, 2006-5-19). In addition, their 
close relations with local governments also attracted criticism, by a new group of 
fundamentalist activists, in which they were accused of ‘silent consent’ to new 
water development projects (Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23). These dilemmas 
highlight the limitations that the achievement of collaborative governance can 
make. While collaborative governance was developing rapidly, the Kaoping River 
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still experienced tremendous changes over the last eight years. A thousand 
hectares of river tidal flat was illegally used as farmland and seven hundred 
hectares as aqua farms, close to the tap water extraction location, and these 
polluted the water source. The problematic aquaculture was not resolvable and 
degrated the river (Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23). The fundamentalist activists 
argued that the problem of water shortage was a false alarm and the government’s 
deliberate misinformation due to the fact that most industries had migrated to 
China. It is believed that the Water Resource Agency overestimates the water 
demand (Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23). 
 
But, this might not be fair criticism. Being unavailable to confront the state does 
not necessarily reduce the contribution of the organisations in this study. Through 
their deliberation, they raised an alternative to traditional water resource 
development from the bottom-up and formulated a holistic vision of national 
water policy (Observations: 2006-3-11; 2006-7-12; 2006-7-16; 2006-10-13; 
2006-11-11). 
 
An active scholar explained that the contribution of collaborators to the initiative 
of new methods of water resource management was subtle and took a long time 
to provide results:  
‘Activists and academia have cooperated to raise the idea of underground 
reservoirs to replace traditional dam projects and trans-basin diversion. A 
relevant experiment has now started. It is very possible to become a leading 
practice of water resource. This campaign process has lasted ten years. 
Unlike the early policy making process from the top-down, this solution is 
raised from bottom-up by the Water Defence movement and deliberated 
collectively by activists, scholars, politicians and bureaucrats.’ (Interviewee: 
051, 2007-1-12) 
‘The government now listens to the environmental issues that the locals and 
NGOs campaign for. Many issues have gradually become the pursuit of 
sustainable development and formulate a holistic national environmental 
vision’ (Interviewee: 051, 2007-1-12) 
 
The first wave environmental groups, including the BDCCA, MPA and the Green 
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Association, have worked with scholars continuously in seeking solutions for 
water resources by utilising groundwater, recharging and extracting in specific 
locations where the geology is compatible. Their advocacy of an alternative 
option to water development was described by one chief executive of the Green 
Association as follows: 
‘Environmental groups have called for two international conferences to help 
introduce the technique of utilising groundwater to replace the current 
method of extracting surface river water, which often severely affects the 
river ecology and neighbourhood villages. The ideal we have advocated is to 
construct an underground weir just under the surface of the river bed to 
extract underground water. If we made a 1,500 meters long weir under the 
river bed where the width is 2,000 meters, we could acquire 1,000,000 tons 
of water. This quantity can make up for the shortage of water supply we face 
in the future in the Kao-Kao-Ping area.’ (Interviewee: 002, 2006-10-21) 
 
Nonetheless, this alternative was not accepted by the fundamentalist activists. 
Moreover, when the new water resource policy triggered new disputes and 
confrontations, the environmental groups the government resorted to were the 
organisations in the first wave of Water Defence rather than the fundamentalist 
organisations in the second wave (Observations: 2006-7-5, 2006-11-11). This 
does not only highlight the political capital the first wave organisations had 
accumulated, but also the contradictions between the two waves of Water 
Defence.  
 
One director of the BDCCA commented that the major difference, between the 
first wave of Kaoping River protection groups and the second, was in their 
intentions and strategies of persuading the government: 
‘The Water Resource Agency did not negotiate with the fundamentalist 
groups but with the first wave environmental groups. The first wave groups 
have the energy to become a counter to the government. They keep the 
network for communication with the government, but fundamentalist groups 
have difficulty in doing the same.’ (Interviewee: 013, 2007-3-8) 
‘The chance to negotiate exists because there is a network between the first 
wave groups and the government. Even in committing to a confrontational 
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approach, the government and the environmental groups eventually need to 
sit down and talk. Sometimes the project is non-negotiable if the ideologies 
of the two sides are too different, like the Meinung dam project. This time the 
trans-basin diversion project is a smaller construction project so that is 
negotiable. There is no absolute success of negotiation because there is 
usually only one small issue in each negotiation. We do not ask for 
triumphant successes. Small losses can be a success too. At least we obtain 
vital information each time.’ (Interviewee: 013, 2007-3-8) 
 
Collaborative governance per se successfully improved some environmental 
concerns at the community level (Observations: 2006-3-25, 2006-3-14, 
2006-3-21 and 2006-3-28), which the collaborative groups evaluated as the most 
important successes of the phase and, as a whole, these allowed them to widen 
the scope of the environmental action repertoire. Nonetheless, it did not achieve 
radical changes on critical environmental issues in either a national or local sense 
(Observations: 2006-1-13, 2006-1-15, 2006-3-21, 2006-4-21, 2006-3-11, 
2007-8-17, 2006-7-6 and 2006-7-12) and unavoidably roused criticism. 
 
The influence of collaborative governance is also constrained by local politics, 
which is overwhelmed by the concerns of political election. As one leader of the 
BDCCA said: 
‘Our work has helped the communities in Pingtung to improve their life 
quality. People’s ways of thinking is changing too. However local 
communities are still fragile and subject to political influence. During the 
election, people cannot resist faction and voting broker politics…Those who 
are enthusiastic in elections will eventually return to the traditional voting 
broker system.’ (Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17)  
‘Some of our members have questioned why we help people inclined to the 
Blue, but we want to fulfil the value of community empowerment and let 
people see everyone is equal to us. (Interviewee: 012, 2006-12-07) 
 
Despite debate over their achievements, the continuous spontaneous mobilisation 
of these collaborative groups is the key to the success of the Water Defence 
movement. It is as a scholar who has been working with the environmental NGOs 
 202
said:  
‘The Water Defence movement and the dialogue between the government 
and NGOs have to be continued in the future; otherwise each agenda might 
take a long time to realise.’ (Interviewee: 051, 2007-1-12) 
 
This endogenous approach of collaborative governance initiated by environmental 
NGOs achieved environmental restoration, which was highly valued by the 
public107, and proposed feasible water resolutions in ways which could not be done 
by government alone nor by their previous interruptive strategies. To put the 
resolutions into practice it demanded a long term campaign, good communication, 
an extensive network of contacts among all actors and even continuous adjustment 
of position during the implementation process. 
 
However, this approach to collaborative governance is also shown not to be 
without its limits, especially 1) policy compromises, which these NGOs 
confessed were unavoidable and 2) constraints on their action repertoire to 
respond to controversial environmental issues. For example, when encountering 
the new water crisis, they failed to make a radical change in water development 
policies and thus were criticised as being hijacked by the government. But 
whether this is fair criticism remains doubtful. Environmentalism can/should be 
embodied in multiple ways and a revolutionary result usually needs various 
conditions to make it come true, sometimes even catastrophes to consolidate the 
public and political will to achieve radical changes in policies. The disruptive 
strategy of environmental NGOs alone cannot achieve radical changes, neither 
can the cooperative ones. These two methods need to complement each other 
when putting public pressure on the government.  
 
6.3.5  State-society relationship in transition 
 
First, looking at the growing complex and inconsistent relations between the 
NGOs and the state from the point of view of the bureaucracy, two heads of the 
Seventh River Bureau and the Kaoping River Watershed Administration 
                                                 
107 This statement is based on the coverage of mass media, the comments of the government officials 
and the large number of public visits shown by these three groups. 
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Committee described their dealing with environmental NGOs: 
‘At the beginning the ideal of restoration was very strange to us. We received 
a lot of opinions from experts and NGOs and then finally had a clearer idea 
of how to modify our way of doing things…I have been working in the Water 
Work sector for twenty one years. In the initial stage, NGOs used radical 
methods to achieve their purpose. Both sides could not understand each 
other. We thought they were radical and extreme; they thought we were 
inactive and ineffective. Environmental NGOs thought government officials 
should do everything and the government officials thought NGOs had 
nothing to do but to criticise. There was a lack of trust and understanding 
between the NGOs and the government. But once we sat down and talked, 
we finally started to understand each other and discussed what we could and 
could not do.’ (Interviewee: 024, 2006-12-26) 
 
Another member of the bureaucracy argued that: 
‘Many in the Water Resource Agency have ended their prejudices against 
environmental activists. I told the director that there is no confrontation 
between the government and the NGOs in the south. We all work together in 
the planning process. The reason why NGOs conflict with the government is 
mainly because some bureaucrats engaged private companies to conduct 
Environmental Impact Assessments of big construction projects without 
consulting environmental groups.’ (Interviewee: 023, 2006-12-15) 
 
A director in the Kaohsiung municipal government said that: 
‘As time goes by, my personal interaction with NGOs is maturing. This is 
because the political transition 108  has revealed the public’s views, the 
capacity of the NGOs has increased and the attitude of government officials 
has matured. When local government recognises NGOs as policy initiators, 
their attitude will be much improved in comparison to ten years ago when 
both sides were hostile and despised each other. At the outset, only 
enthusiastic officials in the government would talk to NGOs, nowadays it 
seems quite natural to interact with them.’ (Interviewee: 019, 2007-2-12) 
 
                                                 
108 This refers to both the political power transfer in the central (in 2000) and local governments (in 
1999). 
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Second, the timing of the Kaoping River protection coincided with the 
establishment of the new DPP regime. Although some interviewees think the 
emergence of collaborative governance does not necessarily relate to the new 
regime because there was cooperation between the two parties during the old 
KMT regime (004, 2007-02-06), most interviewees value how the new DPP 
regime has actively improved environmental policies, released resources to 
environmental groups and sought opportunities to collaborate with them. This has 
led to the emergence of collaborative governance (Interviewees: 013, 2007-03-08; 
003, 2006-05-22; 002, 2006-10-21; 015, 2006-11-13).  
 
‘The transformation of Wetlands Taiwan was closely related to the fact that 
the DPP came to power. The former ruling KMT party was hostile to 
environmental issues, therefore environmental groups had to ally with the 
former oppositional party DDP for environmental campaigns. This is why 
most leading politicians in the government are our former allies. We now 
have access to, and trust with, the current political leaders. After the DPP 
came to power, seventy percent of environmental elites were recruited into 
the government, most environmental issues were incorporated into policy, 
and therefore many groups lost their focus…Nevertheless, environmental 
groups can now obtain more government resources and gain the recognition 
of society. Our struggle skills have advanced and our organisation employs 
more formal staff.’ (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22) 
 
But core members of these NGOs also thought the opportunity of committing to 
collaborative governance was not only provided by a friendly regime, but also 
produced by the past efforts of the Water Defence movement: 
‘The power transition was a crucial turning point. The idealism that 
environmental groups campaigned for suddenly jumped to official tables 
when the DPP came to power. It was not caused simply by the DPP’s 
contribution, but also the energy the environmental groups had accumulated 
to fulfil their idealism.’ (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13) 
‘Many people attribute our fulfillment of community building to the 
presidential power transition, but it should not be seen this way. This 
neglects the effort that the environmental and social movements have put in.’ 
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(Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13) 
 
However, the environmental NGOs’ reliance on government resources, due to the 
limited social resources available, has become an issue among them. A core 
member of Wetlands Taiwan said that: 
‘Our past relationship with the government was like confronting the tough 
with toughness. Our only reliable partner was the mass media, which had 
much more sympathy with environmental issues than they do today. Now our 
political network is much improved. We can achieve our goals simply by 
lobbying. Our relationship is more like a partnership…but after several 
years of DPP rule, we have found that the DPP now has problems to keep 
their environmental promises…In contrast to environmental NGOs’ idealism, 
politicians need to consider all sorts of interests. Eventually we have to be 
self-reliant.’ (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22) 
 
A core member of the MPA said: 
‘We have been asked if the MPA are financially independent enough to 
prepare for the possibility of combating the state…if we can be self-reliant if 
the government resource is withdrawn…Actually, during the anti-dam 
campaign, many government departments provided us with funding and we 
only rejected money from the Water Resource Agency. It is not impossible 
that government funding might be cut off, therefore, we have to prepare for 
it.’ (Interviewee: 014, 2006-05-19) 
‘We now have too many resources…when there is a new government project, 
the state always assigns part of the project funding to the MPA because it 
has higher capacity to make the policy succeed.’ (Interviewee: 014, 
2006-05-19) 
 
One director general of the BDCCA said: 
‘The membership cannot sufficiently support the work of the BDCCA, but the 
government funding can. We do not strive for government project funding. 
The government begs us to accept the project funding. Of course we feel it is 
our mission to accomplish the policy we suggested.’ (Interviewee: 011, 
2007-1-31) 
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‘Because the NGOs cannot get sufficient donations and membership, many 
things they aim to do rely on the government budget as a major financial 
source. Part of the reason that the MPA and the BDCCA have concentrated 
on community building is because the government has budgeted abundant 
funds in various departments.’ (Interviewee: 013, 2007-03-08)  
 
There is an internal contradiction in the attitude of some environmental core 
members toward the issue of whether NGOs should receive sponsorship from the 
government. Some think that being a real NGOs means financial independence 
from the government.  
 
A chief executive of the Green Association said that: 
‘A real NGO should receive no subsidy from the government. We strive for 
authority, not funding. Funding should be acquired in a more social 
movement approach. It is a harder way, but we should develop the capacity 
to raise funds from society.’ (Interviewee: 002, 2006-10-21) 
 
However, he also thought NGOs should be involved in policy implementation in 
order to closely supervise the quality of results: 
‘We agree with other organisations we need to implement government 
projects in order to guarantee that the result of the projects corresponds with 
our expectations. The Green Association can play a more “detached” role, 
others can play a professional role to implement government projects and 
take good care of tax payers’ money.’ (Interviewee: 002, 2006-10-21)  
 
However, the fact that these NGOs receive government sponsorship does not 
automatically result in a biased position toward government policies. Some of 
their core members emphasised that they still raise oppositional opinion from 
time to time during collaborative governance.  
 
A former chief executive of the BDCCA said:  
‘The government money subsidises the financial demand of environmental 
maintenance at best. The money goes into no one’s pocket. It would not 
affect our position on other government policies.’ (Interviewee: 010, 
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2006-10-17) 
 
A core member of Wetlands Taiwan said that: 
‘Government funding only compensates part of Wetlands Taiwan’s expenses. 
We did not make a profit from it. We are still short of money and the subsidy 
is nothing in comparison to the huge volunteer effort we put in. If other local 
groups want to take over these wetlands, we are OK with that. The problem 
is no one can afford to take it over.’ (Interviewee: 005, 2006-11-19) 
 
Nevertheless, the government is highly selective when choosing their civil 
partners. A director general of the BDCCA pointed out that: 
‘The government is canny in terms of releasing resources. It only subsidises 
those communities that have made a previous effort. This is so that it could 
harvest a major outcome with only a little investment.’ (Interviewee: 011, 
2007-1-31) 
 
The selective choice of civil partners suggests the uneven distribution of 
government resources. A director of the Kaohsiung municipal government said 
that:  
‘I admit that there is a geographical differentiation of government resources 
distributed to civil society…The result of nurturing certain NGOs might 
result in an unevenness of resource distribution, but it does not relate to the 
issue of legitimacy. Those with a higher capacity certainly extract more 
government resources. This will lead to a potential crisis of resource 
shrinking. Some NGOs’ expansion is beyond that which local government 
can assist. The capacity of urban civil society to respond to resources is 
different from rural areas.’ (Interviewee: 019, 2007-2-12) 
 
Fundamentalist groups, which have devoted themselves to the second wave of 
Water Defence, criticised some of those first wave Water Defence organisations 
who were absent in the current water crisis. 
 
A chief executive of a fundamentalist group argued that: 
‘Wetlands Taiwan and [other organisations] have developed a route called 
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habitat management and thus cannot devote effort to environmental 
campaigns. This route demands a lot of financial and labour resources, and 
establishes a collaborative relationship with the government. It easily 
becomes government propaganda and sometimes exaggerates the results and 
function of this route. It is window-dressing the government’s ecological 
conservation work. These groups should be aware of this fact instead of 
intoxicating themselves.’ (Interviewee: 047, 2006-04-08) 
 
He goes on to say: 
‘Most of the first wave Water Defence organisations have withdrawn. The 
BDCCA focuses on community work and has changed its perspective. We 
only see their members in conferences; having said that, there is still some 
experience sharing. It would be shameful if past experience is disregarded. 
In addition to direct experience sharing, the BDCCA still supports us with 
their network and resources too.’ (Interviewee: 047, 2006-04-08) 
‘When the state acts arbitrarily [to implement a controversial environmental 
policy], those groups which transferred their attention to local affairs have 
difficulties to counterbalance it. The first reason is because of their lack of a 
strategic coalition and a sense of mission between environmental 
organisations. Second, a broader understanding of regional environmental 
problems is not there in their daily activities.’ (Interviewee: 001, 
2006-12-30) 
 
The close relationship between the first wave Water Defence organisations and 
the Green government also roused criticism. A director general of a 
fundamentalist group made these fierce comments:  
‘I am very disappointed with the Green government. It has been in office for 
four years. I have gone from high expectation, to sceptical observation to 
total disillusionment. My experience of contacting other environmental 
groups is equally disappointing because they have now merged with the 
ruling party. They have lost the persistence of being a part of civil society, 
not to mention they take money from the government.’ (Interviewee: 048, 
2006-10-23) 
‘The BDCCA needs more reflection on their relationship with the local 
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county governor. It worries me that no one can monitor the artificial lake 
project. There is no environmental impact assessment at all109, but the 
construction will start next year…even the major planner said there were 
many factors under the table that he could not decide on.’ (Interviewee: 048, 
2006-10-23) 
‘We want to participate in the policy making process, but there is no 
transparency. When we were invited to speak out, the policies had already 
been decided. …The experience of recent years has been very negative…I 
deeply hope that there will be a more participatory decision making 
process.’ (Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23) 
‘During the last few years, we have been in a very embarrassing position 
when facing the Green government. In 2004, I completely broke up with a 
few friends in environmental groups110… NGOs should insist on their initial 
purposes but not be incorporated into government. My reflection of the 
current situation is very pessimistic. The decision-making process is full of 
all sorts of disguised interests, but not a true deliberative process…’ 
(Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23)  
 
One director general of the BDCCA responded to this fact: 
‘Some members think our current work has digressed from our original 
goals. As a leader I agree to this point of view, we took over too many 
government projects and roused criticism from outside the BDCCA. I think 
our focus should return to issues related to water resources and land use.’ 
(Interviewee: 011, 2007-1-31)  
 
He also emphasised that the organisation will make a clear division with 
politicians: 
‘I cannot deny that we have received a lot of help from Mr. Tsao. Even 
though he no longer sponsors us, there is still partnership between us. 
However, we will remain neutral even though he is the governor…We will 
                                                 
109 The artificial lake was planned to be dug fifteen metres deep, which was unnecessary according 
the opinion of the fundamentalist groups. It was located on top of an alluvial fan where the geology 
featured high-speed water infiltration. Flooding of a metre in depth would be enough to increase the 
speed of infiltration. It was said the purpose of digging this depth was to provide sand and stone for 
construction purposes, which the county government denied, and guaranteed that the soil dug out 
would be kept under surveillance (observation: 2007-8-12) 
110 This refers to the BDCCA. 
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also avoid the participation of politicians…the governor will detach himself 
from us too.’ (Interviewee: 011, 2007-1-31) 
 
Many environmentalists have been recruited to the Green government, which 
implies an effort to devote to reform within the institution. However, the result is 
not without criticism.  
 
A leading environmentalist said that: 
‘Bureaucracy remains across regimes. Their ideology goes on even when 
political transition occurs. NGOs’ relationships with the government are 
dialectic. For the environmental movement, sometimes to enter the 
institution is good in order to stop bad policies in advance, but sometimes it 
is bad because it reinforces the institution. In the case of anti-transbasin 
diversion, being in the institution does not help because there are many 
political forces struggling. We have made a huge effort and spoken strong 
words in the institution but still cannot change the policy. It is better to stay 
outside when facing the government cooperating with enterprise for 
development projects.’ (Interviewee: 001, 2006-12-30) 
 
A leader of a fundamentalist group, having been designated a committee member of 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in government, argued the limitation 
of the deliberation systems in governments and the necessity of ‘undertaking 
confrontation strategies outside the government institutions’ because ‘our state 
machine, enterprise and mass media still exercise violence towards the 
environmental movement’ (Lee, 2009). However, efforts inside the institution and 
confrontation outside are not mutually exclusive but often complementary. Even 
those groups, which have initiated collaborative governance, sometimes would 
undertake a confrontational strategy to resist policy threats111 (The Liberty Times, 
2009-7-16).  
 
The fact that environmental groups played the role of mediating resources between 
the state and grassroots groups112 led to a more controversial debate- whether this 
closer state-society relationship implies clientelism or corporatism. One community 
                                                 
111 Wetlands Taiwan protest against mountain development project. 
112 This perspective was specially emphasised on BDCCA’s case. 
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chief executive explained that the clientelist relationship became obvious during 
election seasons: 
‘The clientelist relationship I mentioned does not refer to traditional 
political rewards but a knowledge asymmetry. Communities rely on the 
BDCCA to train workers and volunteers or to write proposals to strive for 
government resources. The BDCCA does not ask these communities for 
political feedback. However, something makes people associate with 
clientelism…For example during elections, community heads will be asked 
to help and obtain a certain amount of votes. If the voting result is bad, we 
will feel pressure…’ (Interviewee: 043, 2007-1-2) 
 
Despite the fact that they are aware of these criticisms, the leader of the three 
environmental organisations valued that what they offered were different action 
repertoires and resources. One former chief executive said that: 
‘In the new Water Defence, although the MPA is not the major initiator, 
privately we supplied a lot of support. The most important thing is the 
spiritual support and encouragement to help key actors feel self-confident 
and legitimate…but overall, we cannot shift our energy from anti-dam 
movement to other issues.’ (Interviewee: 014, 2006-5-19) 
 
One director general of the BDCCA explained their consideration before 
undertaking interruptive action: 
‘[Before we protest development projects]113, we have to go to the site, meet 
the locals, and find some resources for alternative development approaches 
for them. The way the BDCCA does things is very unlike other groups who 
speak empty words without negotiating the future with the locals beforehand. 
We have to demonstrate to the locals that we have thought a lot about them 
and will work out the problem with them.’ (Interviewee: 011, 2007-1-31) 
 
This case suggests that the relationship between the parties of collaborative 
governance might form a new system of clientelism outside the traditional 
corporatist relationship. Although this evidence does not necessarily imply 
manipulation by political leaders, the reliance on resources controlled by 
                                                 
113 This relates to a highway construction project. 
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government officials/politicians often indicates that the NGOs are either being 
submissive to political wills or are vulnerable to policy threats.  
 
But the implication of the subtle interaction is inconclusive regarding whether the 
new clientelist relation between the state and civil society is a new form of 
corporatism. The traditional form of corporatism was based on private interests of 
both parties, rather than of the public. Its social control was much more extensive 
and most social associations were compulsorily subordinate to the state. In 
comparison, the new rising clientelist relationship between the state and the 
NGOs has been less controlling and mutually dependent without neglecting the 
public interest. On the one hand, the Green government did provide more 
opportunities which stimulated the growth of certain environmental organisations 
while at the same time attracted the scepticism and criticism from those both 
inside the partnership and certain radical environmental groups. On the other, the 
state is highly selective when choosing its NGO partners which need to be highly 
capable and able to negotiate. 
 
What it also suggests is that the attitude of the state is crucial to the enabling and 
development of collaborative governance. Nonetheless, the state itself is 
multilayered, comprising central government, local government, the local office 
of the central government and the communal administrative office. 
Environmental organisations thus need to interact with all the different layers of 
government and this may lead to complex, but inconsistent, relations with 
politicians, local governors and bureaucrats, which can then be exploited. But at 
least, a very positive sign is that the right of initiating a new policy is no longer 
the sole privilege of the government. The collaborative governance that NGOs 
initiated can become the breeding ground of new policies. The society-initiated 
approach is feasible even without the investment of government resources, 
though its scale would be much smaller and progress slower because of the 
limited scale of resources environmental NGOs can mobilise in Taiwan’s society.   
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6.3.6  Return to the local114 
 
This section looks at a phenomenon, emerging outside the core research questions 
defined in Chapter Two, which are shared by all three environmental NGOs in 
this case study. During the Water Defence protest, the focus of the three NGOs’ 
struggle was with central government or its local offices. Since the water issue 
was improved, their focus on environmental actions has tended to return back to 
the local area and communities. This tendency can be explored in three 
dimensions- (1) the transition of their issue focus from national to local, (2) the 
exertion of their ability to materialise environmental appeals at local level and (3) 
their alliance with community groups. 
 
First, they turned their attention from the policies of the central government to 
local issues and changed their pattern of behaviour toward the governments, 
mainly the local. This shift can be understood as a part of their survival strategy 
and an effort to promote their environmental visions at a local level. A leader of 
the Green Association interpreted the concept of ‘return to the local’ as: 
‘After the Water Defence, every group has returned to its own local origin, 
back to their “habitat” where they began their environmental activism and 
to deepen their roots in the local environment… They have developed 
different sorts of new tasks because of the difference of each “habitat” and 
their leaders’ ideas’ (Interviewee: 001, 2006-12-30) 
 
One former director general interpreted the phenomenon of returning to the local 
is because of power devolution: 
‘[The major reason of returning to local] is because we still chase the 
political power flow. In the past, political power was concentrated in the 
central government where critical decisions were made. This made it the 
focus of environmental protest. Nowadays, because the promotion of local 
administration autonomy, many political powers have been devolved to the 
local governments. That is why we have to interact with the locals either to 
cooperate with or to confront them.’ (Interviewee: 004, 2007-2-6) 
                                                 
114 Throughout this paper ‘return to the local’ refers to groups refocussing their attention/activism to 
local areas and local politics. 
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 In addition to encouraging environmentalism in communities, another reason for 
returning to the local was the provision of government funding for community 
building.  
‘The government has encouraged every department to make community 
building related to policies and budget. This provides an abundant source of 
funding for NGOs to apply for from different departments. This explains why 
the MPA and the BDCCA have concentrated their efforts on community 
building.’ (Interviewee: 013, 2007-3-8) 
 
However, returning to local campaigning for environmental reasons is not 
necessarily easy. Two core members of the MPA and BDCCA said that: 
Community per se is not a panacea; on the contrary, it might make the 
problem worse…because community is chaotic. In a post-modern community, 
people’s identity is fragmented and diverse. The central issue is who your 
allies are in the community. They need to be found and form an organisation, 
even a combat force, which has its own identity. ’ (Interviewee: 015, 
2006-11-13) 
 
Second, in order to widen their influence at the local level, it is necessary to 
enhance their ability to materialise their appeals, so that they can gain the 
recognition of the public and local government. ‘Environmental groups in the 
local areas are different from those in the capital. Capital-based groups, 
campaigning in the political and economic centre, can rely on mass media; 
however, in the south, we need to build a grassroots connection for activism. We 
cannot rely on campaign slogans. We have to let people appreciate the benefit of 
environmentalism from their daily affairs.’ (Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17) 
 
It is crucial for environmental NGOs to prove their ability to deliver their appeals 
at the grassroots level, where fewer NGOs can use media effect to influence the 
politics. This materialisation of their appeals is more persuasive to the non-urban 
public than slogans. 
 
Third, for the BDCCA and the MPA located in rural areas, which cover a wide 
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geographical scope, the key to success was linked to their connection with 
community associations, so that they could pay more detailed attention to each 
corner of their rural areas. A core member of the MPA elaborated the thoughts on 
community connection. In the early river protection movement, the MPA’s 
relation with community associations was a strategy for combatting the state. Its 
major purpose was to mobilise the community population for the anti-dam 
campaign. In the post-movement phase, entering communities was aimed at 
building foundations for localising activism. Its focus was to deepen the MPA’s 
roots in communities and pursue organisational transformations. This change in 
focus also forced the MPA into a dialogue with the existing community political 
powers and to mediate faction interests (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13).  
 
Even though located in urban areas, Wetlands Taiwan also had the tendency to 
work in local areas and acquire the assistance of local governments and 
associations which are crucial to their achievements. One core member of 
Wetlands Taiwan said: 
‘In Chouchai Wetland115, we have Blue Cross Environmental Volunteers, 
Community University and many other local groups helping out our habitat 
generation and tour guide work. We provide the space for their need for 
ecology learning. These groups’ efforts are indispensable to the success of 
wetlands.’ (Interviewee: 005, 2006-11-19) 
‘Access to communities is not open; it requires a network relationship and 
the will of the community association to do good… [Doing community 
building] cannot just talk and exchange opinions; it needs to leave a good 
basic infrastructure to the communities.’ (Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17) 
 
To conclude, geographic features affected the collaborative governance they 
initiated. In this section, the interviewees expressed their passion to embody their 
idealism via collaborative governance at a local level. This was not only because 
its scale was more appropriate for practising collaborative governance but also 
because the environmental organisations can interact more easily and effectively 
with recognised stake-holders and power-holders without neglecting 
environmental solutions based on local geographical differentiation. Close local 
                                                 
115 One of the wetlands that Wetlands Taiwan manages. 
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networks between the three parties were established to ensure a consensus about 
collaborative governance and the resources needed to be mobilised. Without valid 
local networks, collaborative governance would not materialise. However, ‘return 
to the local’ was not a panacea that can cure all environmental problems. 
 
6.4  Conclusion: Re-thinking the model of environmental 
borative governance colla
 
With reference to the provisional model established in Chapter 2, this case study 
shed light on how collaborative action emerges based on multiple reasons. There 
were three reasons that gave rise to this collaborative governance, including 1) 
the need of environmental NGOs to campaign for new issues, 2) the water 
restoration issues which demanded private-public cooperation, and 3) the need for 
new thinking and the development of expertise among environmental 
organisations. The first and the third can be seen as ‘motivation to collaborate’ in 
the model. The second reason can be seen as attributed to ‘the nature of 
environmental issues’. 
The emergence of collaborative governance is closely associated with its 
‘geographic specificities’ as emphasized in the model. Those environmental 
groups which are based in rural areas cannot rely on the mass media and policy 
lobby to campaign for their issues. They have to demonstrate their value to 
grassroots interests and therefore contribute to the phenomenon of ‘returning to 
the local’. While Wetlands Taiwan has regenerated several wetlands in order to 
show local governments the benefit of nature preservation, the MPA and BDCCA 
have become deeply rooted in local communities in order to promote 
environmentalism, emphasising the significance of the ‘geographic factor’. 
 
The menace of the potential dam construction in Meinung village brought the 
villagers together, enabling them to stand and fight against the state apparatus. 
Many urban intellectuals and professionals established environmental NGOs in 
order to join this environmental campaign, which has lasted eighteen years, and 
eventually transformed itself into a movement beyond ‘Not In My Back Yard’ but 
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extended into the wider ecology and culture in general. 
The importance of the ‘strategy-making of leaders’ is particularly highlighted in 
this case. These NGOs were highly homogeneous during the 1990s Water 
Defence. However, as the Water Defence protest faded, these groups faced the 
need to alter their approach which was determined by the characteristics of their 
leaders and the resources available. Two similarities in their development were 1) 
they both ‘returned to the local’ and 2) they shifted from elitist to participatory 
organisations. 
 
Similar to one finding in the case of River Enclosure, two examples in this case 
study show how specific events consolidate the determination of the 
organisation’s members to engage with collaborative governance. For instance, 
the local opposition against the suggestion of an ecological dike by the BDCCA 
and Wetlands Taiwan’s decision to engage with the regeneration of habitat for a 
particular endangered bird species, Jacana, whose population dropped to only 
fifty. Both of these two events acted as catalysts to change the focus of these 
organisations.  
The outcome of this case study, using an endogenous approach of collaborative 
governance, has been prominent and renowned, but not without its limitation 
especially in the context of political reliance. Water Defence changed its approach 
from early mass mobilisation to institutional defence and eventually established a 
collaborative relationship with the government. This endogenous approach to 
initiating collaborative governance was complicated and expertise demanding. 
This highly mobilised social resources, including funding and volunteers, and 
talented activists integrated resources from different government departments and 
produced an outstanding outcome. This outcome was impossible for the 
government to achieve alone. Its complex network and integrative capacity 
resolved the problems of departmentalisation and fragmentation of Kaoping river 
management. From Pingtung and Meinung’s case, a new solution to water 
resource management was developed based on local knowledge (Observation: 
2006-10-13, 2006-7-12). 
 
However, the sustainability of this kind of collaborative governance remains 
problematic. First, this is because the threat of water resource supply problems 
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and other environmental issues still remains. Second, because this collaborative 
governance is highly reliant on individual-based political support, and thus 
progress remains vulnerable to political change. It did not become 
institutionalised in the workings of government. These concerns illustrate the fact 
that although collaborative governance has won public applause, it is not without 
limitation. Its transformability of management arrangements is mostly temporal 
and regional and means that key actors will constantly review the need for 
different arrangements even to the point of questioning whether they should 
continue to collaborate. This finding underlines how the feedback mechanism 
functions to affect the leaders’ strategy-making in different phases and 
enforcement of collaborative behaviour. Choosing to leave the collaborative effort 
is a possible option for participants if (a) they find the collaborative process is not 
authentic, (b) is incompatible with their purposes or (c) is incapable of producing 
a positive reciprocal outcome for both parties.  
In the example of the BDCCA, an environmentalist was elected as a 
representative and eventually a governor. His political position helped to acquire 
many resources for environmental projects and organisations, underlining how 
government resources follow political networks and, possibly, contributes to a 
new corporatist order. Though traditional corporatism politics is not obvious here, 
this confirms the importance of the ‘embedded social-political context’ to the 
shaping of the contours of collaborative governance. 
 
The Water Defence organisations formed the first generation of local 
environmentalism, but they developed a controversial transitional relationship 
with the state within a decade. The fast transition from confrontation to 
collaboration implies a wish among both parties to establish more equal, 
reciprocal and respectful relations. There are two reasons which led to this 
transition. First, the political power transfer in both local governments and the 
central government indicated a different approach to governance and the need for 
policy networks. Second, the tolerance of bureaucratic leaders eventually led 
them to become willing collaborators with their civil counterparts. This finding 
fills in our lack of knowledge regarding the Asian process of collaborative 
governance in the model.
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Figure 6. 2: A revised model of the emergence and development of environmental collaborative governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 7 Case Study: Riverfront Adoption 
 
7.1  Introduction  
 
Unlike the previous two case studies which have shown how tribal villages and 
environmental NGOs initiated an endogenous form of collaborative governance 
from inside communities or originations, this chapter illustrates how rural 
community groups respond to an exogenous approach to collaborative 
governance. The riverfront park of the Kaoping River is a total of ten kilometres 
long. Those participating in riverfront maintenance include both communities and 
contractors. There are more than sixty sections in the riverfront and thirty four 
communities have adopted their nearby section. 
 
7.2  Examples 
 
Old Iron Bridge Association 
 
The Old Iron Bridge Association is comprised of ordinary villagers, successful 
local businesspeople and local political leaders. Their action to maintain a green 
riverfront started in 2001 after the River Bureau cleaned up and rebuilt the river 
high tidal flat. The hundred-hectare riverfront green area, as was the case with 
many others, was originally treated as a landfill and thousands of tons of 
household garbage and industrial waste were dumped there illegally. Even local 
township offices dumped the garbage they collected until the Seventh River 
Bureau took action under pressure from environmental groups. After the cleanup, 
the Bureau called for the adoption of the riverfront as a strategy to prevent it from 
being ruined again. The participation of community groups in creating a 
riverfront park has not only made the park a regional tourist spot but also made 
the group an example of community building. 
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A-Ligang Community  
 
The main organisation behind the A-Ligang community programme was the 
A-Ligang Culture Association, which is comprised of villagers, teachers and local 
intellectuals. Their action to adopt a green riverfront started in 1996 in response 
to the call of the local political leader, Mr. Chi-hong Tzao 116 , for local 
participation in maintaining the river environment. Before that, the riverfront 
space was used as landfill. Even local township offices dumped garbage there 
until 1995 when the Seventh River Bureau cleaned up and beautified the space. 
Mr. Tzao helped to find funds and resources for the locals to take over the job of 
maintaining the green space. This case also set an example for both riverfront 
renovation and community participation. Several scholars used it as a case study 
and other communities came to witness their achievement in transforming the 
riverfront.  
 
Chung-yun Community 
 
Chun-yun community is renowned for its success in mangrove restoration. The 
programme was originally promoted by the local government and Chun-yun 
community successfully responded to this call. With political support and a high 
level of commitment, they have restored thousands of mangroves. They are one 
of the earliest groups which was devoted to ecology conservation. The group 
originally consisted of a numbers of elementary school teachers who dedicated 
themselves to mangrove conservation and education in the riverfront. It extended 
its membership to community residents and the broader public. However, they 
found themselves impotent to combat the nearby petrochemical complex and, as 
time went by, they found that public attention and political support decreased as 
did funding from the government. 
 
116 This refers to the current governor of Pingtung County, Mr. Chi-hong Tzao, a politician who was 
a junior high school teacher and started his political career from very bottom level. 
 Table 7. 1: Examples of Riverfront Adoption and their characteristics  
Organisation Starting 
year 
Motivation  Accessibility  Leadership/ 
institution 
Faction 
politics 
Social capital/ 
resources/ 
capacity 
Initiation 
approach 
Process summary 
Old Iron 
Bridge 
community  
2001 Providing a 
pleasant 
green 
environme
nt for 
public 
recreation 
and tourism 
Easy  Rural 
intellectuals 
and local 
politicians  
Obvious  High social 
consolidation 
and 
organisational 
mobility  
Exogenous  Local villagers 
organised small scale 
environmental 
maintenance as a 
response to the call of 
a local politician. This 
action was integrated 
into the Riverfront 
Adoption policy of the 
River Bureau and its 
scale enlarged to cover 
120 hectares of 
riverfront, including 
13 ponds. The 
community group 
behind this action 
comprised 
approximately 80 
volunteers. 
A-Ligang 
community  
1996 Providing a 
pleasant 
green 
environme
nt for 
public 
recreation 
and tourism 
Easy  Rural 
intellectuals 
Obvious  High social 
consolidation 
and 
organisational 
mobility  
Exogenous Local community 
group meditated by 
environmentalists and 
a politician to 
cooperate with the 
river bureau on 
riverfront 
maintenance, which 
covered more than 10 
hectares of riverfront. 
The community group 
behind this action 
comprised more than 
100 volunteers. 
Chung-yun 
community 
1994 Preserving 
mangrove 
ecology 
Easy  Rural 
intellectuals 
Not 
obvious 
High social 
consolidation 
and 
Exogenous Mangrove preservation 
action as a response to 
the call of 
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 and 
providing 
public 
nature 
education 
organisational 
mobility  
environmentalists and 
the local municipal 
government and 
developed as a part of 
the programme of 
Riverfront Adoption. 
This action covered 
4.5 hectares and, as a 
result, more than a 
thousand mangrove 
trees were preserved. 
The community group 
behind this action 
comprised more than 
80 volunteers. 
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Figure 7.1: The locations of the villages practising Riverfront Adoption 
 7.3  Findings  
 
In Chapter One, this thesis raised five research questions about collaborative 
environmental governance in Taiwan: (1) What have been the reasons that have 
motivated the emergence of environmental collaborative governance? (2) Have 
different approaches to initiating environmental collaborative governance led to 
different processes and results? (3) Does the emergence of environmental 
collaborative governance promise a new pattern for its long-term development 
through its institutionalisation within the policy structure generally? (4) What are 
the levels of transformability and constraints of collaborative governance in the 
context of Taiwan? (5) Does the current practice of collaborative governance in 
Taiwan result in a true transition of the state-society relationship or just a 
disguised form of corporatist strategy? In order to answer these research 
questions, each of the following sections, from 7.3.1 to 7.3.5, seeks to answering 
one of them. 
 
7.3.1  The reason motivating the emergence of environmental 
rative governance collabo
  
A director general of the Old Iron Bridge Association explained that the reason 
they decided to adopt the riverfront was inspired by government actions: 
‘We saw the Seventh River Bureau start to restore the tidal flats and several 
million tons of garbage were cleaned up. We felt very envious that the 
opposite side of the riverbank was being made into a riverfront park; 
therefore we raised a request that we wanted our side done too. But at that 
time Taiwan’s economy was declining, and the local government responded 
that it might be easy to build but difficult to maintain. Our director general 
decided that we should, at first, show our capability to maintain a 
community green area.’ (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11) 
‘Therefore, we started from a spot under the iron bridge. At that time we had 
limited resources and very few members. We worked with school teachers, 
principals and local entrepreneurs etc, even the village chief was a member. 
Community elites participated in our work without any expectation of 
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 financial rewards. We did whatever we could with or without money. What 
was beyond our expectation was that the River Bureau decided to entrust the 
riverfront park to us when they had finished constructing it.’ (Interview: 032, 
2006-11-11) 
 
A founder of Chun-yun community described their adoption of a mangrove forest 
on the riverfront as a protest against the pollution from their neighbouring 
industrial park: 
‘The industrial park had been polluting our environment for thirty years and 
once provoked a violent protest by our village fellows. Some of them even 
blockaded the factories. I sought to find an alternative method to protest- 
replanting mangroves in the river mouth of the Kaoping River.’ (Interview: 
046, 2007-02-12) 
‘I live in this place. I am a teacher, so my position was not appropriate to 
join in street protests. But, as a member of the community, I wanted to 
express how I felt about the pollution too. Intellectuals should not keep silent. 
Therefore we started to plant mangroves. Environmental groups gave their 
recognition to our actions and the New Hope Foundation117 joined our 
action for a couple of years, too.’ (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12) 
 
A former director general of A-Ligang community made clear that the 
government’s reform and the suggestion of a local political leader had inspired 
their decision to adopt their riverfront park: 
‘The riverfront was treated as a landfill site by the local township offices as 
with many other similar places. Our actions were motivated by the actions of 
the Seventh River Bureau that took on cleaning up the riverfront and 
removing most agriculture and farming on the tidal flats. The water quality 
of the tributaries of the Kaoping River was all improved too. Our villagers 
were very happy to see the river environment recover its beauty as they had 
seen it in their childhood. Therefore we submitted our request to adopt the 
Kaoping River bank in 1996 based on Mr. Tzao’s suggestion. Until now, our 
villagers are still passionate about volunteering to maintain the riverfront.’ 
                                                 
117 The New Hope Foundation belonged to the County Governor at the time- Cheng-chian Yu.  
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 (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29) 
 
The chief director of the Seventh River Bureau explained the major reason that 
led them to clean up the riverfront and open it up for adoption was the advocacy 
and inspiration of the local leader, Mr. Tzao.  
‘The reason we developed the River Adoption policy was because the 
governor Mr. Tzao invited me (when I had not yet been promoted to chief 
director) to see how chaotic the riverfront was and asked me to do 
something. He suggested that we transform the riverfront to somewhere we 
could provide local recreation and he would find resources to enable 
government action and public participation. I responded to his idea that we, 
as engineers, could take the preliminary action of purifying the riverfront 
and let the community take over the following actions on landscaping and 
managing by gathering resources and volunteering by themselves. In the 
following years, we truly embraced that idea we came up with.’ (Interview: 
024, 2006-12-26) 
‘Lin-bian118 became the first location to put this idea into practice and 
entrusted the locals to maintain the riverfront. The locals thought the 
purification effort made by our engineers did not satisfy their needs and 
gradually modified the riverfront into somewhere more humanistic and 
practical… This gradually evolved into the River Adoption policy as a 
mechanism to make riverfront restoration and local participation possible.’ 
(Interview: 024, 2006-12-26) 
‘The combination of government agencies, politicians and community 
groups working together has became a model that can be applied to other 
localities too. River Adoption became the best mechanism to promote 
natural river landscaping. ‘Do it yourself’ worked better than any written 
words. Volunteers had a very high commitment to natural rivers. We have 
devoted ourselves to promoting this policy.’ (Interview: 024, 2006-12-26)  
 
The officials in the River Bureau found that the results of greening and public 
acceptance were both improved through the policy of Riverfront Adoption. As a 
                                                 
118 It is located in Pingtung County. 
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 result they promoted this model of river management to other areas. A former 
chief director of the River Bureau emphasised the same point.  
‘Before Mr. Tzao became a politician, he had come to me to discuss with me 
about how to transform the riverfront. We agreed to find a place to 
experiment and the place was A-Ligang. It took us two years to finalise the 
model of riverfront transformation. The final result attracted public curiosity 
and interest and therefore we decided to continue promoting this model 
and…entrust the riverfront parks to the locals. Although each section of the 
riverfront became a little bit different, it did not matter just as long as the 
locals cared and thus were willing to maintain it.’ (Interview: 023, 
2006-12-15) 
Their action on improving the riverfront had attracted the public’s interest in 
participating and they recognized that local communities should be empowered to 
build their own versions of riverfront. The Director General emphasized how the 
assistance of Mr. Tzao and his affiliated association made their work possible: 
‘Mr. Tzao helped a lot by acquiring us a NT$500,000119 funding from the 
Tourism Bureau, which was used to plant flora on the riverfront, and other 
funding used in research and planning, and so on. Prof. Lin120 helped us 
plan community building and volunteer management. She also introduced 
other communities to learn from our experience. The BDCCA121 provided 
advanced concepts and helped us to integrate with other community work in 
the broader Pingtung county area.’ (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29)  
 
A former chief director of the Seventh River Bureau also stressed the importance 
of political leadership: 
‘The major reason we successfully promoted River Adoption was because 
both the governors of Pingtung and Kaohsiung counties supported [river 
management reforms]. The new governors were actually the advocates of the 
movement.’ (Interview: 023, 2006-12-15) 
 
                                                 
119 Approximately US$15,000. 
120 This refers to Prof. Hui-may Lin who has devoted her efforts to empowering grassroots groups to 
community building. 
121 This refers to the non-governmental organisation Blue Donggang Creek Conservation 
Association, which has aimed to help locals to develop environmentalism.  
 229
 To conclude, the above narratives reveal that the government’s actions with 
appropriate leadership and mediation can inspire the public from the top. The 
leadership can range from a high level political leadership to local community 
leadership. With stable but limited government funding, the local participants in 
the exogenous approach of collaborative governance have stayed enthusiastically 
in the programmes and this approach can seen to be  as effective as the 
endogenous approach. 
 
 
7.3.2  The exogenous approach of initiating environmental 
rative governance and its results  collabo
 
The Director General of the Old Iron Bridge community said their motivation 
was simply to clean up their own environment. They did not foresee that their 
actions would expand to community care and cultural education. Although they 
were not provided with abundant resources, they had a lot of participants.  
‘At that time, few people thought of having a recreation area here. They 
thought that it would be deserted even if it was made into a park.’ (Interview: 
032, 2006-11-11) 
‘At the beginning, we simply wanted to clean up and purify our hometown, 
and therefore we focussed on environmental work in the community. 
Gradually, our membership increased and consolidated and they pushed us 
to take over the maintenance of the whole riverfront park and expanded our 
work to environmental and cultural education, even to the integration of the 
tourist spots of the whole township.’ (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11) 
‘We have more than a hundred volunteers. Around eighty volunteers 
attended voluntary work regularly and were involved in tour guiding. This 
place has been transformed from a garbage dump to a popular tourist site. 
Because of the lack of a sufficient government subsidy, we rent out bicycles 
to earn some income to support organisational functions.’ (Interview: 032, 
2006-11-11)  
 
The Director General of the Old Iron Bridge community also pointed out the 
importance of local leadership. Local leaders from every domain have joined 
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 their actions and this has attracted local participants. 
‘Our major cadre are elites and professionals who humbled themselves. 
They did not mind getting their hands dirty and did everything themselves. 
That did provoke villagers to work for the public good…this has surprised 
many visitors that so many locals were willing to maintain such a big 
park...this kind of atmosphere also affected the attitude of nearby 
communities toward public space.’ (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11) 
 
Though it grew rapidly, the organisation does not lack the vision of their future 
development:  
‘At the beginning we just wanted to help clean up the environment and never 
thought about the long term goal of our work. But now we have developed 
various kinds of community work, like environmental volunteers, cultural 
education, water protection and community health promotion.’ (Interview: 
032, 2006-11-11) 
 
A director general of Chun-yun community pointed out that, since they 
cooperated with the county government, their conservation work kept expanding 
and became a well-known example of ecological education: 
‘Our preliminary experiment of transplanting mangrove trees was a triumph, 
and then we had several major transplanting events with the county 
government and other groups. We also did ecological monitoring and 
investigations which covered birds, fish, crabs, butterflies and their 
accompanying species. Overall, conservation was combined with 
education.’ (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12) 
 
A-Ligang’s Riverfront Adoption has lasted for more than a decade and has 
become a well-known example that others are learning from. Therefore whenever 
the Seventh River Bureau launches a new case of community participation, they 
usually ask the first time participants to learn from A-Ligang. 
‘When we successfully presented our result of Riverfront Adoption, many 
other communities and groups came to learn from our experience122. Almost 
                                                 
122 For example Lin-bian, Shin-Pi and San-di-men had come to learn from them.  
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 every community was interested in improving their riverfront and imitated 
our model. The whole riverfront section (from A-Ligang to Li-ling) has 
followed our method…It has been eleven years now and the whole riverfront 
has been transformed into a bicycle path by the Seventh River Bureau and 
Mr. Tzao has found funding and resources to help these communities 
consolidate and mobilise to engage in riverfront maintenance.’ (Interview: 
040, 2006-12-29) 
  
The Director General of the Old Iron Bridge clarified that their volunteers had 
operated so well that they did not need any help from the government’s temporary 
employees. In other words, they preferred less government intervention.  
‘The labour we use on riverfront maintenance is mostly volunteers. There 
are about fifty of us working regularly. We use the subsidy from the River 
Bureau to hire two persons to operate weeders. There are no government 
temporary employees working here. We do not need them because they do 
not work as hard as volunteers.’ (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29) 
 
He also emphasised that two things they did better than other community groups 
was are spending money really carefully and promoting new issues to motivate 
their members (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29). This is the key reason why, when 
the same leadership transferred from Chun-yun to another community, Lin-yuan, 
he found it difficult to motivate local participation.  
‘When I was transferred to a new position in Lin-yuan, I tried to instigate 
local teachers in mangrove conservation, but I found it difficult. It was 
because I did not get government project funding here to embark on 
something from scratch.’ (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12) 
 
Although this approach to collaborative governance is exogenous, there are 
significant signs of local autonomy and spontaneity. Without grassroots actively 
responding to the government’s call for public participation, the exogenous 
collaborative governance would not succeed. However, the locals’ perspectives 
are diverse and so are their needs. Instead of pursuing homogeneity, the 
government had to tolerate a heterogeneous pattern of collaborative governance 
to avoid a ‘one pattern fits all’ notion of riverfront management. As the former 
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 director general underlined, the most important thing in creating a public green 
space is to bring forth participants’ own local perspectives in order to create 
something they really enjoy (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29). 
 
In conclusion, although the exogenous approach of collaborative governance is a 
top-down approach, it has great potential to expand very fast if it obtains an 
autonomous response from the grassroots. It also needs appropriate local 
leadership helping to put policy into practice and to manage carefully the 
necessary resources. Even simple environmental maintenance can be a catalyst to 
local development and tourism.  
 
7.3.3  The long-term development and institutionalisation of 
mental collaborative governance environ
 
The Director General of A-Ligang community association suggested that 
although their volunteers were still very passionate about their adoption work, 
they faced difficulty in attracting new members. 
‘The passion of our volunteers is not decreasing at all because we have a 
subgroup working on organising and motivating volunteers. It has continued 
for eleven years. Every one of us who is available comes out to volunteer as 
a tour guide….However, the younger generation participate very little in 
cultural and environmental activities. It is a little bit difficult to attract them 
to do volunteer work due to their common indifference to public affairs. The 
best volunteers are usually retired teachers. They can motivate local 
residents. ’ (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29) 
The Director General of Chun-yun community stressed the importance of 
authority and funding provision from the government which gave them 
opportunities to grow. 
‘The Seventh River Bureau is the major government agency in Riverfront 
Adoption. Its ecological awareness has been raised and the approach of 
river management has become environmentally friendly. Therefore the group 
has made wood paths on mangrove habitats to avoid harming the wildlife 
and given us the opportunity and subsidy to adopt the habitat...these actions 
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 have made it easier for us to achieve conservation.’ (Interview: 046, 
2007-02-12) 
 
Although this approach is initiated by the government, it cannot guarantee that 
government resources will be stable. The participation of local communities 
would lead to government resources, but if the locals started to rely on them, it 
might result in a lack of spontaneous social mobilisation and lose public and 
government attention.  
 
The Director General of Chun-yun community complained how they started to 
lose government attention: 
‘Although the county government cares about our riverfront, they are unable 
to pay attention to it because of insufficient employees and budget. They 
used to provide us with funding as well as the River Bureau, the Agriculture 
Bureau and the factories in the industrial park…The money was well-spent 
on mangrove re-planting, ecology monitoring, public education, wood and 
bicycle paths. The result was good, but they no longer sponsor our work due 
to the fact that their attention diversified to other cases.’ (Interview: 046, 
2007-02-12) 
In comparison, the mid-stream area of the Kaoping River receives more attention 
than the river mouth area. The Chun-yun community, for example, which has 
been subjected to much more pollution due to the neighbouring industrial park, 
has received little compensation for environmental conservation. 
‘This is really unfair. The fact is that we deserve more attention and funding 
for environmental conservation since we have received so much industrial 
pollution which has effectively given birth to the economic boom. But the 
truth is that the funding is insufficient and the government effort is too little.’ 
(Interview: 046, 2007-02-12) 
 
It is possible that the government does not want to fund anything that would 
instigate a big reduction in pollution which would, in turn, inhibit economic 
growth. Nevertheless, government policy usually requires the adoption groups to 
become self-sustaining at the end of their restoration programmes and therefore 
reduces its subsidy step-by-step. This situation was endorsed by the chief of the 
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 conservation section in the local county government. He said that the community 
group should find their own financial resources and be self-sustaining to ensure 
their own long-term development. 
‘Financial independence is crucial to community groups. Government 
funding is a sort of encouragement rather than a long term commitment. For 
example, sometimes it does not fit with what the community wants to do and 
misappropriates it…Sometimes there is political interference which causes 
conflicts in competing for government funding. We should create a 
community mechanism which can take a proportion of everyone’s income to 
be a funding source for public infrastructure.’ (Interview: 2006-11-9) 
 
The office in charge of the Riverfront Adoption admitted the fact that there were 
some abuses of an exogenous approach to collaborative governance: 
‘Better examples include A-Ligang and Lun-ding communities. They are 
more spontaneous. Some communities join this action through the 
intervention of local political representatives. This kind of community 
adoption usually does the job superficially without continuous care and 
monitoring. Having said that, if the River Bureau makes a firm request, they 
will do it better.’ (Interview: 163, 2006-12-7)  
 
The former chief director of the River Bureau noted the importance of 
environmental organisations and local leadership empowering grassroots groups 
to avoid the Riverfront Adoption becoming the interest of faction politics.  
‘We have to seek the help of the BDCCA to introduce and encourage local 
teachers and leaders to commit to the adoption. We found those communities 
introduced by the BDCCA worked better than others. Some communities 
engaged with this job only for the subsidy…some township offices even 
requested us to give them the right to authorise an adoption unit. According 
to our experience, this usually results in faction competition. We are more 
willing to give the authorisation directly to community groups.’ (Interview: 
023, 2006-12-15) 
 
The exogenous approach to Riverfront Adoption can only operate under two 
conditions - that it leads to spontaneous action from the grassroots and to 
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 continuous support of government officials. For example, a problem appeared 
when the key official promoting the scheme left and there was a lack of local 
environmental consciousness to fill the gap. The former chief director of the 
River Bureau said: 
‘After I got promoted and left the position [of chief director of the River 
Bureau]…I still came back a lot to see the subsequent results of my former 
work and found much had been deserted. I suggested that the River Bureau 
do some improvements, but my suggestions were neglected too…The policy 
of Riverfront Adoption has been disregarded by the Bureau. Fortunately 
some community adoption still functions and lots of local representatives 
and grassroots people still consider it a mechanism and expect the 
government to work better in this regard.’ (Interview: 023, 2006-12-15) 
‘If we contract out the work of riverfront maintenance, the contractor 
usually only does it before official inspection. In contrast, if a local group 
adopts the riverfront, they usually do the work every day and even report to 
us about offences. Actually the latter costs less than the former in terms of 
government budget.’ (Interview: 023, 2006-12-15) 
 
Though Riverfront Adoption is an exogenous approach, its result does not only 
rely on particular government officials to promote it, but also on the quality of 
communities. The chief-director of the River Bureau gave attention to this point: 
‘Communities are not all the same. Some of the groups used a limited 
government subsidy well and mobilised their own resources to provide 
public goods, but some of them misappropriated the subsidy and contracted 
out the work instead of utilising local villagers. We have to distinguish which 
group is good enough for us to authorise the adoption work.’ (Interview: 024, 
2006-12-26) 
 
In conclusion, even though the government promoted the policy of Riverfront 
Adoption with funding investment, the community groups that responded to this 
policy have found it difficult to attract new resources and recruit volunteers from 
the younger generation when the older ones retired. 
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 7.3.4  The transformative capability and limitations of environmental 
rative governance in Taiwan  collabo
                                                
 
This kind of collaborative governance has a very limited influence on policy making. 
As the Director General of Chun-yun community described: 
‘We are not able to take part in the policy making process. Everything 
depends on the interest of the major political leaders. If they are interested, 
we would be authorised and empowered to participate. If they are not, we 
could not achieve anything even if we tried our best to strive for it.’ 
(Interview: 046, 2007-02-12) 
 
The impact local initiative can make is limited when it comes to improving wider 
environmental problems. It needs to be noted there was a serious problem of 
pollution caused by mining companies and an industrial park that the 
communities strongly disliked. For example, the Director General of Chun-yun 
community expressed his concern about the extent that riverfront conservation 
can influence the nearby pollution from the petrochemical industrial park. All 
they can do is to somehow make the industrial park more environmentally 
friendly and provide a wildlife shelter rather than an ideal mangrove habitat. 
‘At the beginning, we wanted to make a contrast between the petrochemical 
industrial park and mangrove habitat. But recently our mindset has changed 
slightly. There is no way that we can make the industrial park leave. The 
government is still promoting petrochemistry. What we can do is to suggest 
that the industrial park take some environmentally friendly measures which 
can help create a positive image for the factories.’ (Interview: 046, 
2007-02-12) 
‘Our next goal is to bring environmentalism into the industrial park and 
bring feedback from them regarding the mangrove conservation area when 
combining resources and industrial culture.’ (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12) 
‘This year the Industrial Bureau provided the industrial park with a NT$ 3M 
123 budget to improve its environment and a little bit of the money will be 
spent on the conservation area based on our suggestion. We advised them to 
 
123 About US$100,000. 
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 consider how to combine the industrial park and the mangrove conservation 
area. The industrial park should compensate for the impact it has caused on 
residents’ health.’ (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12) 
The influence of Riverfront Adoption on policy making is constrained to the 
riverfront the locals adopt. It has difficulty in extending its influence to wider 
areas and policies, and cannot guarantee the stability of government investment.   
 
Both the Old Iron Bridge and the A-Ligang communities once considered 
splitting into two due to internal conflicts. This is due to their situation in the 
existing social-political context and, in some cases, it has fuelled local political 
competition. One leader of the Old Iron Bridge community criticised another 
saying: 
‘[The former leader Mr. Zheng 124 ] had a different view from others; 
therefore we formed another group…he lacked the enthusiasm to achieve 
anything but political ambition. He wanted to get elected as a village 
representative; therefore what he did was only around the village periphery. 
That was why we left and established another group because we care about 
our wider environment. Since our new group was established, he has lost 
most of his volunteers and his public work has been abandoned…Our first 
director general was elected as Township Chief six months after we 
established.’ (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11) 
 
On the contrary, other groups criticised the current leader of the Old Iron Bridge 
as being too aggressive and competitive. 
‘[The former leader Mr. Zheng] was a gentle person who did not haggle 
over details, but the current director general did and kept attacking the 
former leader. The Old Iron Bridge community association have taken a lot 
of money from the government. It got a subsidy of NT$ 800,000 per year125 
for maintaining the riverfront alone. They even have problems with the 
township chief 126 . They have accused the township chief of not being 
supportive enough and take advantage of the association to pursue personal 
                                                 
124 This refers to Mr. Rong-hua Zheng a leader who established the former body of the Old Iron 
Bridge.  
125 About US$ 22,000. 
126 He is one of their former director generals. 
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 interests.’ (Interview: 003, 2006-5-22) 
 
A director general of the Old Iron Bridge community association rejected this 
criticism: 
‘Many grassroots have internal conflicts between director generals and chief 
executives. They have factionalism. In our association, we emphasise 
openness, fairness and transparency, especially about finances, which can 
easily come under suspicion. We would rather be poor than be treated with 
suspicion. Usually rich groups collapse more easily than poor ones.’ 
(Interview: 032, 2006-11-11) 
In A-Ligang community, internal conflict led to a split.  
‘When we first adopted the riverfront, the early directors had different ideals 
from us. Later, they were not elected as directors. Then they decided to form 
another group and claimed our early achievements were accomplished by 
them. It does not matter. I think most villagers and officials are very aware of 
who has accomplished what. It is good that some people leave to explore 
new domains of public affairs, but please do not smear the image others’.’ 
(Interview: 040, 2006-12-29) 
 
The chief director of the River Bureau explained how they responded to the 
factionalism caused by the Riverfront Adoption policy.  
‘The policy of Riverfront Adoption has become so popular that every 
community wants to adopt a riverfront section. Even those political groups 
desire to share the monetary subsidy. If they do not acquire a subsidy, they 
will mobilise their political influence and cause a dispute either inside or 
outside the local communities. Riverfront Adoption has become the target of 
factional competition. Everyone knows that it can consolidate the public, 
gather resources and even win votes. That is why the local township wants to 
get involved and take advantage of the subsidy.’ (Interview: 024, 
2006-12-26) 
 
The former chief director of the River Bureau went as far as to say, in order to 
avoid the dispute of factionalism, he ‘preferred to entrust the riverfront directly to 
civil groups rather than by way of township offices which are always affected by 
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 factionalism.’ (interview: 023, 2006-12-15) With regards to this kind of internal 
conflict within community groups, the chief director of the River Bureau 
emphasised that they must be fair to every group. 
‘When there are community groups competing, we have to be really fair 
about the adoption procedure and subsidy allocation, otherwise there might 
be dispute, making those groups dysfunctional.’ (Interview: 024, 
2006-12-26) 
‘It is quite important to keep harmony between groups. No one should 
over-insist on their own opinion. Toleration of others’ opinions is crucial for 
reaching the real targets. For example A-Ligang was a really consolidated 
group. But because they had different opinions about which targets should 
be prioritised, they split up. It was really a shame. We had to divide the 
riverfront into two sections to allow both groups to adopt and the local 
atmosphere became bad too...’ (Interview: 024, 2006-12-26) 
 
To conclude, in the case of Riverfront Adoption, there are several examples of 
internal competition for interests. These kinds of interests are not necessarily 
related to money, but more to political advantage and leadership. In Taiwan, 
almost every public affair will be related to politics and thus it is difficult to 
promote public participation. In the community, almost everything will be 
politicised and lead to factionalism while not necessarily in the form of 
conventional corporatism. Even the officials in the township offices claimed the 
subsidy of Riverfront Adoption should be assigned by them. 
 
The distribution of government resources, instead of being based on traditional 
political patronage, is more related to a pragmatic cost-effective evaluation of the 
government apparatus, at least in this case study. The influence of corporatist 
control, which was overwhelmingly manipulated from the centre of the ruling 
party, is seen to be reduced to a minimum level. However, local political 
competition seems to overshadow environmental activism, which should aim to 
pursue public interests rather than personal political benefits. The funding of 
public affairs has become one of the resources that political factions compete for. 
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 7.3.5  State-society relationship in transition 
 
This section discusses how the state and society interact in this exogenous approach 
to collaborative governance. Did it ultimately alter the relationship between the state 
and society or just disguise the existing power structure in another way? If there is 
genuine collaborative governance, does the state continue to dominate the nature 
and practice of collaborative governance?  
 
The Director General of the Old Iron Bridge community pointed out how the trust 
between the grassroots and the government was built, alongside recognition of 
the results of Riverfront Adoption, and thus brought them abundant government 
resources.  
‘Our interaction with the government has developed. In the early stages of 
our organisation, it was very difficult for us to acquire funding from the 
government. Every application was rejected. But after we had done a good 
job on the first project, the government found our organisation worth 
investing in and therefore has actively reminded us to apply for various 
sources of governmental project money.’ (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11) 
But he emphasised that they did not abuse government funding. They only 
applied for an appropriate amount of project money to coordinate volunteers’ 
participation and growth in activity.  
‘If we accept project funding which is beyond our capacity and end up doing 
a bad job, it will give the government a negative impression and attract 
criticism. Therefore we evaluate our ability and volunteers’ willingness 
before we accept any project entrusted to us.’ (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11) 
 
The Riverfront Adoption was a typical case of how modern governments can 
empower and nurture social associations, without jeopardising their autonomy to 
manage their own environmental affairs. With a small amount of subsidy and 
administrative assistance127, the government can stimulate the growth of rural 
community associations, enabling them to participate in managing the 
                                                 
127 For example, every 10m2 subsidy of US$ 1, and sometimes can also provide temporary 
government-employed staff.  
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 environment. Although most community examples in this study can mobilise 
plenty of volunteers from their villages, they are financially dependent on 
government funding. 
 
In addition, the distribution of government resources was targeted. The Old Iron 
Bridge community showed how the government repeated their investment in the 
same communities that had performed successfully while some other 
communities gradually lost public attention, for example Chun-yun community. 
Similarly, A-li-gang faced a future of its subsidy reducing slowly but surely, 
which meant, in order to be self-sustaining, the community had to create income 
from eco-tourism or fund-raising. 
 
In general terms, the state-society relationship became progressively more equal 
and reciprocal regarding cooperation over environmental management. But this 
kind of cooperation was highly selective. From the perspective of government 
officials, investing in communities that had a higher probability to succeed helped 
their internal grading, and also explains why they were reluctant to approve grant 
applications from communities that had no track record of successful outcomes. 
 
7.4  Conclusion: Re-thinking the model of environmental 
borative governance in Taiwan colla
 
In contrast to the previous two chapters, this chapter examines the exogenous 
approach to initiating collaborative governance, with regards to Riverfront 
Adoption, to see how it has worked differently from the endogenous approach. 
This case study reveals two major mechanisms that gave rise to Riverfront 
Adoption. First of all, several riverfront sections had been treated as landfill sites 
for approximately two decades. Villagers were not able to access the river and 
their resentment had built up. The discovery that the riverfront had a large amount 
of toxic industrial waste buried underneath it further fuelled public discontent in 
1999. This discovery acted as a focussing event which motivated both the local 
communities and the government.  
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 The River Bureau finally started to take action by cleaning up the riverfront and 
initiating water restoration, which eased the anger of local people somewhat. A 
transformative government official and local political leader played a crucial role 
during the process. They developed the strategy of Riverfront Adoption together 
and translated social resentment over environmental deterioration into positive 
conservation actions. The local political leader negotiated with the River Bureau 
to cooperate with local residents to transform the riverfront. This strategy had two 
purposes: the first was to prevent waste landfill happening again, and the second 
was to provide a recreation place for local people. What the River Bureau had to 
offer was a very small amount of funding to assist with everyday riverfront 
maintenance, and respect for what the locals decided to do.  
 
In this case, the extent to which environmental action became politicised was 
more obvious than with the other two case studies. It exhibited very clearly how 
collaborative governance initiated externally and soon became embedded in the 
existing local political context. Political factions made the neutralisation of 
environmental actions impossible, and activists were unable to avoid being 
categorised as belonging to one side or the other of competing factions. In two 
examples, community groups encountered internal struggles and eventually 
split-up. Part of the reason was a dispute over the government funding, and part 
as to who benefitted from the leadership and reputation associated with the 
scheme. Extra political capital would help in elections. These tensions pointed out 
the importance of consensus building before any exogenous approach to 
collaborative governance could be undertaken. A prestigious leader or a 
good-intentioned government official could function as an arbitrator, who could 
search for a suitable local leader, find resources and even deal with administrative 
routines and government grant processes.  
 
Apart from the issue of it being deeply rooted in the existing political context, the 
exogenous approach was often largely configured on the operations of the 
bureaucratic system in place at the time and limited the degree of reform. The 
capability to improve the environment of Riverfront Adoption was much lower 
than in the previous two case studies. This is because most actions pertaining to 
Riverfront Adoption were government-oriented and their scope was limited to the 
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neighbourhood riverfront only and never extended to other controversial issues 
regarding the river, such as industrial pollution and gravel mining. Villagers were 
to be content to improve their own neighbourhood, but unable to deal with, and 
be emotionally disconnected from, other larger issues regarding the river.  
 
This approach to collaborative action could only result in limited reform, not only 
because the scope of Riverfront Adoption was restricted to very local issues but 
also because, in practice, the majority of villager participants were persuaded to 
adopt collaborative and institutional methods rather than disruptive ones. 
Institutionalisation, as a feedback mechanism, obviously led to a reinforcement of 
participants’ adaptation towards collaboration- oriented actions and away from 
disruptive confrontations. Its final institutionalisation meant that collaborative 
governance continued to function as a commonly-accepted way of governing.
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Figure 7. 2: A revised model of the emergence and development of environmental collaborative governance 
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 Chapter 8  Discussion  
 
In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I examined how local environmental groups with different 
cultural backgrounds and resources struggled to obtain greater autonomy over the 
management of their environment. The purpose of Chapter 8 is twofold. First, it 
reviews the findings of all these case studies, identifying areas of similarity and 
difference between them. It attempts to synthesise the results in the search for 
general conclusions and to see how those conclusions relate to the questions 
raised by the literature review, but it does not presume that all the case studies 
should have similar outcomes. Second, it discusses how these empirical studies 
can contribute to the theory of governance, and especially how they relate to the 
model outlined in Chapter 2. The case studies analysed in Chapters 5-7 reflect 
different approaches towards collaborative governance. The case of River 
Enclosure represents a grassroots autonomous initiative, whilst Water Defence 
was initiated by environmental NGOs and Riverfront Adoption was promoted by 
a government agency. These examples of the Taiwanese experience of conducting 
collaborative governance are used to examine the series of questions raised in 
Chapter 1. The questions are:  
First, what have been the reasons that have motivated the emergence of 
environmental collaborative governance? Second, have different approaches to 
initiating environmental collaborative governance led to different processes and 
results? Third, does the emergence of environmental collaborative governance 
promise a new pattern for its long-term development through its 
institutionalisation within the policy structure generally? Fourth, what are the 
levels of transformability and constraint of collaborative governance in the 
context of Taiwan? Fifth, does the current practice of collaborative governance in 
Taiwan result in a true transition of the state-society relationship or just a 
disguised form of corporatist strategy? 
 
The following sections discuss these questions in sequence. Section 8.1 restates 
the argument and the theoretical model that lies behind this research. Section 8.2 
discusses the mechanisms behind the rise of collaborative governance in Taiwan. 
Section 8.3 examines the different approaches to initiating collaborative 
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 governance and how these are critical to its success. Section 8.4 lays out the 
reasons affecting the long-term development of collaborative governance and its 
possibility of institutionalisation. Section 8.5 assesses whether the deliberative 
process as a form of democratisation has a positive association with 
environmental improvement, while Section 8.6 reviews how Taiwanese state and 
society are transforming their interaction and roles in the area of environmental 
governance. Section 8.7 addresses how an additional factor – the context – is 
important to each case. Finally, Section 8.8 discusses how the findings of this 
research modify the theoretical model of collaborative governance developed in 
Chapter 2.  
 
8.1  Governance in theory  
 
This study of collaborative governance in Taiwan aims to contribute to three 
important contemporary debates. The first is the issue of sustainable development; 
the second contributes to questions of local governance, including the 
relationships between central and local government and between citizens and the 
state, when managing the environment; and the third to debates surrounding the 
changing role of civil society in local governance in Taiwan. More specifically, 
this research addresses the general observation that governance theory needs to 
move beyond grand theorising and typologies, and undertake more detailed 
empirical studies to survey to what extent the world is actually shifting from 
government to governance (Kooiman, 2003: 4-5; Van Kersbergen and Van 
Waarden, 2004: 165; Adger and Jordan, 2009).  
Second, to avoid the notion of governance becoming a static phenomenon, mode 
or instrument, the governance of sustainability needs to be seen in terms of both 
processes and outcomes. It needs to be analysed in a more dynamic and 
interactive way in order to make clear what forms of governing could possibly 
lead to expected outcomes (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 22; Adger and Jordan, 2009), 
without neglecting the underlying power structure (Van Kersbergen and Van 
Waarden, 2004: 166; Adger and Jordan, 2009).  
Finally, much of the existing literature on collaborative governance lacks 
sufficient examples of in-depth Eastern studies. To date, most empirical data in 
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 support of governance theory is taken from western experiences. This study has 
tried to compensate for this deficit in the literature by starting from an East Asian 
perspective. Although there is a growing amount of research assessing the signs 
of a vibrant civil society participating in governance in East Asia, only a small 
proportion has been examined using the framework of governance theory. 
Therefore this thesis aims to contribute to filling this gap in the governance 
literature and in so doing assist the development of the theory relating to 
collaborative governance. Moreover, contestations over the nature of different 
governance models in East Asia mostly focus on economic performance and 
democratisation, they seldom engage with the environmental domain. In 
particular, there is little research into the transformation of environmental 
governance in Taiwan. 
 
The role of the state in East Asian development has always been a controversial 
topic. The processes of policy making in Asia were traditionally monopolised by 
the state. The state was the principal and dominant, if not dictatorial, decision 
maker in the policy making and implementation process. Strict control over 
economic activity, concentration of political power, and close regulation of 
cultural life were typical in the region (White et al., 1985). However, recent 
research has sought to modify this conception of the Asian state, seeing it instead 
as fragmented, imperfect and even disorganised (Boyd and Ngo, 2005), especially 
after the financial crisis of the late 1990s. These conclusions have rekindled the 
debate over the appropriate roles of the state (Drysdale, 2000). In particular, the 
traditional statist perspective on the East Asian political economy was considered 
inadequate in explaining economic performance, was neglectful of intra-state 
dynamics, and was limited in its depictions of state-society relations. In order to 
remedy these shortcomings, some researchers have turned to concepts taken from 
the network theory as they are seen to provide a conceptually richer description of 
state-society interaction. More emphasis is placed upon the significance of 
partnerships, collaboration and level of delegation (Moon and Prasad, 1994). For 
example, Drysdale and contributors in the book Reform and Recovery in East 
Asia offer a different view of the state after examining how Asian states reacted to 
the financial crisis of the 1990s (Drysdale, 2000). With extensive reform 
programmes underway in almost every Asian economy, they argue that 
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 governance rather than government can play a key role in facilitating future 
economic performances and preventing future catastrophes.  
 
Similarly, findings from Japan (Yamamoto, 1999), and many other developing 
countries (Boyd and Ngo, 2005; Haggard, 2005; Koo, 2005; Underhill and Zhang, 
2005; Warren and McCarthy, 2009), suggest that the process of environmental 
policy in Taiwan was associated with a major transition from government towards 
forms of governance alongside the rise of civil society. Other examples in both 
African and Asian countries also show how cooperation in policy/programme 
implementation between the state and non-governmental actors can sometimes 
solve intractable development problems (Brown and Ashman, 1996).  
 
In line with this argument, this research has assumed that the emerging civil 
society in Taiwan was the major engine behind newly appearing reforms of river 
governance, acting as the architect of new policy design and promoting public 
participation. At the same time, the emergence of collaborative governance would 
not leave the forms and functions of the state unchanged. This thesis explores 
what changes have taken place in this regard in the context of local environmental 
initiatives in Taiwan. 
 
8.2  Underlying mechanisms in the rise of collaborative 
governance 
 
The theory of governance elaborates on the value and potential ways of 
conducting collaborative action between state and society. However, it lacks 
evidence on how collaborative governance emerges, what its original purposes 
were and how it was initiated. These questions are worthy of investigation 
because they are where the success of collaborative governance lies. This section 
discusses how collaborative environmental governance emerged in Taiwan, who 
initiated it and what the reasons motivating the emergence of collaborative 
governance have been. The empirical data reveals that there are several reasons 
leading civil society to give rise to new patterns of environmental governance. 
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 In the case of Water Defence, the rapid growth of industrialisation in the last 
thirty years, especially regarding the development of heavy industries, has 
degraded the river environment and water resources. This external cost of the 
industrial boom stirred up environmental protestation and led environmental 
activists to organise and to put up proposals for river restoration. More than just 
protesting, proposing and lobbying, they engaged in direct action themselves, 
without waiting for government action, using their own social and human 
resources. In the case of River Enclosure, the river environment had deteriorated, 
in part at least, because the modern state rule had disrupted traditional customary 
custodianship of tribal river management, without putting sufficient resources in 
place to manage the use of river resources. Especially for those river tributaries 
which are located in remote mountain areas, this inadequate rule resulted in the 
degradation of the river environment. Indigenous villagers often felt river 
resources were exploited. There was a state of anarchy without proper 
management, especially by comparison with customary means of doing so. This 
caused collective resentment among the villagers towards government inaction 
and eventually led to their spontaneous decision to undertake River Enclosure in 
order to regain the ownership and ecology of the river. In contrast to the previous 
two cases, Riverfront Adoption was initiated from outside. It was government 
officials and local politicians who drew up this policy intended to tap into social 
vitality in order to transform the riverfront from landfill sites. Helpful bureaucrats 
and local political leaders encouraged and empowered local villagers to 
participate, successfully catalysing public commitment.  
 
While in the cases of Water Defence and River Enclosure, environmental 
activism created new means for public participation in environmental governance, 
in the case of Riverfront Adoption it operated the other way round. Here it was 
the local state that created a policy instrument which inspired the local growth of 
civil society. It is similar to a Japanese case where a policy mechanism was used 
to facilitate activism which in turn reformed the use of public space. Civil society 
surely needs both political and physical spaces in which to meet and flourish 
(Sorensen and Funck, 2007; Daniere and Douglass, 2008). In other words, the 
former two cases represented a kind of self-help designed to cope with the lack of 
government action, whilst the latter tended to complement government action and 
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 policies as local collaboration was grafted on to an existing initiative, even if the 
initiative was designed to incorporate a local partnership once it had been set in 
motion. Although both approaches emerged from different mechanisms, they led 
to a similar result in terms of river restoration: the river became accessible, the 
river ecology recovered and citizens were catalysed. 
 
Prior to these initiatives, Taiwanese society existed under dictatorial rule which 
precluded any chance of public participation except by corporatist organisations 
established by the government. Despite this history, the case studies do reveal that, 
with appropriate empowerment and leadership, the public can be encouraged and 
inspired to engage in public resource management. Alongside this positive 
conclusion, a more negative motivation for engagement arose out of government 
inaction which led in turn to attempts to reclaim the local right to manage the 
river, even to the point of returning to traditional environmental institutions. 
Nonetheless, the changing relationship between the state and civil society at this 
time ‘allowed’ such local action to take place without state interference. 
 
The ineffectiveness and inaction of the state has led to a series of surges of social 
mobilisation, but so too has the active engagement of the government. While the 
former dismisses the reliance of the public on the governing actions of the state, 
the latter makes use of the enthusiasm of the public for environmental 
improvement and their willingness to engage in any restoration action. One 
crucial element is the availability of local leadership capable of promoting the 
opportunity and developing public involvement. Local leadership often bridges 
the state and social actors regarding resource inputs and political legitimatisation, 
but at the same time the state can also be highly selective in terms of with whom 
it prefers to cooperate. In some cases, state assistance is linked to the successful 
performance of particular commitments and their leaders, and in others more 
explicit political patronage is evident. More generally, it is the proliferation of 
local civil society in Taiwan which has developed beyond the protest politics of 
the 1980s and 1990s (see Ho, 2009) that has been fundamental to the emergence 
of collaborative governance (see also Yamamoto, 1999). 
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8.3  Examining the initiation and outcomes of collaborative 
governance: exogenous vs. endogenous approach 
 
This section distinguishes between the two approaches to initiating collaborative 
governance: endogenous and exogenous. There is even a third approach, a hybrid 
approach, which merges the two approaches at different stages. The difference 
leads to different processes and, potentially, outcomes. 
 
In the case of Water Defence, those environmental organisations which undertook 
direct action, did so on their evaluation of their available resources, strength and 
interests. And this varied from activities directed towards wetland regeneration, 
or the promotion of organic farming, but in all cases community participation 
became the focus of their ways of operating. This was a more constructive rather 
than disruptive strategy of civil engagement than the forms of protest employed 
in the 1990s. Their goals and actions were more reformist and altruistic and less 
confrontational. For example, the leading environmental activists put forward a 
series of proposals to restore the river environment, including wetland 
regeneration, landscape conservation, water restoration and so on, rather than 
confront state organisations directly. Instead, though some of their proposals were 
put into practice without the consent of the state, they capitalised on the hesitancy 
of the state to act and promoted new strategies of conservation, partly in the belief 
that demonstrating their value on the ground would lead the state to incorporate 
them into formal policies on a region-wide basis. In practice, the case studies 
suggest that this is an attainable idea only where autonomous social mobilisation 
was combined with high organisational competence.  
 
In the case of River Enclosure, tribal leaders initiated a local approach to 
governance based on the community resources available to them. One of the vital 
elements in the successful employment of this approach is the conventional 
institution called Gaja, which means the obligation of every household to share 
community work and welfare under the direction of traditional leaders. This 
institution supported the emergence of River Enclosure, which was amended 
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 through a modern form of consensus building via village meetings. The 
consensus was achieved through a more democratic process than the traditional 
paternalistic social order. The outcome is that every household shares the 
responsibility of environmental management through a form of consensus rather 
than written rules. It was based upon a strong commitment to conduct River 
Enclosure since the management of the scheme required 24-hour patrolling, 
which was not just harsh but also dangerous. Nonetheless, these inconveniences 
and threats were thought to be worthwhile if only to regain a sense of 
environmental ownership, even if this was not a legal form of ownership backed 
by the authority of the state.  
 
Reclaiming the right of customary community control remains a major incentive 
for action in many indigenous areas. As Acciaioli (2009) exhibited in Indonesia, 
indigenous people have strived for an accommodation of customary 
custodianship in modern environmental governance, through partnership with 
state agencies, and returned with stronger environmental commitments. 
 
In the early stages, River Enclosure was a community collective action against 
the state’s jurisdiction over river management. However, because the result of 
River Enclosure was seen to be so effective among local communities, 
government agencies chose to circumvent their bureaucratic procedures and to 
accept this form of behaviour thus helping the spontaneous growth of social 
action. In other words, for River Enclosure to continue to succeed, it was 
important that local government officials became committed to the scheme, so 
assisting a new mode of governance to develop. In so doing, it further nurtured 
the development of local civil society.  
 
It formulated a hybrid approach combining both endogenous and exogenous 
practices. While the villagers spontaneously initiated River Enclosure, it later 
became a social action which relied on government support to continue. However, 
when the government converted this kind of endogenous collaborative 
governance into policy of its own and committed government resources to it, it 
proved to be much less successful. At a very practical level, for example, the 
government only employed day-time patrollers, which was the opposite to fish 
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 poachers who often only operated at night, and these government employees, 
most of them from outside the villages, were often unwilling to cooperate with 
locals or follow the instructions of local leaders. As a result, government 
investment had very little effect, and, even worse, it reduced the willingness of 
local villagers to volunteer. 
 
In contrast, exogenous collaborative governance, like Riverfront Adoption, was 
planned by a government agency which made provision for it in its budget and 
developed the means of engagement. The participant communities followed the 
government-made rules and directions. Not surprisingly, by comparison with 
River Enclosure, Riverfront Adoption was more easily extended to other areas 
and provides a comparable example to the widespread Japanese civil actions on 
community reform that were elicited by government policy (Sorensen and Funck, 
2007).  
 
However this did not mean all issues of riverbank management were solved. 
Reform actions mostly focussed on narrow local interest, constrained in the 
riverbank areas and were less easy to expand to other sites. This was due to the 
limitations of capability and resource availability of local activists, while, at the 
same time, the concern of most of villagers is for their own community benefit 
rather than the environment as a whole. Nevertheless, if these sorts of social 
actions can be spread nation-wide, a revolution in policy design can be catalysed. 
 
Through the policy of introducing riverfront adoption, the riverbank environment 
was significantly improved. The policy catalysed public participation by 
providing a public good. This increased the collective consensus in the 
community, and mobilised social resources. The environment, as a kind of civil 
space, provides the physical sites for civil society to function autonomously. The 
liberation of public space has attracted significant civic actions in many societies 
(Friedmann, 1988; Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 1994; Daniere and Douglass, 2008). 
 
Not every example of collaborative governance can be said to be wholly 
endogenous or exogenous in its initiation or in its appropriateness. One method 
that was suitable to one community might not apply to others because of 
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 differences in societal-political contexts and geographical characteristics. It can 
be argued that an exogenous approach can be more easily adopted and operated 
by communities and organisations for environmental improvement at ground 
level where it lies within the aims of government agencies, but endogenous 
initiatives may encourage greater local social cohesion as they evolve from the 
central concerns of local social actors. However, the success and ingenuity of 
locally initiated collaborative governance relies on the commitment of the local 
population to their common choice.  
One of the limitations of the exogenous approach of collaborative governance is 
that it is usually restricted to certain policy areas and processes, whose primary 
aim is to assist bureaucrats and politicians in conducting an environmental 
measure of their choosing. It might be just a placating gesture to diffuse public 
irritation for poor environmental management results, but it is least likely to be 
effective in resolving a controversial issue or in respecting local autonomy in 
local environmental affairs.  
 
The empirical materials showed that both approaches have their limitations and 
strengths. It might be of theoretical interest to explore the possibility of 
successfully merging these two approaches. In reality, the merged model of 
collaborative governance, which might fit in with the bureaucratic system and its 
interests without opposing the needs of relevant communities and the 
environment, demands a very particular set of circumstances to make it possible, 
with no guarantee of success. On top of these conditions, the merged model needs 
to be able to be institutionalised for its long-term development. 
 
Appropriate government investment and facilitation can elicit a significant citizen 
response. As Dobson suggests, citizenship is unlikely to emerge spontaneously. 
On the contrary, it requires new educational systems and democratic spaces in 
which to thrive, and he argues that government should invest in raising the 
public’s ecological citizenship to ensure commitment among the public towards 
environmentally friendly behaviour (Dobson, 2003; Dobson and Bell, 2006; 
Dobson, 2009). In the case of Riverfront Adoption, it was only fifteen years ago 
that the residents who lived beside the river were bereft of any hope of a clean 
and ecologically vibrant river. Current government actions on cleaning up 
 255
 pollutants in and along the river have regained the residents’ trust of the 
government’s determination to be involved in environmental management. This 
implies that an exogenous approach towards collaborative governance can, in 
some cases, equally catalyse the enthusiasm of the public in participating in 
environmental affairs and the growth of civil society. Similar examples can be 
found in some Brazilian cases of participatory budgeting projects that overcame 
traditional clientelism in order to enable cooperative governance to thrive (Abers, 
1998; Souza, 2001). 
 
Based on the ladder of participation (see Table 2. 2), the degree of power and 
delegation gained by the participants of the three case studies are significantly 
beyond ‘tokenism’ in Arnstein’s terms (i.e. informing, consultation, and 
placation). In fact, the examples of Dashe, Koushe, Gaujung (River Enclosure), 
Wetlands Taiwan, BDCC and MPA (Water Defence), have presented a high level 
of community autonomy in the early stages of their social mobilisation for 
conservation action and protests against environmental degradation. The 
development projects were led by communities, rather than by the government. 
They remained so until the government stepped in at a later phase, which resulted 
in their reliance on government resources. Even so, their participation in 
governing remained interactive and functional according to the spectrum. 
 
After all, there is no such thing as a ‘one-size fits all’ approach that can be applied 
to policy domains. The success of collaborative actions is contingent on local 
circumstances, geographic specificities, appropriate leadership and participants’ 
commitment. However, as a suggestion to policy makers and practitioners, an 
appropriate hybrid model, especially with regards to institutionalising 
collaborative governance, should establish a set of rules and mechanisms, which 
is flexible enough to accommodate local demands and needs, and, most important 
of all, encourage local commitment and autonomy. This observation is also 
relevant to the practice of multi-level governance (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; 
Bulkeley and Moser, 2007), in which authority is not only redistributed to 
supra-national or sub-national institutions, but is also dispersed from different 
levels of governments to social voluntary sectors and networks (Peters and Pierre, 
2001). Instead of becoming a dilution of responsibility and increased ambiguity 
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 of accountability, the dispersion of authority should be carefully designed based 
on the nature of the environmental issues in quesion and which tiers of 
government or social sectors have the greatest capacity and relevance to address 
them. It follows that, sometimes, cooperation across borders is necessary in order 
to overcome the limitations of resources and operational capability (Bulkeley and 
Kern, 2006).  
 
 
8.4  Mechanisms for the long-term development of 
collaborative governance and its institutionalisation 
 
This section examines the significant determinants and difficulties of the 
long-term development of collaborative governance and how the actors involved 
strived to sustain this new form of governance. It is crucial, of course, for the 
organisations involved to increase their capability to acquire continuous financial 
support and political commitment from state organisations to input the long-term 
support for collaborative actions. But the financial input is not the only element 
important in the long-term development of collaborative governance. Without 
spontaneous mobilisation of social participants, both endogenous and exogenous 
approaches of collaborative governance cannot be sustained or transferred to 
other areas of policy. There must be commitment from local leaders and 
government officials if the local community is to be genuinely empowered and its 
members given the means to adapt themselves to new rules and practices. 
 
Whilst governance theory foresees that genuine collaborative governance can 
improve the quality of environmental management, it is simply too optimistic to 
assume that collaborative practice between active citizens and responsive 
government officials can develop and be maintained without problems along the 
way. The process of initiating and practising collaborative governance can be 
time-consuming, expensive and frustrating with no guarantee of a consensual 
result. 
 
In the case of Riverfront Adoption, government subsidy was stable and sufficient 
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 enough for local communities to establish regular practices on limited 
government funding. Local communities did not have to worry about the 
availability of resources for future development or that continuous participation 
would constantly require sufficient political recognition to be effective. On the 
other hand, Water Defence, which was not a government project, had to rely on 
social mobilisation to obtain resources from both the public and private sectors. It 
also required constant attention be paid to the integration of their preferred 
activities into the government’s project budget. The problem is that the evidence 
suggests that spontaneous social mobilisation can often acquire government 
resources, but not necessarily for the long term. Therefore, the groups in Water 
Defence needed to consistently propose new programmes, which could then 
obtain new sponsorship from either the government or society as a whole. 
Nevertheless, these projects were then not easy to institutionalise due to their 
traits of being place-based and temporary strategic measures. 
 
While River Enclosure began as a spontaneous social action, it was gradually 
accepted as part of government policies and largely promoted to other river basins 
with the purpose of improving river ecology. However, the results were not 
always positive. Many communities conducted river enclosure as a response to 
government sponsorship, but without deliberative discussion or volunteer 
mobilisation within their own communities. Consequently, these communities 
became dependent on government funds and human resources although 
government funding was not planned as a regular and stable money supply for the 
locals with the result that some local initiatives had to be abandoned when the 
assumed resources were diverted to other areas and policies. Only a few River 
Enclosure initiatives are still in operation, and then only because of the voluntary 
river patrolling action of the locals. 
 
These three cases reveal that two elements, spontaneous social mobilisation and 
stable funding, are the keys to long-term development. Although an exogenous 
approach can obtain government recognition and long-term subsidy, its failure is 
unavoidable without the spontaneous participation and capability of the 
grassroots. Equally, an endogenous approach, which responds to local 
circumstances, has similar difficulties if it is unable to access long-term resources 
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 from both government and society more generally.  
 
In addition,  collaborative governance needs to be ‘institutionalised’ in order to 
guarantee its long-term development. It needs to become part of established 
practice, not forever remaining on the outside. But this is a difficult transition to 
make, politically and culturally, and most of the case studies demonstrate this. 
Water Defence is almost impossible to be institutionalised (Hou and Chen, 2009) 
because it relies on social actors’ efforts to propose a flexible, situation-based 
solution and at the same time to integrate government resources to realise the 
solution. In the case of River Enclosure, attempts to institutionalise the practice of 
river patrol led to the withdrawal of volunteer villagers and the collapse of the 
patrol system. It would seem that in these case studies written rules seldom apply 
to successful collaborative governance. Progress relies more on government 
officials’ genuine devolution of power and willingness to act, in addition to the 
countless informal acts of coordination among the social actors in their work 
cooperating with the government. These efforts are indispensable and need to be 
consistently applied to the phases of policy-making, strategic action, and 
implementation.  
 
8.5  The limits of collaborative actions   
 
This section considers the extent to which the new forms of collaborative 
governance can achieve effective reform of environmental management. Interest 
groups are often established to influence the policies and practices of others, state 
or non-state. This often reflects their natural expertise and concerns, but when 
they get involved in delivering environmental services can suffer a loss of vitality, 
professionalism, or even separation from the movement from which they emerged 
(Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). Some who have agreed to deliver services in 
association with local governments have suffered problems of co-option and 
distraction from their original goals (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). The heavy 
engagement of Machizukuri groups in Japan with local governments in processes 
often created or supported by local governments, means that Machizukuri today 
often has more in common with 'public participation' processes than with social 
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 movements (Sorensen and Funck, 2007). The distinction between public 
participation and social movement matters because whereas the former is 
intended to improve local environments, the latter is intended to make 
(r)evolutionary changes over the political-economic system, the policy priorities 
and the environmental consciousness of the public.  
In this thesis the case studies have shed different lights on their capacities to 
reform environmental governance. An endogenous approach to collaborative 
governance can appear to be more profound than an exogenous one, probably due 
to the fact that most such cases emerge out of contentious politics towards 
existing governing institutions. Thus they tend to demand greater policy changes 
than those government-initiated programmes. Another reason is that grassroots 
movements reflect a greater willingness and persistence on the part of their actors 
to mobilise every bit of their social resources in order to realise or restore their 
favoured condition of the environment.  
 
In the case of Water Defence, environmental campaigners kept challenging the 
state’s boundary by seeing how far established policies could be altered. The 
movement started as an anti-dam construction campaign and was opposed to any 
large scale water resource development. In the event it not only halted the water 
development programme, but also transformed itself into more than a hundred 
local forms of collaborative conservation, located in various parts of southern 
Taiwan, based on the expertise and interests of each campaigning group. These 
proposals created a new ‘action repertoire’ (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 181-2) 
within the environmental movement and convinced a number of different 
government departments 128  to collaborate on these experimental projects. 
Although taking a different course of action from their original anti-dam purpose, 
they successfully changed the perception of government officials and the public 
towards environmentalism, leading to numerous local environmental 
improvements. This achievement contributed to their capacity to present feasible 
environmental restoration proposals, which integrated different sources of 
government funding and established a strong network of supporters within 
                                                 
128 For example, they have worked with the Forest Bureau, Seventh River Bureau, Council of 
Cultural Affairs, Council for Hakka Affairs (in central government) and Agriculture Bureau, and the 
Water Resources Department (in local county government).  
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 government who were inclined to support their action plans. However, some 
forms of public participation can conflict with regular policy making, such as 
budget planning for a long-term project, and therefore there needs to be some 
flexibility in the collaborative process if it is to be successful. 
 
In contrast, actions associated with Riverfront Adoption spread widely with a 
minimum amount of change in the local landscape and on the basis of 
volunteering. Similarly, River Enclosure, although starting as a spontaneous 
action within a couple of tribal villages, was quickly incorporated into 
government policy in 2006 and spread island-wide. Nevertheless, its actions were 
often restricted to local tributaries and in some government-promoted cases there 
were no volunteers or paid patrollers available to monitor poaching behaviour. In 
the worst case, local power-holders counteracted the efforts of civil action. This 
happened mostly in rural areas. These two case studies have shown that the 
influence of an exogenous approach of collaborative governance was often 
constrained and led to a limited level of reform. Also, even with government 
sponsorship, it can be seen that it does not necessarily last longer than an 
endogenous approach. 
 
Environmental protection emphasises the importance of ecological restoration; 
public participation aims to improve the democratic process of decision making. 
The latter does not always correlate with the former, but the evidence in this 
thesis suggests that most of the time enhancing public involvement leads to a 
greater public commitment to environmental values and a better developed sense 
of ownership of the environment. Sometimes the greatest achievement of 
collaborative governance is an improved policy process rather than environmental 
improvement. Especially in the post-authoritarian phase in Taiwan’s history, 
between 1990s and early 2000s, the democratic value of collaborative governance 
seemed to attract more attention (Hsiao, 1987, 1995; Ho, 2003; Huang, 2004; Yen 
and Kuan, 2004; Ho, 2005b; Fan, 2006), than its environmental outcomes.  
 
The sign of emerging collaborative governance implies a deeper democratic 
political system and a society more involved in governance, but it is often 
constrained at different levels of reform in particular policy domains. For 
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 example, the local level is the most suitable to practice deliberative democracy 
and collaborative governance. Gaventa and Valderrama (1999) have emphasised 
that linking citizen participation to the state at this local or grassroots level raises 
fundamental and normative questions about the nature of democracy, plus the 
skills and strategies for achieving it. They have tried to explore the dynamics and 
methods of strengthening community-based participation in the context of 
programmes for democratic decentralisation. Even though public participation 
has prospered at the local level, the case studies show a concern as to the limited 
extent these actions can influence policy-making in central government. For 
example, although the Water Defence movement restored the water environment 
in many locations and extended its coalition to an unprecedented scale, ultimately 
the coalition has not yet been able to overturn the new water resource 
development projects129 planned by central government. Even worse, in the case 
of River Enclosure, although many tribal villages have enjoyed fruitful results 
from the ecological restoration of the river and the resulting profits attained from 
eco-tourism, the issue of soil erosion caused by deforestation has continued to 
threaten the safety of these villages and the river basin. In addition, in the case of 
Riverfront Adoption, hundreds of hectares of riverfront green were created, but 
beside these riverfront parks mining companies were located that treated the river 
as a source of gravel for construction purposes, which has led to a deterioration of 
the water quality and surrounding natural habitats. In addition, from the water 
quality date, shown in Figure 4.2, it can be seen that there was no sign that the 
heavily polluted area was decreasing in size, probably due to the fact that pig 
farming was still degrading the river basin130. 
 
The core concern of governance is to diffuse or redistribute authority in order to 
incorporate social actors into the policy process and implementation in order to 
reach a structural change for governing sustainability (Petschow et al., 2005). 
Unfortunately, the conduct and results of collaboration in Taiwan have been 
limited to domains that seldom impact on major policies, especially regarding the 
                                                 
129 Although the Water Defence coalition successfully overturned two dam projects, they have faced 
difficulties confronting the new water development projects, including a transbasin diversion, an 
artificial lake etc. 
130 Although pig farming has been expelled from the drinking water protected area since 2002, it 
moved to a down stream area where it was not regulated.  
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 need for natural resources by industrial enterprises. However, at least in these 
case studies, while citizens have the potential to make big changes, very few of 
them are ‘tolerated’ at the higher level of policy process. The case studies were 
actually street-level reforms authorised by frontline government officials, 
especially in the case of River Enclosure and Riverfront Adoption. Although there 
were higher ranking government officials participating in the negotiation of Water 
Defence, very few concrete results were achieved in regards to shifting the 
paradigm of water development projects. Social actors have also urged the 
government to reconstruct its departmental organisations into a more integrated 
structure for governing the river131, not to mention demanding a river policy that 
prioritised sustainable development and ecological conservation instead of water 
resource development, gravel mining and flood prevention. However, the results 
of the campaign are limited. 
 
8.6  Taiwanese state-society relationship in transition 
 
This section asks whether environmental collaborative governance ultimately 
alters the relationship between the state and society, or whether it just 
re-presented the existing power structure in another guise. Traditionally, the state 
monopolised the whole governance process, which led to a very low level of 
public participation. The Taiwanese government was generally considered as 
manifesting a benign form of authoritarianism (Chen, 1995b; Liao, 1997; Ting, 
1999; Edmonds and Goldstein, 2001; Ho, 2009), which has often tried to 
incorporate local factions into the ruling system. Some (Ho, 2009) argue that the 
political situation in Taiwan has been so unstable and severely competitive that 
this alone undermines the value and purpose of public participation, especially 
when the increase in public participation is largely associated with the DPP 
regime. Many respondents worried that future changes in political party might 
have a negative impact on collaborative governance.  
 
This section analyses how the Taiwanese state and society have changed their 
                                                 
131 For example, as mentioned in Chapter 4, rivers in Taiwan are governed by twelve different 
departments that lack horizontal coordination.  
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 roles and relationship along with the emergence of environmental collaborative 
governance. The three case studies in this research unveil the fact that the state no 
longer monopolises the initiation and implementation of policies. Potter et al. 
(2008) and Edwards (2001:3) would agree with this argument. The involvement 
of civic society leads to a policy that better fits the needs of the population as well 
as, in these cases, the imperative of environmental restoration.  
With regard to the debate as to whether traditional corporatism has remained and 
overshadowed the effectiveness of collaborative governance, this thesis has a 
more optimistic finding. Because of the high level of social autonomous energy, 
civil society has been able to defend itself from traditional corporatist control. But 
the cooperation of the two parties has not entirely circumvented local political 
factionism. In the case of Water Defence, the state-society relationship moved 
from confrontation to cooperation, but the transition was uneven. The state is a 
complex entity and whilst some government agencies actively contacted social 
actors, in order to coordinate environmental solutions, other departments, such as 
the economic related ministries, totally excluded civil society members from their 
policy processes. In the last decade, environmental groups and government 
agencies have been trying to find common ground for restoration action for the 
Kaoping River. In some cases cooperation has produced discernible results, not 
least in strategies for water restoration and wetland regeneration. Nevertheless, 
some NGO members have categorised these results as window-dressing rather 
than a fundamental shift in power and relations. Moreover, water developments 
are often intractable, not only because of the problems in controlling water 
pollution but also because the benefits have been unjustly distributed, not least 
because many of the water development projects have aimed to satisfy the 
demands of heavy industry first and the needs of the general public second. This 
meant that the state’s collaborative relationship with environmental NGOs has 
remained in tension because the demands of industry kept re-surfacing. Whilst 
there was difficulty in finding common ground for action over water resource 
restoration, these controversial issues have challenged the possibility of trust 
building between the state and society. 
 
Most environmental activists have been included in one type of consultative 
institution or another (see also Ho, 2009), especially after 2000. Indeed, 
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 environmentalists gained legitimacy and were appointed to government positions 
but cynicism, among NGOs, researchers and observers, remained about the lack 
of change in some of the controversial policies, revealing the continuing authority 
of the state over major policy domains. In the case of River Enclosure, the state 
was often absent from or negligent towards river management in the mountainous 
areas leaving laws and regulations with insufficient human resources to 
implement and monitor them. Government actions regarding river governance ran 
counter to local expectations, leading to deterioration in river ecology. This led 
the indigenous mountain people to undertake self-help action, filling the gap in 
public authority, although these actions were against the law. In due course, the 
state sought reconciliation with the indigene accepting the positive outcomes of 
their actions and their popularity. River Enclosure has led government agencies 
(such as the Forestry Bureau and county governments) to recognise the feasibility 
of entering into a partnership with the indigenous people.  
 
Customary community control over river management has been reasserted 
through River Enclosure practices, but with a slight difference between traditional 
methods and modern practices, which implies change in the state-society 
relationship. Traditional ways of practising River Enclosure are conducted by 
autonomous clans. The position of customary custodianship was usually decided 
by the traditional clan leaders. However, its position in the resurgence of River 
Enclosure is under the recognition and support of the state, therefore modern 
skills of conducting government projects and negotiating community 
participation are required. However, this slight difference of who can legitimately 
authorise the policy of River Enclosure has significant implications for the 
relationship between the state and society. The state’s right to approve the 
applications for River Enclosure, though there is seldom a case being rejected, 
implies River Enclosure no longer belongs to the domain of tribal autonomy.  
 
In the case of Riverfront Adoption, the government agency (River Bureau) 
became the institution that empowered local communities to participate in public 
policy. The Bureau also accepted that public participation was a valuable concept 
in promoting democracy and that it could be used as a policy tool to resolve the 
problem of the democratic deficit. However, the opening-up of community 
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 participation in environmental management also provided a new opportunity for 
local factions to engage with the policy processes or even compete for 
government resources. This undermined local communities who often lacked the 
ability to integrate different opinions and thus resolve political factional 
competition. 
 
The pursuit of collaboration requires a willingness to experiment with 
non-traditional sources of accountability in order to address the problem of 
legitimacy (Freeman, 1997). In addition, the commitment of government officials, 
as well as the dedication of social actors, is an important variable when 
considering the value of public participation. For example in the case of 
Riverfront Adoption, the chief director of the Seventh River Bureau was fully in 
favour of this policy and gained a rewarding response from local villagers in the 
river basin. The cases of adoption grew rapidly. Similarly, in the case of Water 
Defence, with the commitment of a chief in the city government, Wetlands 
Taiwan swiftly expanded the scale of regenerated wetland and the scope of the 
adopted wetland park in Kaohsiung city. But both cases faced the return of 
conservative, bureaucratic attitudes once these two chief officials left their 
positions. The bureaucratic attitude of government officials in Taiwan towards 
public participation is sometimes a means, or a cover, to prevent accusations of 
providing benefit to particular civil groups.  
 
The decrease of authoritarian control and the upsurge of social demand for better 
governance explains part of the reason why, in the last decade, collaborative 
examples grew rapidly, as similar to the case of Indonesia (Warren and McCarthy, 
2009). Nevertheless, there is a dilemma attached to this rapid growth of 
collaborative governance, rooted in a history of an unequal state-society 
relationship, that it tended to be fragile and prone to manipulation (Hickey and 
Mohan, 2004) due to its reliance on government resources and officials’ support. 
What Agrawal and Gupta (2005) worried about is the likelihood of the level of 
participation being much greater for those economically and socially better-off. 
This phenomenon sometimes occurred in rural areas, such as River Enclosure and 
Riverfront Adoption, where only those who were able to deal with bureaucratic 
routines and gain the recognition of local authorities could successfully apply for 
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 government projects and funding. But, this was not without exception. In cases 
like Dashe, poor villagers relied on their own to conduct River Enclosure without 
outside aids, simply because of strong tribal norms, social capital and undivided 
leadership. 
 
The traditional shadow of corporatism and cohesive social control by the state 
was not obvious in this research. The worst case was the counteraction of local 
factionist politics, which was afraid of the rise of citizenship becoming a sort of 
political power to compete with the current power holders. Therefore, those cases 
of collaborative governance in this research, especially as illustrated in the case of 
BDCCA and MPA (in Water Defence), emphasised the management of local 
relationships and were expected to combine the benefits and concerns of the 
locals with environmentalism. 
The state-society relationship is becoming more equal and reciprocal. As Ho 
(2009) also noticed, the role of activists has transited from being ‘viewed as 
disruptive protestors by officials to reliable partners in environmental 
governance’. Most of the government officials emphasised that they not only 
learnt from the endogenous approach of collaborative governance to shift policy 
direction, but also saw community participation as an end-in-itself. 
 
The emergence of this collaborative approach to environmental activism was 
from the grassroots level and was unlike those capital-based environmental 
activisms based in Taipei and established under the assistance of international 
NGOs and the influence of western thought (Weller and Hsiao, 1998). The 
examples of collaborative governance in this research were little influenced by 
discussions taken in Taipei or by foreign organisations. They stand in contrast to 
those described by Huang and Ho who emphasised how the capital-based groups 
were incorporated into the state apparatus (Huang, 2004; Ho, 2009). Huang also 
argued that the incorporated NGO elites were able to reconstitute the state by 
working within the state institutions and thus promote new legislations. However, 
this study remains sceptical as to what extent this argument can be applied to 
locations away from the capital. Here the influence of environmental and 
grassroots groups in collaborative governance remained partial and 
complementary. 
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To conclude, the state-society relationship in Taiwan has been altered rapidly 
since the late 1990s along with the party political shift and the emergence of civil 
society. Evidence in this research, at least from the perspective of environmental 
governance, does not support the suggestion that the newly emerging partnership 
between the state and society is a new form of corporatism (Huang, 2004). 
However, it is without doubt, that the Asian state continues to dominate, and 
seeks to manipulate its partnership with society.  
 
8.7  Contextualising collaborative governance 
 
One significant additional finding is the influence of embedded contextual 
differences (Robins et al., 2008). Each case of collaborative governance has shed 
a different light. Local factionist politics, geographical differences, availability of 
social capital and organisational capacity, all generate intricate differences in the 
mode of collaborative governance and the way social actors and government 
officials commit to it. The geographical differences between rural and urban areas 
alone explain many of the diversified forms of collaborative governance. Those 
cases which were located in rural areas, such as Riverfront Adoption and River 
Enclosure, tended to get less government resources and were less regulated by the 
government, thus needed to be self-reliant. These two studies have demonstrated 
the consistent mobilisation of villagers in rural areas in delivering an 
environmental service, in contrast to the success of Water Defence which has 
tended to rely on the expertise and political savvy of social elites and 
professionals. 
The political impacts of local factionalism also differed according to geographic 
differences. In some of the case studies, particularly those allocated in rural areas, 
for example, A-li-gang, Old Iron Bridge (Riverfront Adoption), Minchuan, Minzu 
and Koushe (River Enclosure), the research found that emerging forms of 
citizenship in these areas encountered the resistance of existing local political 
factions. In some cases, leaders of environmental activism, despite having 
obtained successful outcomes to their environmental campaigns, failed to be 
re-elected as village heads and this led to conservation actions being halted. Some 
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 of them faced a split in their organisations due to the competition for local 
leadership and disputes regarding the location of resources. These political 
cleavages were often found to be fatal to the emergence of collaborative 
governance. This is why those cases of Water Defence insisted on being 
politically neutral or vigilant in their selection of political coalitions. In Taiwan in 
general, no matter whom initiates the new pattern of governance, the more rural 
the location the higher the risk of factionalism and the greater the need for 
reliance on self-help. 
 
Even within rural communities, there might be differences in their level of social 
capital, which is an important element for building consensus and commitment. 
For example, Dashe had a stronger sense of community consolidation, which 
enabled villagers to reconcile their differences even though it was the village that 
received the fewest subsidies from the government. In contrast, Minchiuan and 
Gaujung encountered internal struggles over the issue of financial feedback from 
tourist income. 
 
Different social groups embrace different environmental norms which translated 
into different forms and underlying ideology of conservation actions in the river 
basin. In Taiwanese society, ‘nature’ combines many different meanings. 
Generally speaking, Chinese society, which has been largely influenced by 
Buddhist thought, believes that humankind should live in harmony with nature. 
However, it actually translates very differently to different groups in this society. 
Indigenous Taiwanese society embraces nature as a way of living, which is 
traditionally complemented with a lot of rules and taboos, but for rural villagers it 
has a more utilitarian meaning, such as referring to agricultural production. For 
the ordinary layman, its definition can vary ranging from pastoral nostalgia, to 
resource supplies for daily needs to biodiversity. For example, while Water 
Defence was mainly organised by middle-class urban activists for eco-centred 
purposes, whose values tended to be in forms of conservation as an end in itself, 
River Enclosure and Riverfront Adoption were promoted by lower income rural 
leaders and villagers who mostly considered the river a part of their livelihoods. 
This was revealed from some of the examples seen in the case of River Enclosure, 
in which conservation action failed to continue due to the dispute over the income 
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 distribution of tourism and fishing licenses. Another example was the factional 
struggle, in the case of Riverfront Adoption, over the issue of who was legitimate 
enough to acquire a government subsidy. Similarly, local civil groups are 
structured differently from one another and they therefore also produce diverse 
types of governance. For example, in the case of Water Defence, the diverse 
forms of Water Defence action often derived from differences among the 
environmental groups, such as organisational expertise, ideology of conservation 
and political networks. The varying combination of these factors, produced 
different forms of collaborative governance. For example, BDCCA have used 
their political connections to help hundreds of community groups acquire 
government grants to initiate projects for environmental improvement. The reason 
its members chose to facilitate community groups was geographical. BDCCA was 
located in rural areas with only a handful of members, thus only when community 
groups in the river basin supported their ideas, was river restoration be possible. 
In contrast, Wetlands Taiwan chose to act alone, using their own expertise in 
wetland regeneration and species protection combined with sponsorship both 
from the government and society. These circumstances allowed it to work alone. 
In another case, the social actors of River Enclosure took a similar form of action 
because of the homogeneity of the local indigenous villages involved, most being 
economically disadvantaged, yet socially consolidated and culturally connected.  
 
The success of the new form of governance relies on the availability of 
facilitative officials, local leadership, social capital and organisational capability, 
which altogether describe the level of social autonomy and yet the configuration 
of a new form of collaborative governance often depends also on its context. As 
Potter (2000: 381) has concluded, there is no single model of ‘good governance’, 
but it may have different properties ‘depending on the particular institutional 
context concerned’. While social capital provided a basic source for the initiation 
of River Enclosure, the local leadership and facilitation of government officials 
has made Riverfront Adoption prosper region-wide, and the organisational 
capability and political network has guaranteed the transformative ability of 
Water Defence. ‘Whilst there are considerable opportunities that can be and are 
being realised through an increased role of civic society in development, civil 
society is no ‘magic bullet’ for the future. There is a need to consider what 
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 particular combinations of public, private and civic institutions are most effective 
in specific contexts’ (Potter et al., 2008: 326). 
 
8.8  Conclusion: collaborative governance model for 
Taiwan’s circumstances 
 
This final section modifies the model of environmental collaborative governance 
in Taiwan established in Chapters 2 based on the findings in Chapters 5-7. The 
purpose of doing this modification is to discover to what degree  the model fits 
Taiwan’s case and how Taiwan’s case can enrich the theory of collaborative 
governance. Particular attention has been paid to the mechanism of the emergence 
of collaborative governance and the factors including leadership, local factionism, 
organisational capacity, geographical heterogeneity and government actions. 
 
8.8.1  The role of civil society  
 
The results of the empirical research are largely consistent with my assumption 
that civil society can play a more active role in solving the managerial deficit of 
river environment and resources. Social spontaneity is a major stimulus in 
initiating collaborative governance, in response to long-lasting environmental 
issues, some of which are linked to longstanding grievances such as indigenous 
land rights. Social spontaneity is crucial to the processes of environmental 
governance, continuously attracting public attention, mobilising social resources 
and putting public pressure on the state. It is critical to incorporate civic society in 
the process of initiating and sustaining collaborative governance, while at the 
same time empowering the members of civic society to reclaim the right to 
participate in the processes of public policy. It is possible that civil society 
functions, such as mobilising resources within the state through advocacy and 
lobbying, can provide a novel approach for the public to participate in the process, 
which, in turn, can lead to a more effective way to restore the environment. We 
can no longer assume that the state still controls the process of collaborative 
governance because the most crucial determinant of its success would be the 
continuous engagement of civil society in the process of policy development and 
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 its implementation.  
 
These findings lend support to the assumption that civil society has the potential 
to be both the initiator and implementer of environmental management, but the 
key to its success or failure is often held in the hands of government recognition 
and financial support. In addition, we can conclude with certainty that effective 
collaboration between state and society is not achievable without time and effort; 
neither is it possible to follow a fixed set of rules. The case studies have shown 
that collaborative governance cannot be promoted by the actions of civil society 
alone. Equally, it is highly unlikely that effective, long term river management 
can be achieved on the basis of local participation alone; the state cannot be 
totally withdrawn from the process. Collaboration depends on the whole-hearted 
participation of both the state and society. 
 
In Taiwan, civil environmental projects have tapped into the public's pent-up 
demand for effective, hands-on community-building strategies. They continue to 
provide unique opportunities for people from different communities and walks of 
life to work together toward the basic goals of a healthy environment, quality 
employment, and a sense of place and community (see Shutkin, 2000; Hickey and 
Mohan, 2004). An increasing number of communities are transforming their 
environmental problems into opportunities to address underlying social and 
economic problems. Social networks can empower civil actions. As Ostrom 
(1997) and Shutkin (2000) both argue, personal relationships and networks, 
neighbourhoods and livelihoods can fuel civil environmental projects (Ostrom, 
1990; Shutkin, 2000). 
 
This suggests that the role of civil society in sustainable development will 
continue to gain greater weight. As Potter et al. (2008) have pointed out, NGOs 
have a number of characteristics that make them peculiarly suitable to the needs 
of sustainable development. These include (1) their ability to innovate and adapt, 
(2) their 'relative smallness' (Chambers, 1993); (3) their social approximity 
(Malena, 2000); (4) their tradition of working with the poorest groups and the 
grassroots (Craig and Mayo, 1995) ; and (5) their calibre, commitment and 
continuity of staff (Conroy and Litvinoff, 1988). There is increasing evidence that 
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 NGOs act as initiators and executive bodies in a multitude of environmental 
projects (Rucht, 2005). There is a growing realignment of environmental 
protection strategies away from a purely law-based, law-driven and professional 
model to one in which diverse groups of citizens, environmentalists, government 
officials, and business people collectively become the experts in both planning 
and implementation (Shutkin, 2000). 
In this study, although civil society has often been coupled with the absence of a 
strong financial base and has depended on the state to provide an enabling 
environment and resources (Yamamoto, 1996; Mouer and Sugimoto, 2003; Schak 
and Hudson, 2003). NGOs may run parallel activities, they may play oppositional 
roles, or they may represent weaker members of society, organising them in ways 
that allow them to become more influential in decision making and resource 
allocation. This ‘civil society’ function entails moving from a ‘supply side’ 
approach, concentrating on project delivery, to a ‘demand side’ emphasis, helping 
communities to articulate their concerns and participate in development processes. 
Similar to Brown and Ashman’s (1996) findings, this study suggests that the most 
feasible, successful patterns for development projects are either through the 
mediation of non-government organisations (NGOs) or by grassroots-centred 
cooperation. The availability of different forms of social capital is vital to their 
success. 
 
8.8.2  The role of Asian states 
 
There is also a need to modify the concept of ‘stateness’ in Asian states (Petschow 
et al., 2005) in order to achieve 'governance', which has no standard definition 
except the principle of a diffusion or redistribution of authority away from the 
state. I found in my case studies that the role of the state was twofold. On the one 
hand, it played the role of empowering much grassroots participation and could 
be as equally important as civil society in terms of supporting a diversified and 
non-standardised process of policy participation, as well as providing financial 
aid. On the other hand, the state can stifle the vitality and creativity of civil 
society if it over interfered in the process of collaborative governance. Thus the 
state can be as much part of the problem as it is the solution to societal problems 
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 (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 2). The state plays a leading role, making priorities and 
defining objectives (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 12). The state facilitating the growth 
of civil society associations by empowering NGOs and self-help groups to deliver 
social services and promote social changes is different from traditional 
corporatism which aimed at controlling society. Today, the central perception of 
government is not as a ‘provider’ but as an ‘enabler’ of a vibrant society 
(Kooiman, 2003). 
 
However, the constant circumstance of power imbalance between the state and 
society, as a residue of past authoritarian rule, inevitably results in the tendency 
for social actors to over-rely on government resources in order to expand and 
maintain their programmes. This constant imbalance has not reduced the 
motivation of civil society actors to collaborate. Instead, collaboration has also 
been used as a growth strategy for action and as a means of developing their skills 
in seeking the realisation of environmental policies of their choice. 
 
The transition of the state-society relationship arises from the process of 
collaborative governance. It requires the relationship to evolve from one party 
dominating the other (in Taiwan’s recent history it has usually been the state 
overwhelmingly controlling social order and repressing any autonomic action), to 
one of greater mutual respect and reciprocity and a desire for a successful and 
genuine collaboration. In addition, the state per se is not a homogenous entity. 
Whilst some government agencies might work hand-in-hand with their civil 
partners, others continued to monopolise the policy process and produce 
environmentally unfriendly decisions. Thus the state plays both roles of 
empowering and disabling civil society. While its cooperation with civil-society 
actors helps the latter to expand in size, actions and confidence, its 
over-intervention can equally suffocate the vitality of society.  
 
Collaborative governance does not simply refer to the devolution of the right of 
managing the environment from the state to civil society. While some may be 
concerned about the allocation of responsibility to, and accountability of, NGOs 
following their participation in policy implementation, in fact it also requires 
considerable capacity-building from both sides to develop effective 
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 collaboration– and this takes time.  
 
Politics is the core of the process of these collaborative governance cases. It 
covers a range of political factors, including the political support (either from 
central or local government), along with the capacity of the state to respond to 
public demands and to steer collaborative actions. The emergence of 
collaborative governance can also be seen as a coincidence when the DPP became 
a new regime in 2000, but it was a minority in the national congress. It was 
forced to seek support from, and cooperation with, its social partners in order to 
achieve its goals under the stress of boycott from oppositional legislators. A 
similar situation happened when Ro Mu Hyun came to presidential power in 
South Korea in 2002. He emphasised establishing citizen partnership in order to 
cope with the fact that his party was a minority in parliament (Kim, 2010).  
 
However, this does not imply that civil society actors cannot initiate/achieve 
collaborative governance without the support of a friendly regime (here referring 
to the DPP), but when this is the case the process is slower and with more barriers 
to overcome. The success of collaborative governance was deep-rooted in a 
decade long of preparation and campaign by social activists in Taiwanese society. 
Even after 2008, since the DPP has no longer been in power in the central 
government, activists have strived to continue collaborative projects with local 
governments where the DPP is still in power but with fewer resources from the 
government sectors. In other words, the success of collaborative governance 
requires both strong social spontaneity and state capacity. 
 
Nevertheless, another contrasting example is in the Philippines in that when the 
nation has a very strong civil society, which acquires an enormous amount of 
resources from international donors and sponsorships from UN-related 
organisations, it continues to have difficulties in practising collaborative 
governance with its own government (with or without outside aid). This leads to 
the problem that the state capacity will never be enhanced if it stays as an outsider 
in these projects of governance reforms.  
 
To conclude, collaboration does not refer to simply devolving power and 
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 responsibility to the social sector, instead, it requires higher and newer types of 
state capacity to make it successful. Political regimes, in order to make 
collaborative governance successful, need to be 1) ready to listen and learn the 
public’s ideals about environmental reforms and related strategies/actions, 2) 
ready for a prolonged, interactive, dynamic, constant evolving situation when 
communicating with the public, and finally 3) ready to be persuaded and 
encourage participants to reach a consensus on which common ground can be the 
starting point for action-taking. 
 
 
8.8.3  Return to the local 
 
Growing evidence shows how local environmental governance is becoming the 
central concern of environmental groups and leading to their decision to ‘return to 
the local’. Many activities of social movements worldwide have been promoted 
by the loss of local control over the environment, natural resources and 
indigenous land rights (see New Internationalist, 2001). It has become evident 
that much presumed 'lack of care' regarding the environment at a local level arises 
because 'people do not feel in charge of or, indeed, do not have the power to act' 
(Pye-Smith and Feyerarbend, 1995:303). Environmental campaigns in Asia tend 
to have a local focus and react to very concrete problems in the immediate 
neighbourhood. This pattern is in marked contrast to the profile of the most 
successful western movements for whom the focus is above all on perceived 
problems in distant parts of the world (Kalland and Persoon, 1998). Even 
mainstream environmental organisations in the West are retooling themselves, 
shedding their centralised structure and returning to a locally based organisational 
model.  
 
Evidence in this research shows that the most plausible location for launching 
collaborative governance is at the local level, where the cost of collaborative 
governance and deliberative process is reduced and a clear boundary between 
stakeholders can be more easily defined. Most important of all, the locals are 
devoted to the land where they feel they have ownership and rewards, while at the 
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 same time the street-level government officials, who are located close to the 
residents, feel more obligated to work with them. 
 
Government at a local level should be especially responsive to citizens’ desires 
and more effective in the service delivery. In addition to the fact that the local 
level is the place where most collaborative actions are made possible, 
collaborative governance should also be contextualised based on local conditions. 
Whilst there are considerable opportunities that can be and are being realised 
through an increased role of civic society in development, civic society is no 
'magic bullet' for the future. There is a need to consider what particular 
combinations of public, private and civic institutions are most effective in specific 
contexts, and in a democratic process. 
 
8.8.4  Governance and sustainability 
 
The crisis of unsustainability is, above all else, a crisis of governance, according 
to Adger and Jordan (2009). The transition to a more sustainable world will 
inevitably require radical changes in the actions of all governments, such as 
reforms of government structure and policy priorities. In addition, it also requires 
significant changes to the lifestyles of individuals everywhere. They examine 
these necessary processes and consequences across a range of sectors, regions 
and other important areas of concern. It reveals that the governance of sustainable 
development is politically contested, and that it will continue to test existing 
governance systems to their limits. When government policies fail to solve 
problems, the typical reaction is to try to fix the policy or to tinker at the edge of 
the system. Very seldom do leaders or the public question the institutions that 
have failed, nor do they often ask whether alternative practices and structures 
could be more effective (Innes and Booher, 2010).  
 
Similarly, Petschow emphasises sustainable development as closely connected to 
governance structures and requires the investigation of new forms of social 
co-operation and confrontation. In this, we must take into consideration different 
levels (global to local), players (state, company and civil society), control 
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 structures (hierarchy, market and hierarchy-market joint) and also the fields of 
action. Governance structures for sustainable development must especially enable 
individuals and social learning processes, and create options for design. This 
applies particularly against the background of the intra- and inter-generational 
justice precepts of the sustainability concept (Petschow et al., 2005; Adger and 
Jordan, 2009). 
 
8.8.5  The limits of collaborative governance 
 
Whilst today most government agencies and citizens in Taiwan embrace the idea 
of public participation, its methods and meanings remain vague and difficult to 
realise. The current public consulting processes have often been exaggerated as a 
kind of deliberative policy-making, and have also often been used as a tokenistic 
method to ease public discontent. In practice, the consulting processes are often 
manipulated by powerful stakeholders and government officials. In addition, 
much of environmental behaviour by the public, for example recycling, is done 
for pragmatic reasons rather than out of environmental awareness. Both the 
public and industry are still trying to find loopholes in the law and regulations if 
there is no effective inspection and scrutiny. This delays the progress of the nation 
to being green. 
 
Despite the fact that there has been progress in Asia, including public 
participation in local environmental governance, there is still too much optimism 
about the extent that local people can influence policy choices. In addition, the 
participatory process is still prone to being manipulated by powerful actors 
(Forsyth, 2006)132. Therefore, these difficulties of embodying the true value of 
public participation, in addition to the delay in environmental improvement, have 
motivated both environmental organisations and grassroots groups to embrace the 
continuing need for direct action. The case studies in this research show that the 
actions they chose to undertake tended to produce visible outcomes, even though 
those outcomes might be limited in terms of reforming environmental policies. 
Collaborative actions were mostly focussed in the areas of beautifying the river 
                                                 
132 As Forsyth (2006) found out in the case of the Philippines and India. 
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 environment, rebuilding wildlife habitats and conserving rural landscapes. 
Although these issues are important they are not vitally critical issues inextricably 
linked to larger economic, social and political forces.  
 
During the previous two decades, public pressure for protecting the river has 
increased to an unprecedented level. The influence of environmental activism has 
penetrated into government institutions, and outside social pressure against 
industrial expansion has grown larger, but the expansion of heavy industry has 
remained virtually unshakable because of government support. Some 
environmental activists remain sceptical as to the achievement of collaborative 
actions. This is due to the fact that they cannot confront the major threats to the 
river environment such as the expansion of high energy and water consuming 
industries planned by both the public sector and private enterprises, and the 
mining of river sand and stone. As a whole, the impact of collaborative 
governance in the Kaoping River basin has been limited to certain 
non-controversial domains. 
 
 
8.8.6.  River as a controversial issue 
 
The issue positionality of water and river is especially relevant to the form of 
collaborative governance. Rivers, given their fluidity, cross borders and meet 
multiple functions, and so influence the population and ecology across boundaries. 
The management of rivers can range from irrigation, water supply, biodiversity, 
flood prevention, industrial demands, fisheries to recreation facilities. Different 
demands regularly cause conflict between stakeholders in the same part of the 
river, as well as between those operating upstream and those downstream, and 
between different government departments and regulatory agencies. For example, 
in Taiwan, river jurisdiction is divided between twelve government sectors and 
none of them, for example, is solely responsible for deterioration in the river. The 
call for watershed management, widely supported in many areas of society, has 
been evident for more than a decade but has not been fulfilled, not least because 
public participation has played a minor role in river governance and the allocation 
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 of the river’s water has retained a highly politicised nature. 
 
In comparison, although forestry resources tend to be associated with particular 
territories, their management can also lead to trans-boundary issues.  
Deforestation can, for example, lead to a semi-permanent haze over large areas as 
a result of slashing and burning. Timber has increasingly become a very sensitive 
and highly priced commodity as the trade has been integrated into global 
capitalism. In recent decades this has been especially true in a third world context 
where thousand year forests have been treated as economic resources and felled 
on a grand scale for agriculture, industrial development or short term economic 
gain. 
 
More generally, the applicability of collaborative governance to other 
environmental resources, ranging from fisheries to hunting grounds to common 
land management, is clearly evident. That said progress on the ground depends on 
political context, social conditions and the nature of environmental issues and 
these vary from place to place ensuring that no single approach to collaborative 
governance fits all situations. Methods and forms have to respect local societies’ 
own initiatives and, especially, indigenous knowledge and autonomy if they are to 
be effective. 
 
8.8.7  Potential research agenda 
 
A few suggestions for future inquiry are identified based on the findings in this 
study. Firstly, the research demonstrates that the emergence of collaborative 
governance, both endogenous and exogenous, reflects changes to the macro- 
political situation, social awareness and the local capacity to mobilise over 
environmental issues whose resolution demands collaboration between state and 
non-state actors. It also argues that collaborative governance is a very general 
concept and varies in its forms and results dependent significantly on how it is 
initiated. The three case studies demonstrate that whilst collaborative governance 
has justifiably emerged as an instrumental tool for incorporating social vitality as 
a means of addressing environmental problems that cannot be solved through 
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 conventional methods, a collaborative form of river governance does not 
guarantee success. In particular, one key issue identified is how it can retain its 
effectiveness over time whilst at the same time continuing to provide concrete 
benefits for democratic transformation in a post-authoritarian society.  As 
societies evolve democratically, then the optimal means of collaborative 
governance have to do so as well. Research is thus required that develops a clear 
method for identifying and evaluating these changes based upon comprehensible 
and publicly acceptable criteria. 
 
Secondly, political support acts as a catalyst to encourage various forms of 
collaborative governance but exactly which form will emerge depends upon 
particular mixes of political opportunities and social conditions.  For example, if 
there is a lack of social spontaneity, political support on its own will not ensure 
success. Moreover, up until now, the reformative benefits of most cases of 
collaborative action in Taiwan have been limited to a minority of the population 
and to specific policy domains. Institutionalisation should promote collaborative 
governance over the longer term but as this research concludes, 
institutionalisation has to be flexible enough to accommodate local conditions 
and needs. Any drift towards uniform measures and regulations, often reflecting 
state control and bureaucratic convenience, have to be resisted and further 
research is required into how this can be achieved in different social and political 
contexts. 
 
Thirdly, where local political support for collaborative governance declines over 
time because of the broader consequences of political transition or decreasing 
resources, the legitimacy of grassroots engagement and the standing of NGOs in 
governing common resources depends increasingly on public consensus. This, in 
turn, leads to another concern – how to ensure that the operating framework of 
NGOs and other grassroots groups remains consensual and collaborative and, in 
the case of Taiwan, does not retreat back to confrontational strategies. This is a 
key concern where the state retains its dominant role in deciding policies and 
resource distribution, and where states empower or facilitate particular actors to 
collaborate because this can reinforce existing power imbalances within societies. 
In practice, the state may do better if it steps back and allows locals or NGOs to 
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 explore what they need and how they are going to achieve it. Then the 
administrative recognition, facilitation and financial support that the state 
provides can be utilised in more appropriate ways. This situation requires a study 
of how a system of bureaucracy can be open-minded enough to pursue 
environmental policies through a participant approach allowing the most 
disadvantaged groups in society to voice their concerns and be part of the action 
using their local knowledge. 
 
Fourthly, collaborative governance discourages traditional corporatist politics 
because of its high demands on social spontaneity, public consensus, transparent 
democratic process and concrete governance results. More detailed research is 
needed to examine how the political processes of collaborative governance 
depress the activities of traditional corporatism. This research has identified the 
phenomenon of the dialectical relationship between collaborate governance and 
local political factions which could set each other back. But whether this kind of 
political rivalry relates to the once overwhelming corporatist practice of social 
control requires further in-depth examination.  It needs to look into the 
possibility of whether, and the method of how, collaborative governance can 
transform or resist this form of rule. 
 
While the experience of this study suggests that new forms of collaborative 
governance in Taiwan are at least partially successful, it is not a practice that is 
easy to transpose to other developing countries. The key is definitely not related 
to economic success as the case of indigenous River Enclosure explained. The 
Taiwanese approach to collaborative governance has been dependent upon a 
particular degree of democratisation and social autonomy since the 1990s.  
These conditions are absent in many developing countries. This is not to 
underestimate the strength of civil societies in developing countries but to note 
the importance of reforming initiatives being initiated in local societies rather 
than being dependent upon outside support. The key need is to reinforce local 
consensus and solidarity to act, which in turn engages with the development of 
democracy. Whilst collaborative governance, in principle, can be applied 
generally to solve conflicts over natural resources, it is not an easier approach to 
effect than traditional hierarchical ruling. It can be time consuming and 
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 exhausting, and sometimes participants lose their initial enthusiasm as time goes 
by. Moreover, as this study reveals, water controversies and local differentiation 
encourage different forms of collaboration; no single solution is a good form of 
solution. Collaboration has to reflect local circumstances and develop respect for 
indigenous autonomy and knowledge. 
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 POSTSCRIPT 
 
The writing of this thesis has lasted five years. During this time, I have continued 
as a volunteer engaging in various environmental projects in the Kaoping River 
basin. This has allowed me to continue observing the progress of collaborative 
environmental governance in Taiwan and to reflect on my own thesis findings. 
 
Presidential power transfer in 2008 
 
The thesis has emphasised the importance of the attitude and role of the 
government in influencing the growth of collaborative governance. The DPP 
(Democratic Progressive Party), after coming into office in 2000, has assisted the 
emergence of collaborative governance as part of a more robust civil society. 
However, in 20 May 2008, Taiwan experienced a presidential power transfer. The 
KMT (Kuomintang), which had ruled Taiwan for a half century prior to 2000, 
regained power after eight years of DPP rule. This power transfer has affected the 
fortunes of some endogenous cases of governance reform that were launched 
because of the close cooperation between the DPP and autonomous NGOs. The 
KMT regime has a history of taking unfriendly environmental positions, 
triggering a new outburst of local environmental action against water resource 
development, highway construction and industrial development on the wetlands, 
putting back the goals of long-term sustainable development and ecological 
conservation. That said, the presidential power transfer has not totally eliminated 
the process of collaborative governance in some of the cases in this study. This is 
due to the fact that the field sites, located in southern local counties and cities, 
remained under the political control of the DPP and locally rooted social power 
has continued to exert authority.  
 
Continuous follow-up 
 
After formal data collection was completed in 2007, I have continued my 
involvement in the environmental movement in southern Taiwan. These actions 
have included attending deliberative meetings of several river restoration projects 
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 and helping to alleviate the aftermath of Typhoon Morakot. The latter included 
assisting disaster victims and mountain village rebuilding. Additionally, I have 
been participating in a government sponsored project writing an environmental 
history of Pingtung County, which is part of my field work site. During the work, 
I met several important interviewees (both social actors and decision makers) in 
the thesis research and have included some of their continuing ideas about the 
development of collaborative governance in the final version of the thesis.  
 
Typhoon Morakot and community rebuilding  
 
On August 8th, 2009, Taiwan encountered a severe disaster- Typhoon Morakot. 
The area mainly affected was the Kaoping River basin. Landslides brought by the 
typhoon resulted in 700 people being buried alive and thousands of villagers 
losing their homes. Almost every case in this study, no matter whether it is Water 
Defence, Riverfront Adoption or River Enclosure, was more or less affected by 
the influence of Typhoon Morakot. The landslides tremendously changed the 
landscape of the river. For example, the deepest sediment in the river increased by 
42 metres. The river water became so muddy that it caused the water supply for 
Kaohsiung City to stop for one week. In fact, the level of turbidity of the river 
water reached a historical high. Many indigenous villages in the mountain area 
were completely demolished so they needed to opt for relocation, if they were not 
forced to leave. This aroused a tremendous dispute over several controversial 
issues of environmental justice, including whether the government had the power 
to force mountain villagers to leave and how the indigenous could survive 
culturally, economically and socially once uprooted from their home villages. 
Another controversial issue of relocating indigenous villagers was that most of 
the decision-making was monopolised by government officials, under the KMT 
regime, rather than through a deliberative and participatory process.  
 
Among the devastated tribal villages, Dashe and Koushe, which were both case 
examples of River Enclosure, illustrated very different processes when dealing 
with the typhoon aftermath. Koushe totally halted its River Enclosure practice 
and tourists stopped coming and they were pessimistic about their ability to do 
anything to reverse the damage caused by the landslides. On the other hand, 
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 Dashe villagers successfully saved everyone in the village, which was more 
severely stricken, and reached a prompt consensus, making a clear plea for 
relocation collectively in order to start their new life and continue their culture on 
government owned farmland. In comparison, another relocation case, Houcha, 
which was also one village in the anti-dam campaign but not included in this 
research, lasted two years without making a clear decision from either the village 
itself and the government until Typhoon Morakot made other options impossible 
other than relocation. The key differences between these villages, which had 
different responses to the aftermath of a natural disaster, might be the level of 
villagers’ consolidation and the building of social capital during the processes of 
environmental and community actions.  
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